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
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C. F.

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
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AN ENQUIRY

INTO

HUMAN NATURE.

BY  
*Gibson*  
JOHN G. MACVICAR, D.D.,  
AUTHOR OF "THE CATHOLIC SPIRIT OF TRUE RELIGION," ETC. ETC.



EDINBURGH: SUTHERLAND & KNOX.

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M.DCCC.LIII.

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## TO THE READER.

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To explain the following work, it may perhaps be allowed the Author to state, that about fifteen years ago, when his duties led him to move much among the masses of several of our large towns, and to gather the opinions which were in the ascendant among them, he was very much struck with the numbers whose opinions, based upon an exaggerated estimate of the value and the perfection of scientific views, and on very pretending but very shallow schemes of the human mind, were falling fast into materialism and fatalism, with the dreadful consequences of such tenets,—renunciation of religion, and moral and political recklessness. Shortly afterwards he left Europe for a field of action in the East, but the state of things which he had witnessed at home continued to haunt him, and led to the question whether it might not be possible to vindicate the spiritual nature, the liberty, and the responsibility of man in a manner which might be scientific in form though popular in substance, and so find readers among those who—idolising science all the while—were falling so fast, and in such numbers, into the contrary opinions—opinions which, whenever they have become popular, have proved no less fatal to



the well-being of society than to that of individuals when held in private. Circumstances having proved favourable in the East for making the attempt, some chapters were written, and these form the earlier part of this volume, as also the essays on "Science and Philosophy," and on "The Science and the Philosophy of Common Sense," which, not to break the thread of the analysis, have been thrown into an appendix. But in the progress of thought the subject proved so deeply interesting in itself, and seemed to be so imperfectly explored, at least under the regime of an exact method, such as that set forth in the essay on "Method" (also in the Appendix), that the spirit of philanthropy had for a time to give way to the urgency of curiosity,—the uneasiness to know some things of importance about the soul which could not be learned by reading. Hence long delay in accomplishing what was at first proposed, as also a growing unfitness for doing it in a popular style, of which the greater part of this work, it is feared, will give abundant proof.

On his return to Europe this autumn, the Author finds, as it appears to him, no less need for works vindicating in a scientific way, the grandeur of human nature, than when he left, and for rescuing Psychology from its threatened absorption into Physiology. He therefore ventures the volume now in the reader's hands as a contribution, slender indeed, but earnest, towards this end; and though with certain fears, yet not without a hope also, of being encouraged before long to follow it up, by a more scientific, and probably also a more extended treatise, in which the Psychological views that are but incidentally and hurriedly indicated in this, are fully expanded in scientific con-

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nection. Meantime, the state of the social atmosphere, already so much darkened by new books, and carried about by every wind of doctrine, has led him to prefer something by way of pilot balloon merely, which is all that this volume pretends to be.

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To prevent misconceptions which might be apt to form themselves on a cursory inspection of what follows, it may be well to add here, that when the Author, in the following pages, speaks of human nature generally, or treats it as the object of science, he always contemplates human nature in its normal state, that is, as an Institution of God, not as a fallen thing, a product of the abuse of human liberty,—he has in his mind human nature in the state indicated in the motto on the following page, and which it is the aim and the end of regeneration to restore. The view which the motto gives is the only stand-place for abstract Science; while the doctrine of the fall is the only position from which the human race, in all the peculiarities of its actually existing state, can be reached, and these peculiarities satisfactorily explained. X

EDINBURGH, 2d Dec. 1852.

"GOD CREATED MAN IN HIS OWN IMAGE,  
IN THE IMAGE OF GOD CREATED HE HIM."  
—Gen. i. 27.

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# ENQUIRY INTO HUMAN NATURE.

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## INTRODUCTION.

### THE CLAIMS OF THE SUBJECT.

By mankind in general, human nature is held to be the noblest, or next to the noblest, of all things. It is held to be either the image of God or—the original of God! the former, by the best philosophers, with Plato at their head, and all who hold the books of Moses sacred, and, therefore, all Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, nearly one-half of the civilised world; the latter, by many philosophers (of another stamp), and all who profess the religion of Budhu; for of this creed, so scanty in its doctrines, but so large in the numbers of its professors (who are said to amount to several hundreds of millions), the gods are merely men who, through their merit, have forced their way into godhead—a godhead which, however low, is yet the highest that an orthodox Buddhism acknowledges. The study of human nature may therefore be fairly regarded as in a manner sacred, and might be legitimately pursued through curiosity only, without any other inducement.

But there are more cogent motives to this study. Human nature is not an object for curiosity merely. It is the source of all our enjoyments, the sum of all our powers. It is the great artist to which poetry, eloquence, history, philosophy, and all the arts and sciences, owe their existence. It is the grand instrument of feeling to which life owes all its interest. It is, in a word, that which makes us to be what we are. It is our very selves. The study of it, therefore, cannot but be deeply interest-

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ing. But what above all other considerations invests this study with importance is the fact, that, as it exists in the individual, it is eminently modifiable for better or for worse, and that by the individual himself. Yes ;—upon the principles a man embraces, the neighbourhood he enters, the training he puts himself under, the actions he performs,—in short, on the use a man makes of himself, it mainly depends whether he is to be free or a slave, useful or useless, happy or miserable, in time and in eternity.

Man needs only to make a pious use of the free will which has been awarded to him by God, in order to accomplish the noblest purposes. But for the attainment of these, human nature is man's only instrument. If, then, it be desirable in every case that one who is going to use an instrument which has been placed at his disposal, and which he cannot but use one way or another, should learn as soon as possible what it is good for, and how to use it with skill, surely in this case such a step is most necessary. Surely every man ought, and that as soon as possible, to become acquainted with the aptitudes and capacities of his own nature, and learn to use with advantage that all-important instrument, which is in fact himself.

True it is, no doubt, that, just as one may attain to good health and preserve it without having made a special study of hygiene, so may one attain to a generally good use of his mind simply through the natural gift of instinctive good sense, without which, indeed, no science can be of much use, or go far to make a man wise. Spontaneous self-development, in the light of God's countenance shining down upon the whole creation, on the one hand, and in the light of the world shining all around, on the other, do much for man in the mental as well as in the material sphere of his being. Much reflective knowledge is fallen into, and much philosophy is picked up incidentally in the course of life, without special application. The tide of life is often thrown into an eddy in which reflection is both spontaneous and necessary, were it only to find out ways and means of getting into the current again ; and thus a sensible man never fails to attain to some proficiency in philosophy, sooner or later, and to know himself more or less, and to see his way in some measure at last.

But surely it were far better to acquire such knowledge by stated study for a time, and in an orderly manner. Surely it were far better to call in the wisdom of others to the aid of our

own thoughts, and to enrich our reflections with the lessons of history, than merely to leave our mental information to chance; merely to find ourselves at last, and that, perhaps, when life is near its close, in the possession of such few principles only as it may have fallen to ourselves incidentally to discover in the course of life. Life is in fact too short, and the consequences of false principles and errors in conduct are too serious to let self-education in this chance way be commendable in any case where it is not absolutely unavoidable. Now, in the infancy of society alone was it unavoidable; not in our day. To us existence has been awarded far down the stream of time; millions of the great and good have gone before us; and in this our day surely the true economy of intelligence in its every walk demands, as a very first step, that we enter ourselves in the wisdom of others, and avail ourselves, as soon as possible, of such principles of truth and conduct, as have been fully ascertained and distinctly laid down, by those whose thoughts and lives the past has left to us.

Not but the acquisition of knowledge by tradition, however venerable and trustworthy the source from which we have it, must always be accompanied by our own free thoughts. While the thoughts of other men are proposed for the student's reception, there must be a play of cogitation in his own mind. Otherwise, these thoughts from without cannot be either understood or appreciated. Otherwise, they can only be held to be true, not found to be true. They can scarcely be said to be believed, much less to be understood. They can only be entertained formally or historically in the mind, not believingly or philosophically. Man, in the innermost sanctuary of his being—there where his life is hid—is essentially free, and feels himself to be so; and this conscious liberty of his he loves even as his very life, which indeed it is. And therefore whatever threatens to trammel his liberty he resists (in so far, at least, as his liberty actuates him), and would put away from him if he could. Now, belief, from its very nature, limits liberty. Except, therefore, such thoughts as well up spontaneously in the mind, and appear to liberty to be her own, the Soul places all things that are intruded upon her, face to face with herself, and though she consents at once to retain them in the memory, yet, as to her own personal convictions of them, she insists on being allowed to escape from them if she can; to all which reason cannot object, provided only the

effort to escape be made legitimately; for such is the law of liberty, and such is human nature, in so far as it is under the guidance of this principle. And hence it comes to pass, in the actual working of the human mind, that, not till after the Soul, vindicating to herself all the liberty which reason allows, has found other men's views either to force belief by their own evidence, or to mingle with her own thoughts as their kindred, that views arriving from without, really engage the active principles of human nature in their service. Not till after the Soul herself, in the exercise of her powers as an individual, has operated upon memorial or traditionary knowledge, its principles and doctrines, do these attain the rank and character of convictions, and prove really serviceable for the conduct of life.

In assigning the first place in point of value to knowledge handed down to us by others, I am very far from intending anything in disparagement of the mind's own resources, very far from proposing any restriction on the mind's most free exercise, provided only that all its powers are brought legitimately to bear upon the point under inquiry. But is it not shocking to think of the conceit of these times, which it is our lot to live in! Though perhaps it would not be difficult to show that in all the highest walks of thought, we are but macadamising the more solid and weighty judgments of those who have gone before us, yet it is a popular opinion that we are the wisest of all men—nay, that wisdom has begun with our age. It is no unusual thing for an author, who, perchance, may be very popular and great notwithstanding, to neglect, nay, to throw aside, nay, to boast that he has neglected and thrown aside, all older works which treat of the subject he discusses. Thus M. Auguste Comte, who begins to be very favourably quoted by many English authors,<sup>1</sup> (and who, if characterised according to the philosophy of the land where I write, would be recognised as T. Hobbes born into this world again, and now as a mathematician, as a punishment for his pretension in mathematics when he lived in the seventeenth century). Monsieur Comte, when presenting himself to the reader, “en qualité de fondateur d'une nouvelle philosophie

<sup>1</sup> The author of “A System of Logic” of great value, characterises Comte's “Cours” as by far the greatest yet produced in the Philosophy of the Sciences; and the author of the Biographical History of Philosophy designates it as the “Opus Magnum” of our age.

générale, à la fois historique et dogmatique . . . celui qui a directement fondé une science nouvelle la plus difficile et la plus importante de toutes, et qui, en même temps a spécialement perfectionné la philosophie de chacune des science antérieures," and when explaining the "régime sévère," under which he put himself when composing his treatise, "où il a assuré la netteté, l'énergie et la consistance des diverses conceptions," informs us in the deeply interesting and instructive "Preface Personelle," prefixed to the sixth volume of his "Cours de Philosophie Positive," that for twenty years at least he imposed upon himself "a titre d'hygiène cérébrale," the obligation to avoid all reading as to the views of others on the subjects he was investigating, and that during more than four years—and that, when the science of society was his theme—he forbade himself all reading whatsoever of political or philosophical journals, whether daily or monthly, etc., except only the weekly publication of the Academy of the Sciences, to the contents of which, moreover, he often confined himself, characterising that periodical as a work "que dégénère de plus en plus en étalage habituel de nos moindres vanités académiques!" The noblest works also received the same treatment at his hands. And when engaged in founding what he gives forth as the science both of the history and the destiny of humanity, he tells us, not merely frankly, but with a boasting air, "Je n'ai jamais lu en aucune langue ni Vico, ni Kant, ni Herder, ni Hegel, etc."! Now, this may be a very natural habit for one who has devoted his life to mathematical pursuits, from which whatever cannot be constructed in space or time, whatever does not appear by intuition or deduction (which is but intuition extended into a series), is rejected or neglected. And it may do very well for the mathematician, the relations of whose science are only four at the most, and these always to be found at home without seeking for them, since they always manifest themselves in the mind itself. But it will never do for the man who is to grapple with such subjects as theology and sociology. In reference to such sciences, does it not on the contrary bespeak a state of mind which, to say nothing against its logical condition, indicates such defect or neglect of the social framework of humanity, and is so wanting in that friendliness which forms the better part of our nature, that it would be vain to expect anything either morally sound in itself, or profitable for the human family

from such a source ? Nor need we ever be surprised to find the greatest mathematical powers, and the finest scientific taste, associated in the same individual with the grossest errors in morals and religion, and in the principles and objects of human nature generally. Accordingly this author himself speaks of "la puerile affectation de certains philosophes à vanter la prétendue sagesse de la nature, dans la structure de l'œil," and adds, "si entre certaines limites tout est nécessairement disposé de manière à pouvoir être, on chercheroit néanmoins vainement dans la plupart des arrangemens effectifs, des preuves d'une sagesse réellement supérieure, ou même seulement égale à la sagesse humaine."—(Tom. iii. p. 462.) This for the structure of nature ; and for that of society, he has systematically proclaimed "la nécessité et la possibilité de rendre enfin la morale pleinement indépendante de toute croyance religieuse."—(Tom. vi. xix.) Whether M. Comte's philosophy did not come to him later in life than his atheistical and unsocial dispositions, so as to be in reality their product and manifestation, not their ground, and therefore no argument at all against piety in others, it is for himself to consider. He complains that already, during his "adolescence," when he was only of the age of nineteen, he was deprived of his just honours in consequence of his religious opinions—(tom. vi. xviii.)—whence it appears that these opinions, such as they are, were at all events formed at a very early age. Whether his philosophy sprung from his irreligion, or his irreligion from his philosophy, is, as has been said, for himself to consider. But this surely is for all, that when a person under natural defect or long disuse of the social and religious faculties begins to treat of God and man, we are not called upon to attach much importance to his results in theology or ethics, merely because they are those of a great mathematician ; for all our faculties, whether corporeal or mental, grow weak when they are not duly exercised, and especially when they are dishonoured or disclaimed. M. Comte's point of view, therefore, is essentially bad, and the entire habit of his mind is unsuited to these researches. If the author of the "Cours de Philosophie Positive," instead of delivering up his genius into the hands of his egotism in early life, and breaking off from the friendship of society and of God, had only chosen as his companions (which would not have cost much) the Vico, the Kant, the Herder, of whom he

says proudly, "*Je n'ai jamais lu en aucune langue*," the world might perhaps have had, from a man of genius like him, a life-giving soul-sustaining philosophy, such as is needed for this age, instead of that heartless system of thought which he has actually given; and which, though he has been pleased, and others after him, to call "*Positive Philosophy*," is yet truly the most negative of all possible philosophies, proposing for life no higher object than "*hygiène cérébrale*," and for death nothing better than annihilation.

Great respect is ever due to those who have gone before us; and the more the history of philosophy is known, the more fully does it appear that all discoveries which are destined to stand the wear and tear of time, are but the essence and expression of many thoughts that have been uttered in preceding ages, and of great variety of reading in the discoverer. Nor let it be believed, though it be often said, that the great thoughts of such true philosophers as Socrates, Bacon, and Descartes, say anything against this. True, these great men did not build much on what the learning of their times had to offer them. But it was not till after they had given a most serious attention to that learning, such as it was—not till after they had entertained it by a most friendly criticism, and found it to be wanting, that they gave it up and called for a new beginning. Very far were they from trusting in themselves, so as to despise others. Socrates grasped at a good author,<sup>1</sup> and so great was Descartes' love of reading, that he gives it as his belief, that had he not been accidentally parted from his books by his military engagements, he would not have thought of forming a method for himself. That Bacon was a great student, is well known. Add to this, that these men were anything but monks in their manner of life. They kept themselves always in the busy world. And if after they set a thinking for themselves (or rather for the world), Socrates and Descartes, at least, gave over reading, they indemnified themselves for this by mingling much with living men, and holding themselves always ready to look at everybody that had a face, and listen to everybody that had a tongue. Society in every form was full of interest to them. Not the retreat of the recluse, but the social circle, the forum, the camp, nay, the field of battle

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.



claims both among its heroes. Now all this is as it should be for the interests of wisdom, and a thorough knowledge of human nature. But let me not press this argument further, lest in vindicating others I condemn myself, since here I venture on these pages, in

“The utmost Indian Isle Tabrobane,”

thousands of miles away from all converse with adequate libraries and learned men ; whence, however, that deep conviction of the value of books which has given rise to this digression.

But to return. Surely an orderly acquaintance with the elements and laws of our nature, supposing it possible to be attained, cannot but constitute knowledge of a most valuable kind. Impart such knowledge, and a more regular, constant, and cheerful fulfilment of those laws wherein our well-being must necessarily consist, may surely be expected. Many casual influences, which, when entertained in ignorance of their bearing on our well-being, prove to be most injurious, might be at once repelled.

The various institutions of society and forms of government, might be framed at once in harmony with man's social nature as manifesting itself there and then, when such institutions and governments are needed, and not, as hitherto, merely by experiment too much in the dark and under the dominion of passion.

Education might be conducted so that the various prepossessions which it never fails to generate, as well as those habits which it has for its object to form, might be in keeping with the aptitudes and capacities of human nature for beauty, truth, piety, and goodness, and rather developments and extensions of intelligence, than limitations and contradictions of it, as is too often the case at present.

And as to the enjoyment of the passing hour, if only a true harmony and proportionate development were established among all the faculties of our nature, happiness would become spontaneous, and attach to the very flow of thought itself, all independently of its products ; for a flow of right thinking and feeling is always, and that purely in its own right, very pleasant. Spontaneous thought is essentially soul-delighting. Thus by a general knowledge of the true principles of human nature diffused through society, and acted upon, a high state of well-being, both individual and social, might be at once secured and perpetuated.

With regard to human nature, indeed, in so far as it consists

in a bodily economy, the value of an acquaintance with its contents and laws is fully acknowledged. Those who have made a special study of the conditions of health, have an honourable name and rank assigned to them in society, and are anxiously consulted (a fee accompanying) by those who have not. Now, similarly, with respect to our mental economy, there can be no doubt that a knowledge of it would be as much appreciated as medical skill, were we only as solicitous about truth and conduct as we are about health; and were there parties accessible to us, who, in virtue of a superior knowledge of human nature, were as competent to give advice. This is in fact proved by the position which a priesthood holds in every state of society, except only its two extremes,—that of barbarism on the one hand, and that of enlightenment on the other: the former, because society in that case cannot appreciate intellectual superiority or the priestly character; the latter, because on the part of the priest such superiority does not exist, the limit of intellectual progress being to elevate the whole nation into a royal priesthood.

No sentiment is so popular at home, as that "knowledge is power;" and it is often instanced as evidence of Bacon's genius, that he could have put so great a truth in so terse a form. But the sentiment is familiar in the East, and here infinitely more importance is attached to it. All that Bacon had in his mind, when he said so, was that knowledge gave power over external nature, so as to improve the arts of life. But the philosophers of India carry their views of the power of knowledge much farther, nay, transcendently far. From immemorial ages they have maintained that when the soul has accomplished the analysis of all its relations, and can discriminate clearly itself and body, as well as all other things, then nature, which is at once the great tormentor and the great instructor of the soul, ceases both to give sorrow and information, and liberation and blessedness are obtained. "Nothing in my opinion," says the author of the "*Sankiya Karika*," "is more retiring than nature. Once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of the soul." Knowledge, according to the Indian philosophers, is adequate, and alone adequate, to procure and to secure for ever complete repose to the soul. But this notion of theirs is purely ideal. Their theory can never be verified by man. The limit of knowledge they propose is

wholly beyond our reach. Contenting ourselves with a lower flight, may we not, however, affirm with certainty, that an education for this life cannot be considered as in any measure completed by him who is entering upon the world, until he has made a study of his own nature,—that nature which he is destined to carry about with him all his days, and out of the depths of which all his enjoyments and all his sufferings are to flow in time and in eternity?

It is also obvious, that a knowledge of human nature is as needful to sound and fruitful speculation as it possibly can be to the formation of character; and indeed such knowledge forms the only trustworthy antidote to the extremes of credulity on the one hand, and of scepticism on the other. Plainly, this study ought, therefore, to precede the fixing of all our ultimate opinions on philosophy, as well as our entrance on the active business of life; and a scientific education cannot be considered in any measure complete while the student remains ignorant of psychology. But these things have been already beautifully shown by more than one popular author in our language; and as the Introduction to Locke's "Essay," and that to Stewart's "Elements," where this has been done, are easily accessible to every one, and better worth reading than anything which it is possible to say here, we may pass on.

Yet not without a word or two as to the difficulty and the reputed hopelessness of the science of mind; of which charges the former is to be admitted, but the latter denied. There is no chance that psychology will be able, at least for a long time, to compete with the other branches of natural science in popular favour, or even to enjoy that share of consideration to which its importance entitles it. The special mission of man, as an embodied species, being to the outward world around, thought and feeling, when directed outwardly and through the senses, flow far more freely than when they are confined within the breast, and called upon to give an account of themselves to themselves. Such, also, is the appointed relation of the external world to the soul, whose main business in this life is to find her right place in the world, and work her right way through it, that external objects are far more impressive than any others. They even, as it were, picture themselves in the mind; while the phenomena of pure thought are incapable of anything of this kind, and possess

a form, or rather a formlessness, which makes their study but poor entertainment except to a few.

Mental phenomena, also, as they develop themselves spontaneously, are generally very complicated, very much interwoven, nay often truly confluent, so that to bound them off from each other, to define and arrange them scientifically, is hardly possible. Most inconveniently for analysis also, they insist upon a simultaneous apparition in the mind, and thus tend continually to distract the attention,—so that it is not till after long practice that the attention can bestow itself in continuance upon any one; in this respect, therefore, as in so many others, forming quite a contrast with external nature, very unfavourable to our scientific acquaintance with them, and reminding one of these words, in which there is, I think, a more weighty import than is usually attached to them—*νους κυκλος αισθησις γραμμη*.

The phenomena of mind are also eminently fugitive. They are problems for investigation, in which the velocity is infinite. Scarcely can any one be laid hold of for the purposes of discovery but forthwith it is gone, or in the memory only, and something else is in the mind.

Nor is this all that renders the science of mind difficult. From the fact that man's first exigencies relate to the external world, and from the highly combined state of his mental faculties as they come naturally into play in the course of life, it happens in language, which is thus a product of synthesis, that each word is a representative of many things. Language is, therefore, very inadequate for expressing the results of analysis and the simple objects of the spiritual world. Over and above the intrinsic difficulties of his theme, therefore, the student of mind has to contend with an inadequate instrument of expression. Nor can this evil be remedied. Even an Augustus found that he could not give a new word to the language of Rome; and all attempts on the part of individuals however philosophically disposed, to interfere with the vernacular, are sure to fail. The best chosen technical terms scarcely ever gain more than a merely pedantic currency. Now, though from all this, no doubt, great good arises, since, in consequence of this, language is always kept to the business of life, and being the property of the whole people, and of all property the most valuable by far, serves to bind the nation into one confederacy of intellect,—yet great evil comes

to the dejected metaphysician. These are difficulties in the study of psychology which cannot be got over, and, therefore, to be patient under them, we ought to call to mind its paramount importance.

Meantime, as we have said, let not a scientific knowledge of mind be considered in any degree hopeless. The truth is, that if, free from prejudice and prepossession, and without any particular subject-matter or contents in view, we propose the problem as one of general science, viz.,—*What are the conditions on which anything can be thoroughly known and understood?*—we shall not fail to discover that it is not matter, at all events, which fulfils these conditions—it is not matter that holds out any possibility at all of being perfectly or fully known.

Thus matter, considered as the object of knowledge, cannot but be for ever external to that which takes cognisance of it. Not only, therefore, is there no warrant for hoping that matter ever can be thoroughly known, but there is the strongest possible presumption to the contrary. All its outward features and changes, its attributes and phenomena, may perhaps be known,—at least they are cognisable by an adequate intelligence; but as to all besides, as to its interior—in a word, as to the thing itself—we must, while in our present point of view—remain for ever in profound ignorance. Thus, as to the ink and the paper under the eye, we can know many things about them; but as to the things themselves, so far are we from knowing them, that no one can tell whether, notwithstanding their manifold differences in appearance and mechanical properties, they may not, after all, and in the last analysis, be the same. Nor would this question be solved to Philosophy, though the chemist were able to give us here a definite answer in the language of his science. Even though chemistry had reached such perfection that all things yielded to analysis, and gave as the ultimate ground of the material system only one and the same kind of matter, still should we not remain in profound ignorance of matter after all? That ultimate hydrogen or hylogen—what could we know about it but its outside, and that at a great distance from the thing itself? We could only know it in its phenomena—its products and effects, not in its immediate operation or essence. It may, perhaps, be said, that such deeper knowledge would be of no use to us though we possessed it,—and that may

be true. But that is not the question. The question is one of pure science, and not of utility, and the conclusion is unavoidable. *In consequence of our point of view, which is such as always to keep matter, when considered as the object of knowledge, external to us—a full knowledge, a perfect science of matter, is impossible to man.*

But what are the conditions on which the perfect knowledge of anything may be accomplished, or on which such knowledge may at least be possible? Is ignorance of interiors altogether inevitable?—No. Plainly the interior of matter remains unknown, not because it is incognisable in itself, but because of the observer's standing-place. What is wanted, and, so far as appears, all that is wanted, in order to a thing's being thoroughly known, is, that the percipient principle should be able to get into the inside of it,—in other words, that the thing inquired into should itself become a self-knowing thing. But what is such a thing as this?—Is it not just that which is sui-conscius—a mind—a spirit—a soul—a human being? A complete or perfect science of mind or spirit, therefore, is by no means so desperate as it has been shown that a complete or perfect science of matter is. In order to this, no more is needed but that the entire contents of our mental being lie within the sphere of consciousness. And though this is certainly not the case with us—at least during the mundane period of our existence—yet it is equally certain that to whatever extent the human mind is good for knowing anything, it is good for knowing itself. Science, therefore, when she bends her attention upon mind, has two strings to her bow; while, when she engages with matter, she has only one. Thus, on the one hand, mind, as existing in others, manifests itself outwardly, constituting individual biography and general history. Its phenomena may, therefore, be studied by observation under all the advantages with which matter and the material system may be studied. Meanwhile, on the other hand, the mind that is in self is also ever manifesting itself inwardly, and its phenomena are directly cognisable by consciousness. Thus, while matter can be known only on the outside, mind may be known both on the outside and on the in. And though it is certain that to a finite being like man no one thing can be perfectly known (for such is the concinnity of the universe that a perfect knowledge of any one thing implies a knowledge of

all things), yet the legitimate doctrine as to the relative prospects of the science of matter and the science of mind, when looking both to the means of discovery and the point of view, is, that the science of mind is destined ultimately to attain to a much higher perfection than the science of matter, and to give the typical ideas and laws to which all those of physics shall be referred.

And, in point of fact, even already much has been done in the science of mind. This science is by no means in that very backward state in which materialists are fain to represent it. A greater number of the laws of mind are known than those of matter. They do not make the same show, indeed; but that is only because they are so familiarly known that we do not credit science with them. The constitution of mind is also better known than that of matter; and if authors on the science of mind were to lay down, previously to their divergence into different views, all those doctrines which they hold in common, it would be seen that consciousness is a far more powerful organon of discovery than either the calculus of the astronomer or the crucible of the chemist. If it be asked, Why authors on the philosophy of mind do not lay down those doctrines which they all hold in common, and thus present to philosophy a positive science of mind at once, the answer is most satisfactory, for it is this,—the certainty of these principles is so absolute, and they are so familiarly in use, that, like light, air, water, and every common good, they do not possess any speculative interest or exchangeable value.

It is also well worthy of remark, that not so soon as variations begin in the views and statements of different authors, does uncertainty or error begin. Nay, often has it been found that authors, even when they oppose and contradict each other, have the same thought in their heads, and differ only in their point of view and the language which it suggests.

Let it be fully granted, that the study of the mind, as it manifests itself in our breasts, is extremely difficult; that, in addition to what has been already said on this head; the mixed nature of man, not merely composed of body as well as soul, but of these elements fused as it were together; the vast variety of endowments, corporeal as well as mental, which the goodness of his Maker has awarded to him; and the high destiny that is before him, if he accomplish the mission for which he is sent into this world, namely,

even to bear the image of the ever-blessed One who called him into being, and consequently to be for ever blessed himself,—let it be fully granted that all these things concur in rendering the study of human nature very difficult, yet, great as no doubt the difficulties in psychology are, they are not after all so great as they are popularly represented to be. And let not the reader suppose that, in consequence of such disparagements, the science of mind must be for ever less engaging than the science of matter. The latter, even assuming that it could be based with scientific accuracy otherwise than upon the science of mind (which it cannot), owes its very existence to the fact, that “man has very bad eyes, and a great deal of curiosity;” and when man either gets good eyes or ceases to be curious, physical science will cease also, and become one with the contemplation of nature in the light of spontaneous intuition.

But the science of mind having the inexhaustible and ever-new domain of free thought and feeling for its object, has a root in the nature of things which must keep it alive for ever. Physics may vanish into psychology, and become a branch of what is now called metaphysics, but the science of mind can never cease. Every individual mind that has life in itself must ever be the subject of new phenomena. Modern science is certainly on the way to the discovery, that throughout the whole universe, so far as it is cognisable by us, the same laws are at work and regulate all things. Now these laws, when reduced to their most general forms, and viewed as in emanation or operation at the fountain head, cannot but be dictates of mind. If not, then they are not laws at all, but only manifestations of something inconceivable, which, without knowing what we mean, we call by the name of Fate. As surely, therefore, as generalisation is the grand operation of all science, and the discovery of laws, still more and more general, the grand aim in every branch of philosophy, all science, in proportion as it makes true progress in the direction it aims at, must ever tend towards the philosophy of mind, and must culminate in it.

Let us not, then, be discouraged from viewing man as a spiritual as well as a corporeal being, either from the undoubted difficulties, or the reputed hopelessness, of mental science. Let the worst that can be said of it in these respects be held as true. Let it be that, while physical science has been advancing gloriously,



and gaining new victories over the hostile elements of nature, and fresh laurels for those who have devoted themselves to the conflict with ignorance in this field, age after age,—nay, year after year of late,—little or nothing that is of any interest or importance has been discovered in the science of mind since the days of the ancient Greeks. Let it be true that men, of otherwise admirable genius, have been landed by their metaphysical speculations, and that even in modern times, in the most ridiculous conclusions; as, for instance, in the denial of a material world (Berkeley, Fichte); the denial of a spiritual world (Laurence, Comte); the denial of everything but impressions and ideas (Hume); nay, of everything but a process (Hegel). Let it be admitted that many men of genius, when in the pursuit of discovery in this field, have gone wide from the dictates of common sense, which must be for ever the last word for man. Let it be that human nature, though it be so near and so familiar as to be the very home of every man, is yet not so well known as the solar system in the sky. Let all these things be, since they are all affirmed with more or less truth; still we ought not, for all that, to despair, or regard the theory of the human mind as hopeless. The constant use of such expressions as these: “Our mental frame”—“The economy of human nature”—“Our intellectual system,” and the like, plainly indicate that there is in wait to be discovered a “*mechanique celeste*” of thought and feeling, as well as of the starry heavens. And if so, ought not the boasted state of astronomy, and of physical science generally, to serve rather as an encouragement to the study of mind than as a dissuasive against it? Only since the time of Galileo, nay, only since the time of Newton, has natural science fully emerged from a state of uncertain description and heterogeneous hypothesis; and what though it may perhaps be somewhat true that the science of mind still remains in this state? Compared with the whole period of philosophy, the epoch of Newton is but as yesterday, nay, it is still to-day. Why then despair of the science of mind? The future will bring to it a Newton too. Instead of being turned away from the pursuit of mental science by considering the more advanced state of physics, the student of mind ought rather to seek his revenge by adopting and pursuing to the utmost possible, for the advancement of psychology, the methods which have proved so successful in natural philosophy. But that

has been often insisted upon already, and need not be urged here.

Here, however, let us make two remarks on method, most needful to success in the speculative sciences.

I. When setting about the study of any object with a single eye to obtain a pure and scientific knowledge of it, we ought to emancipate ourselves as far as possible for the time, from all the chance impressions and notions which we may have acquired incidentally about it.

Knowledge which has been got merely by chance, is never either pure or logically constructed. Its object is almost always loaded by sensational coincidences of acquisition, and usually trammelled by the personal relations, nay, distorted by the personal interests, of the observer. The insight which accident gives is indeed invaluable ; but when our aim is to acquire a logical knowledge of any familiar object, or to construct or attain to the science of it, the first grand principle of method is to bring ourselves as far as possible into the position of an observer, who (while he has insight into the object), is now looking upon it for the first time, all free from prejudice and preposition, and is viewing it not in its individual features, but as far as possible panoramically, or in the totality of its attributes or phenomena.

II. This done, our next grand aim ought to be to attach ourselves to its attributes or phenomena, not anyhow, nor in any order, nor as they may happen to strike us, but in the order of their importance in constituting the object, or in making the object to be what it is. More technically, analysis, as soon as it is entered upon, should be always conducted so as to violate synthesis as little as possible. It should be made to proceed by successive descents, and modest abstractions, from that primary synthetic condition in which the object is given to the mind, on the mind's first seizing hold of it ; for in this primary act of seizing and holding, happily for the reality of knowledge, the object is given in its totality—given as the being or thing that it is, in the true place and time in nature that it has. Yes ; such is the mind's first grasp of everything as it gets it from nature, and such it continues to be until the letting loose of curiosity upon it. The object is given in the fulness of its being and attributes. Only, in all these it is given simultaneously, and therefore confusedly and indistinctly ; and hence it is that an object, as seen at first sight, is incapable of

B

imparting satisfaction and intellectual repose in the contemplation of it. Before this state of mental well-being can be attained, the object must be viewed in detail, or analysed; and after that it must be taken again in its totality, or in synthesis. Nor is there necessarily any harm in this, though at the same time there is less advantage than is commonly supposed. All that this mental discourse upon the object effects—and it is all that intellect can effect in any case—is merely to light up the object, merely to render it clear and distinct. It gives no more than is given at first. No mental process can create evidence. It can only let it in. The most minute analysis, together with the closing act of synthesis, when accomplished in the most perfect and faultless manner that is practicable, only reconstructs and restores the object, and presents it again as it at first presented itself. And hence the grand secret of method is, when the moment comes that curiosity must be let loose upon an object, to guard and regulate analysis, so that the first observation which is allowed to record itself in the mind, shall embrace as much as possible of the entire of the object; the second only less than the first, but more than the third; and so on, until the last fact that is discoverable shall be reached.

Such is the method of observation most suitable to the shortness of human life and the fallibility of man. It is sometimes seen realising itself spontaneously, and it is then known by the name of sagacity. But it may also be acquired in no inconsiderable degree by culture; and such is its value, that scarcely any amount of discipline and painstaking is too great for this end. It has, I think, especially this in its favour, that, by requiring the student, both at the commencement and the close of his study, to grasp and hold his object in the totality of its features, and to moderate analysis and investigation as he proceeds, by a frequent retreat into synthesis and contemplation, it keeps the soul true to nature, and her powers of poetry and of belief alive. It forbids an excessive indulgence in analysis, which is always dangerous; for analysis is a suspension of belief, rather than an act of believing: and as every faculty, whose function is too much suspended, becomes in time too weak to balance those which have in the meantime been enjoying full play, so does the soul's power of believing in this case tend to fail, and the habit of exclusive analysis to issue in a sceptical turn of mind.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE CHARACTERISTIC OF HUMAN NATURE.

THE object proposed for study in this volume, is human nature. According to the method, therefore, which is suitable for such an inquiry, our first aim ought be to discover, if possible, that which in one conception will give the greatest amount of the contents of man's being, and the conditions of his existence ; and which, though it be a product of analysis, as it unavoidably must be, and therefore necessarily defective in some measure, may yet fall short of the whole truth, as it were, but by one step.

Very different is the object of the psychologist from that of the systematic naturalist. To the latter a difference is everything. All that he wants, by way of characteristic, is some fact or feature in the object under investigation which may be peculiar to that object. And hence he is content to give, as the characteristic of man, the fact that he is a two-handed mammal ; for this marks him off from monkeys, which are four-handed, and from all other mammals, which are four-footed. The psychologist, on the other hand, looking to the object of his science from his point of view, wants to know in a single conception what it is that goes farthest in that object towards the making a man of him. It matters not to the psychologist whether the attribute he is seeking may not go also towards the making of all other terrestrial species besides. Nay, the further it goes in creation, the more it manifests itself in all other species, the more acceptable it is to him ; for the more likely is it to be the true ground of human nature ; because it appears not obscurely, that the entire animal creation is, as it were, but a pre-exercitation of nature for the final introduction upon the stage of man, as the species who should resume and

represent the whole animal kingdom ; and while he should bear the image of the earthy on the bodily aspect of his being, should bear also the image of the heavenly on its spiritual aspect.

But without indulging longer in generalities, what, let us at once ask, is the fact or feature in human nature which holds such a position as it has just been shown, that it is the part of the psychologist to seek for? What is the fact which, in a single conception, gives most of human nature, and most truly constitutes its ground? I am persuaded that whether we proceed by the method of tedious and formal induction, or by that simultaneous induction which constitutes sagacity, any one may discover for himself, or, being told, may satisfy himself, that to find this feature we need only to fall back on the first word which the recorded philosophy of Europe uttered; we need only to adopt the opinion of Thales, when he pronounced the soul to be something that has the power of movement from within itself, *κίνητικόν τι, αὐτο κίνητον*, an idea which has, moreover, always held a conspicuous place in the current of philosophical thought, and which, to preclude variety of interpretation, we may here adopt under the clear and distinct conception of **SELF-DIRECTIVE POWER.**

That this is really the leading fact in human nature, the conception which embraces a larger part of the entire of humanity than any other that could be named, appears in every point of view which can be taken. What is it, in fact, which in ordinary discourse is named "character," but the peculiar mode of self-direction which belongs to the individual considered? And what is it which invests with its peculiar interest and air of truth a well-composed narrative of the life and times of a great man, but the display of his self-directive power, inweaving itself with the times in which he finds himself placed, so as to enable him to lay hold of every advantage, and to meet and master the circumstances which oppose the objects he aims at? In a word, what is the leading feature of that form of human nature to which the name of manliness is awarded, and which we must, therefore, admit to be the generally understood characteristic of man—what is it but a power from within of resisting the pressure of external agencies, and of choosing and making good one's own way? A life of mere yielding proves to be utterly insipid, and enlists none of our sympathies on its side. These sym-

pathies are, on the contrary, so much inclined to the other side, that without demanding a masterly use of liberty exercised in the light of intelligence, let there be in a man nothing better than headlong emotion, let there be but a determination that hurries on the man, however blind, provided only that the course he pursues be consciously and intentionally his own, and then, however bad in itself that case may be, and however fatal in its consequences, still we are interested, we are moved, we feel that in having to do with such an one, we are having to do with a man who possesses a character. Character thus shows itself to be one with self-directive energy.

The same fact is also well learned by the observation of childhood, for, immediately after the instinctive operations necessary to organic life and development, what are the most remarkable phenomena of the merest infancy? Are they not those of self-will? Does not the whole life of the little being usually consist in trying to get what it wants, and to do what it likes? And what, in the absence of pain, occasions all the child's screaming, but his vexation at finding his will crossed, under a conscious impotency on his own part to obtain the object he is set upon. Or, if the fond mother maintains that love, betokened in smiles, is the earliest emotion of infant life, be it so: that love belongs to the little creature's will, and is a manifestation of its supremacy as truly as anger could be. If this be disputed, then let the mother only cross it; she will soon find that she has broken the covenant on which alone an infant gives forth smiles before the dawn of reason; anger will not fail to outpour itself. Infancy shows a self-directive tendency sooner than it shows anything else. This is the characteristic of the child as well as of the man.

The entire structure of language also bears witness to the same fact, and assigns self-directive power, as the leading feature in human nature. Nor is its evidence without great value, because language is the spontaneous development and expression of human nature, and, therefore, cannot but show truthfully what human nature is. Now, such is language, that if the prerogative of self-directive power be denied to man, the most important terms of speech are immediately falsified. Thus in all languages we find such terms as—will, ought, responsibility, duty, obligation, approbation, merit, demerit, reward, punishment, and the like; and such terms are for ever on the lips of all men, and are thus

shown to be called for by human nature for daily, nay, for hourly use. But deny to man self-directive power, and forthwith they become an inanity, nay, a cruel deception, and a piece of mere arrogance in those that use them. Language is also constituted in no small measure of active verbs, all of them expressive of self-originated power in him who uses them.

But yet the testimony of external observation, whether drawn from that of life or of language, is not stronger or more emphatic in favour of self-directive power, as the grand characteristic of humanity, than is that of consciousness. Thus, whenever we look within, and whether we regard ourselves as individuals, or as members of society, or as the creatures of God, and put to ourselves the question, "Have I or have I not a self-directive power?" there is not a human being in the right use of his mind who does not immediately answer in the affirmative, who does not feel obliged to confess to such a power, and to hold himself to be responsible in consequence. Even he who knows that his eternity is at stake, feels that he dare not deny that he possesses self-directive power, and that he cannot deny it without adding another falsehood to his other crimes. Consciousness does not affirm with more certainty, "I am," than it affirms "I may, I can, I will, or I will not, just as I please." Nor is this grand fact left to rest upon the witnessing of consciousness merely, distinct and unequivocal though that may be. The great fact is inwoven with every part of our mental frame: it is engraven in the deepest chambers of the soul. Complacency the most blissful, and remorse the most dreadful, visitants of the breast, are appointed to watch its movements and to regulate its outgoings. And if, after all this, man be but a mere machine, a thing of mere necessity and fate, then what a solemn mockery is human nature! what a deep-laid machinery of deception are these breasts of ours! And that, too, in those very chambers of the soul into which the light of heaven appears to shine most sweetly and most clearly; for what so dear and so clear to man, as his own liberty. If, then, the light that is in us here be darkness, how great is that darkness! Suppose it, and then if in such a case there could be a God—if in such a case man could have a maker, he would be distinctly fixed by his intelligence in charging that maker with deceiving him, and that in reference to a matter where he had a right to know the truth, if man have any

rights at all. But yet such blasphemy need not be dreaded. The argument which denies self-directive power to man, is of such a form that it denies self-directive power universally; and in the last analysis, and when its full weight is given to it, denies the possibility of a creation, and even of the being of a God. It therefore renders blasphemy impossible, for it annihilates its object. Thus, when we listen to conscience, and make the experiment in its presence of denying self-directive power to man, we are plunged into utter confusion.

But in the intellectual, as well as in the moral sphere of our being, we may appeal to consciousness as to this point. We may cause the various elements of our nature to pass in review before the soul, and ask consciousness, when they have all come under her eye, which of them all she finds to be most essential and constitutive of herself. We may cause to pass in review the mere perceptivity and the mere sensibility of our nature. Now let this be done, it is forthwith found that the home of consciousness, the characteristic of man, is not in either of them. It is with the self-directive activity that the "me" especially identifies itself. Thus, with regard to belief, and still more with regard to perception (that is, the belief of an object which the mind also defined to itself clearly and distinctly), I do indeed, when referring to them, make use of personal verbs, because belief, and especially perception, is an act in which my activity must concur with the impression from without, before that impression can be received into the sphere of consciousness. But I may be almost destitute of the power of believing, or I may be in a position in which I cannot exercise it, and still I am sure that I am not the less myself for this want. Self, the essence of my nature, therefore, does not lie much in mere believing, not much even in perceiving; nay, it does not lie much even in imagining, though in this one feels that there is more of himself than there is in merely perceiving or believing. I may, through indisposition or defect of ideas, be almost an entire stranger to all spontaneous trains of thought, I may be truly stupid and habitually vacant, and still it is certain that in the midst of all that stupidity and vacancy, the principle which constitutes self may remain entire; nay, when acting in the midst of such intellectual darkness, self may be a very formidable being. Or, on the other hand, my mind may be so suggestive and so well stored with



ideas, that trains of thought may be for ever flowing in my mind almost without engaging "me;" nay, for which I scarcely hold myself responsible, or even hold myself to be the author. Self, therefore, does not lie much in mere imagining, not much in mere remembering, not much in evolving spontaneous or undirected trains of thought; nor is self much mutilated, though almost all fluency of spontaneous thought should vanish. Neither does *self* lie much in mere feeling; on the contrary, it is one of the most specific and arduous duties of *self* to keep mere feeling under. In the act of feeling, indeed, yet more than in that of perceiving, the mind is almost wholly engaged in submitting. And the serenity of a sustained intellectuality, undisturbed by a single emotion, is perfectly compatible with the existence of *self*, and constitutes, in fact, in an especial manner, the well-being of *self*. But can *self* be said to exist any longer, when all self-directive power has vanished,—all power of fixing the attention for instance, all power of deliberating, all power of deciding, and when nothing remains but a mere recipiency, or reflection of thought or feeling, as in a mirror? No; when there is not more than this, there is not a person, there is only a thing, a very wonderful thing no doubt, which, when placed in the proper circumstances, sees, imagines, and feels but still a very helpless and insufficient thing. Add self-directive power, however, give this wonderful thing the faculty of attending to what is passing within it and around it, of arresting good thoughts and feelings, and of pursuing them: in a word, invest it with conscious power, and then there is a being such that give it but speech, and it will immediately say "I;" and give it but a body, and there is all, in so far as itself is concerned, that is necessary for the construction of human nature. Looking to our merely intellectual nature in its relation with our personality, not without truth may we adopt the following rhapsody—"Oh ye metaphysicians! ye blind leaders of the blind! How long will ye be of seeing and understanding, that there is no communication at all between man in his true being and the universe that surrounds him; or, that if there be, it is the communication of non-communication? Know ye not, that ye are what ye are only on account of the antagonism  
 † between you and it, that ye perceive things only by resisting their impressions; by denying them, not in word only, but in vital deed; that your refusal to be acted upon by them, constitutes

your very personality and your very perception of them.”<sup>1</sup> Divest these words of the intentional paradox which they contain, and there is a great truth in them.

But not the observation of individuals or of infancy, not an appeal to consciousness only, but the entire structure of society, bears witness to self-directive power as the characteristic of human nature, and proceeds upon the principle that it is. All social institutions are only so many appliances to beings in whom self-directive power is recognised and respected as their pre-eminent feature. These institutions mainly consist in presenting a variety of objects, known to be congenial to human nature in some one or other of its many likings, which being responded to by the self-directive power of individuals, may prove to be motives or persuasives for men to act in the way which the institution is designed to accomplish. For this end laws are laid down, commended by rewards and punishments. Benches are erected to apply these laws to particular cases as they occur, and thrones to put them in force. Pulpits are set up, that the law of God may be propounded as the *beau ideal* of all law, that which both individuals and nations should endeavour to realise, equally in every social institution, and in every step of private life. Chairs of philosophy are permitted for the investigation of truth, and the criticism of all opinions. Newspapers are circulated, setting forth the plans of the great men of the day, and announcing the exploits, aberrations, and misfortunes of private individuals; those pages of them that first meet the eye usually filled with advertisements,—that is, little paragraphs apart, each by fancy typography, a picture, or doggerel of some kind, rendered if possible more attractive than another, and all of them, when looked into, proving to be of the nature of so many inducements to readers, recognised as self-directive beings, to move or send to some particular place, where some article, which may be expected to meet the likings of a certain number of people, may be had for an equivalent more suitable to the likings of the advertiser than the article he has on hand. The whole of a city in like manner, its sign-boards, shop windows, placards, etc. etc., all bespeak the same great fact—man’s self-directive nature, and the consequent possibility of influencing him from a distance.

<sup>1</sup> Blackwood’s Magazine, 1838.

But of all that the city or the country contains, nothing shows better how much of man, self-directive power constitutes than imprisonment, to which recourse is so constantly had in all ages as a punishment. For what is imprisonment? It is merely the preventing of a man from availing himself of his self-directive power—merely the shutting of him up—merely the confining of him. And it is well known that the more the prisoner is entitled to the name of man, the more does he feel his prison to be a sore punishment. The more also that the science of legislation advances, the more is imprisonment found to be a proper punishment. And why? Because self-directive power, while it may be forbidden its exercise, in so far as it demands locomotion, which is one of its most enjoyable manifestations, and while it may thus furnish a good ground for punishment, yet lies too deeply at the root of human nature to be put down altogether: whence the prisoner, while he is made to suffer much privation and uneasiness by confinement, as is intended, is yet preserved in a state of ability to employ his self-directive power otherwise; and thus may be expected to bestow himself either in profitable labour or in self-improvement, or in both; for either of which, indeed, if a due amount of muscular action be allowed within the walls, he may be even expected to possess a greater aptitude than if he were at large.

Need we go on with illustrations? May we not hold it as established as a general fact, that self-directive power is the grand characteristic and the ground of human nature?

But how does self-directive power realise itself in life? This is one of the most deeply interesting questions in philosophy; or rather, it is the sum and substance of all the principal questions which philosophy propounds. On these generally, however, it would be quite premature for us to enter here, when we are bent merely on establishing a fact, as nature presents it to an ordinary observer. One thing only respecting self-directive power it is necessary to lay down here, because it is an absolute condition of its existence, without which it cannot be even thought of, and that is, that in every case where a man acts as a self-directive being, some thought must precede the forthcoming action. Conceive a man to be acting without any thought, and consequently without any intention or knowledge of what he is going to do, no one would call him, while acting in such utter vacancy, a self-

directive being. Nay, not only must he have a thought, but that thought must be related to his action and expressive of it. Thus, however rapidly a stream of dreaming and unrelated thought may be flowing in the mind or from the lips of the sleeper, or the madman, so long as his actions are quite unrelated, and there is no evidence that a train of thought is directing them, we do not admit him at that time to the dignity of a self-directive being. In a word, in order to the existence of self-directive power, it is an indispensable condition, that an action shall express itself in thought before it does so in outward reality.

And hence the rise of one of the most troublesome and ill-fated questions which philosophy has ever undertaken to handle. Hence the question of the liberty or the necessity of human actions. The action being but the following up of the thought, and the thought seeming to be developed purely by intellectual considerations, or by feeling depending on somatic relations, it has been maintained by many most respectable philosophers, that there is no difference, as to liberty, between human actions and those which take place in the merely material system; it has been maintained, that both are equally necessary, and that our liberty is a mere seeming—a mere fallacy of ignorance. But this doctrine, which is in point of fact, and when logically followed out, destructive of all morality and moral energy, and leaves no religion possible but that of Spinoza, stands—happily for the prospects of humanity—in direct contradiction to consciousness. We hope that it may hereafter appear also that it is scientifically bad, that it mistakes the place which the self-directive power holds in human nature. The truth is, that the self-directive power anticipates every affection, and the exercise of every faculty, and mingles in its operation. It precedes every opinion, and has a hand in the formation of all opinions. It holds thought in leashes, letting one slip to run after its game, and holding back another, as it pleases. Nay, when they have all done their work under its eye, and more or less with its connivance or concurrence, it still exists, advised by them, it may be, but never feeling compelled by them, and still free to do, or it may be not to do, what possibly conscience declares to be distinctly incumbent, with reason as her witness. Our emotive powers have been given for the guidance of the self-directive power, in order to place it in harmony with nature, which is a uniform system, and thus to ren-

der prudence and right conduct possible to man. But all the while that the mind is sailing on in some train of thought or feeling, determined in the main by the mind's own spontaneity awoke under its existing relations, and so far due, no doubt, to laws of development over which the individual has no control, the self-directive power is at the helm, determining the course that is practically taken.

But let us not enter here into this argument in detail. The satisfactory discussion of it demands principles which we have not as yet touched upon. Let us rather close our argument in favour of self-directive power, as the characteristic of human nature, by a general survey of the whole animal kingdom viewed in this respect; for that kingdom is certainly to be regarded as a prelude of human nature; and if we find that phenomena which simulate self-directive power, and are the symbolising of it, are those which are already most conspicuous in the animal kingdom, even in its origin, and become more and more conspicuous as that kingdom rises in organisation, until the faculty and the kingdom culminate together in man, this is no slight argument in favour of the truth and reality of the view, which we have here taken, as to the true ground of human nature.

Now it is a fact, which will not be disputed, that all through the animal kingdom we find either self-directive power, or the dawning of it, manifesting itself in expressive movements, nay, in locomotion itself, wherever this kind of movement is not rendered physically impossible by the organic attachment of the individual to some immoveable object, as, for instance, a rock. And even in such attached species, as if locomotion in some period or other of their existence were the inalienable right of every being that possesses an animal nature, and, as if it were appointed to be maintained by a purely mechanical apparatus when consciousness fails, we find the ova or gemmules of these imperfect beings free to roam about, even when the parents are fixtures,—nature apparently consenting, in this case, for the sake of maintaining a great principle, to violate analogy; for analogy usually assigns the highest endowments of the individual to its most fully developed form—locomotion to the mature animal, not to the ovum. Nay, as if the more certainly to secure locomotion as the prelude of self-directive power to all possible animals, we find locomotion imparted to the gemmules of the contiguous algæ.

And while movements, preparing for a true self-directive power, are thus co-extensive with animated nature, they are also strictly confined to it. As to mere motion, there may, perhaps, be as much of it amidst the molecules of inanimate bodies when they are free to move about, as there could well be amongst as many animalcules. Not only molecules suspended in liquids, in communication with the atmosphere, and liquid molecules, but molecules in solid bodies, appear to be at all known temperatures in a state of action ; and, indeed, more free to move about than is generally conceived or easily understood. Thus, when a crystal of apatite, whose temperature is changing, is inspected with polarised light, suddenly, at a certain moment, the coloured rings undergo a change which can only be accounted for by supposing that at that moment the molecules constituting this crystal make a movement also. But all these manifestations of action, from those of the most distant double stars to those of the molecules obtained from pounded minerals, and seen to move only under the most powerful microscopes, are of an order quite different from the movements of animals. They are all movements of external origin impressed by currents or attractions. They are all illustrations of inertia, or the laws of physics, and are therefore always in continuous curves, such as dynamic science recognises. The external agencies which cause them can usually be detected. Sometimes, indeed, the molecules which are the subject of them, may resemble animalcules in form and magnitude ; but if one of the latter appear on the field of the microscope at the same time, as sometimes happens, how dissimilar are its every movement to those of the mere chemical molecule ! At this moment the little being darts right across the field of view—now it returns curiously gyrating—now all of a sudden it retraces its course, and in a cusp which no geometry could express, no calculus analyse, no dynamics but those of life admit, it darts off and is seen no more. Then another of some other species comes into sight, tediously measuring the field of view by its own length. In a word, there is no end of them ; no end of their curious forms and movements, setting all dynamical trajectories at utter defiance. Even at the very commencement, therefore, of animated nature, and so far down as optical art can enable our vision to reach, self-directive power manifests itself in connection with animal life, and at the same time proclaims itself to be con-

fined to it. This appears, therefore, to be its appointed characteristic, and accordingly it is generally acknowledged to be so, and that not by men of common observation only, but by men of science also. Every organic form which shows self-directive power, or is thought to do so, is at once set down for an animal, at least whilst it continues to do so; for it is worthy of remark, that this criterion of animal nature involves the anomaly that certain species shall be regarded as animals during one period of their existence, and as vegetables during another,<sup>1</sup> which, seeing that such a notion is tolerated in science, is the strongest argument that can be conceived to prove that self-directive power is really the best characteristic of animal nature that can be found.

As we ascend the scale, all doubt and difficulty vanish. Self-originated motion then becomes the leading feature; so that universally, wherever we see the waters ripple in one spot, or the grass move, or hear the leaves rustle, wherever, in a word, we observe local motion, we conclude that an animal is there.

Thus a general survey of nature, the widest induction possible, verifies the conception of self-directive power, as the ground of human nature,—a ground which assuredly consciousness affirms, at the same time, with unwavering distinctness and the utmost confidence. Yes; among all the principles of common sense, there is not one which is more positive, than that a man may go this way or that way, or act or not act, or, in a word, do as he pleases. Consciousness affirms human liberty as a most certain and indefeasible fact; nor can any basis for an argument to subvert it ever be found, which shall be more clearly or distinctly belief-worthy than this affirmation of liberty itself. But it is not consciousness alone, as has been shown, it is the united voice of nature, which calls upon us to affirm liberty, and to lay down self-directive power not merely as a fact but as the most characteristic fact, nay, the very ground of human nature; and this, therefore, we have here endeavoured popularly to do, leaving for subsequent development whatever difficulties there may of necessity attach to the subject.

But of these difficulties there is one, on which it appears that we cannot too soon bestow a few words, because, in virtue of it,

<sup>1</sup> *Infimæ formæ (algarum) inter vitam animaleam et vegetabilem fluctuant, quædam sub diversis evolutionis stadiis utriusque regni cives.*—*Endlicher Gen. Plant.* p. 1.

this principle of self-directive power, though in itself so certain, and to him who is free to look upon nature without prepossession so obvious, is yet thrown in our day into such a position that it has even now to struggle for existence in the popular mind.

It has grown to be the fashion in our day, to a marvellous extent, to give predominance in education to physical and mathematical studies over moral and mental. Young people are now taught to make ink, when they used to be taught to write; and while every school form has its elements of zoology, and infants have scarcely left the breast before they can discourse about mammalia, good old Æsop is heard of only as a hunchback of questionable existence, who, if he really ever did write anything at all, it was only some nonsense about animals speaking, and the like. Hence a very general and growing prepossession in society in favour of material nature. Astronomy, natural philosophy, chemistry, natural history, geology—these and the like, are in our day held to be everything. Now, all these branches of study, however various in detail, agree in this, that they exclude the conception of a true self-directive power from the field of thought. They offer for consideration nothing but figures, movements, and laws. And thus they tend to form the popular mind to the habit of looking for figures, movements, and laws everywhere, and for rejecting all other conceptions as intruders. But of all such other conceptions, there is none so difficult and so intractable under physical modes of investigation as self-directive power. It therefore runs a very great risk of being rejected; and thus the mind, from its first training having been in physics, carrying out here, as it usually does everywhere, its first love into all its after thoughts, shuts up the student surreptitiously with materialism as his philosophy. The spiritual world he finds to be uncongenial and difficult of discussion, and therefore holds to be of questionable existence; and so he lets it pass without knowing or caring to know anything about it, and if piqued by his own conscience, or otherwise, upon the subject, perhaps he dogmatizes most positively that there is no such thing.

While therefore consenting to the expediency, within due limits, of commencing with the study of external nature, let us here also press the necessity that there is for the student to be on his guard against this most insidious fallacy:—the mind's perseverance in its first love, its most excessive love of identity, its



spontaneous determination to apply a theory which it has mastered and made its own, not merely within the precincts of its legitimate sphere, but everywhere. Nothing is indeed better known than this, but yet nothing needs to be kept more continually in mind. In fact, before one is safe, he needs to possess himself even with an exaggerated view of his liability to be misled in this way. A wise man, who is conscious that his intellectual education was mainly in the interest of physics, when he finds mechanical conceptions stretching themselves into the province of mind, ought to infer that all such stretchings are *prima facie* suspicions, and such that they ought not to be admitted without the most severe scrutiny. The mind in such a case is no longer free to compare simultaneously, as justice demands, the relative claims to independent existence of laws of matter and phenomena of mind ; but is, on the other hand, obliged by its course of study not to admit the claims of mind to a hearing till after having been pre-occupied by the study of the claims of matter, entertained too in the midst of all the charms of youthful thought and feeling, and all the delight which every student of natural philosophy enjoys, from the contemplation of the simplicity and the beauty of the laws, which the material universe displays. It is therefore easy to see how materialism should come to be a current opinion, when the popular education runs all in favour of physical pursuits.

But philosophically considered, and admitting that the mind's extreme demand for unity and a system of identity is to carry the day, is it not perverse to trace all the phenomena of the universe to matter, and to necessary or fatal modes of action, rather than to spirit and liberty ? If all begin in necessity, it is obvious that there can be no opening anywhere for liberty to come in ; and it remains only to give the lie direct to common sense, which affirms it in our own breasts, and thus to place reason in contradiction with herself. It is easy, on the other hand, to conceive how a principle of a higher nature, such as self-directive power or free agency, should in certain circumstances limit itself, or be limited, so that its most palpable and usual manifestations should be the observance of uniform laws, such as the laws of motion, or of attraction and repulsion, which is all that is meant by necessity in physics. We see free agents submitting themselves to law every day. And to provide laws of a right

kind for the well-being of the moral system is regarded as the highest exercise of wisdom. Both intrinsic probability, therefore, and the analogy of nature, are in favour of the idea that spiritual or self-directive natures may, under certain conditions of existence, be so limited as to be free to act only under certain uniform and simple modes of action, easily defined even in the terms of mathematics. The other hypothesis, which lays down matter and necessity as the ground of all things, has not the same advantages. If, therefore, philosophy must yield to the demands of the logical faculty for an extreme simplicity, unity, identity at the fountain-head of nature, it were more logical to regard those phenomena and laws named physical, such as the laws of motion, elasticity, gravitation, etc., as manifestations, when existing under certain limiting conditions, of substances or beings which have also in them, when not so limited, and when existing under other conditions, ability to manifest self-directive power. It were more logical to regard body as a peculiar condition of spirit (as for instance consisting of monads in a state of conglomeration or the molecular state, and thus occupying space and seemingly extended) rather than to set out with body as the primal and most simple datum of creation, and then to attempt the genesis of thought, feeling, liberty, and the phenomena of spirit generally out of it. If, then, it be decided that the existence of two substances in nature entirely distinct, viz., spirit and body, ought not to be postulated, such multiplication of principles being contrary to scientific perfection, improbable in itself, and possibly even inconceivable, then all substance ought in its origin to be viewed rather as spirit than as body—body being some degraded state of that out of which, in the proper circumstances, or at the Divine fiat, spiritual natures also could arise.

It might even be fairly contended that some such opinion is necessary and inevitable, at least if we are to take the last results of logical analysis as fully trustworthy. Thus, that every body is compounded, constituted, or made up of molecules, is universally agreed. Every body is therefore a fit subject for analysis. But when any body is submitted to analysis in reference to its mere corporeity or bodily nature, that is, its extension and impenetrability, what do we ultimately arrive at? Do we not, in reference to the attribute of extension, arrive at particles of which the physical limit is that they have at last ceased to be extended,

and are but mere points in space? And as to the attribute of impenetrability, what do we in the last analysis arrive at, but the idea of a substance that can resist the intrusion into its place of other similar substances, and therefore ultimately a centre of force? And thus under a logical analysis, which must be admitted to be legitimate, it may be maintained that a body or chemical element resolves itself into a system of centres of force balancing each other at certain distances, and thus rendering the whole molecule or mass extended, as body is known to be. The elements of body, therefore, are things of which these attributes are to be affirmed in the first instance, that they possess unextended substance and extensive power. But if so, do they not touch upon the confines of the spiritual world, to say the least?

But these things are pleaded here merely to show that the philosophy of matter and fate has no pretensions to explain the system of the universe; and, when severely criticised, cannot even maintain its own ground. Both body and spirit ought to be believed in. They may be one at the fountain-head, perhaps, when rising into existence in obedience to the immediate word of God, and forming, as it were, the first breath of creation; but not the less on that account are they the opposite poles of Being, and constitute the two principles, by the harmonious inweaving of which the beautiful system of creation is constituted, and its economy worked out. Such a view, far from being contrary to the canons of science, is even the necessary complement of science. For, though it is most true that the intellect is always demanding further simplification, and still trying to reduce things more and more to a unity, nay, though this be the very principle of science, still it is also true that this principle has a limit. And that unity which shall be the last word of science must always include two objects, existing in contrast after all. The law of couples, of opposites, of reciprocal action between two contrasted yet homogeneous and harmonising elements, each of which opens a field for the other, and brings it into action is of universal extent. Thus, in the material system, when viewed on the great scale and irrespective of its molecular constitution, all things are developed by the harmonious antagonism of heat and attraction, the former ever tending to develope and expand, the latter to compress and define, the forms of nature. When viewed in its molecular constitution, in like manner all the forms in this sphere

are found to be developed by some unknown kind of reciprocal action, or a couple of conjugate powers, named polarity, productive of the most harmonious and beautiful results; and which, while it undergoes contemporaneous modifications corresponding to every change in the more commanding influences of heat and attraction, yet holds on according to laws of its own, and produces a thousand interesting and admirable phenomena, which the others, so far as we know, could never produce without it. In the organic world, also, no less than in the purely physical and chemical, all is framed according to the same law of couples. Thus physiologists have shown that the essential condition of life itself is the mutually balancing antagonism of a series of decompositions and of corresponding recompositions; subordinate to which also there is the beautifully harmonising antagonism of sex; and subordinate to this again, of special organs, as of the respiratory and the chylopoetic, etc. In the sphere of sensibility, in like manner, everything turns on the antagonism, more harmonious than is often thought, of pleasure and pain; and in the moral sphere of good and evil. Nor is the world of pure intellectuals exempt from this law, but on the contrary displays its influence everywhere. Hence faith and sight, identity and difference, finite and infinite, objective and subjective, space and time, cause and effect, the world of realities and the world of ideas. In a word, every system of thought and of things when complete, presents as its basis two co-ordinate elements, the reciprocals of each other, or one parted into two reciprocally, and by the harmonious antagonism of both the beautiful web of nature is woven. If, therefore, we are to be consistent, mind and matter ought always to be viewed as distinct, and the opposite poles of Being: *inertia*, or unvarying submissiveness to the laws of motion, being the characteristic of the one; *self-directive power*, the characteristic of the other. And here also, in closing, we may remark how pleasingly the grand law of couples, and the universal analogy of science, sanctions the characteristic we have arrived at as that of animated nature. For if, as is not disputed, inertia, or say the obedience to pressures and impulses from without, be the characteristic of matter, then that which is needed as the other term to complete the couple, is just what has been insisted on, viz., *self-directive power*.

Let us also further remark the very satisfactory and symme-

trical relation in which self-directive power, when viewed as the characteristic of the whole animal kingdom (which plainly points to man, and culminates in human nature), places the animal in relation with the vegetable and the mineral kingdoms. Of minerals or crystals the characteristic is simply self-composing or *self-concreting* power. They are, so to speak, merely insoluble seeds without an embryo. To this, *self-developing* power is added in plants, and forms their acknowledged characteristic; while of animals the characteristic, according to the view here advanced (the same seed-producing, self-developing powers continuing), is *self-directive* power superadded. Now, this is a relationship between these three kingdoms of nature, as homogeneous and as symmetrical as could be desired, and which has therefore all the appearance of being legitimate, and a true expression of the order of nature; so far, therefore, the entire aspect of nature is responsive to our characteristic, and so far all is well.

It were also easy to show that, granting these two principles, the inert and the self-directive, the necessary and the free, we obtain the materials for a universe, which may well be complete, up to the full measure of all our conceptions of completeness. Why, then, dispute that which observation and consciousness unite so decidedly and so harmoniously in declaring to be a fact? Why dispute the fact of human liberty, and bring into suspicion even the possibility either of morality or of immortality? Grant it, on the other hand, as reason, and all nature demand, and how enviable is the position of man in the scale of being! If the truth really be, as, following a thousand footsteps in all ages, I have endeavoured to show that it is,—if man be really free as well as under law, then in human nature heaven and earth truly embrace each other; and no reason appears why, as the ages roll on, our own free thought may not have the run of the universe. What, then, ought we to do; what are our prospects? Can reason propose any other questions so interesting as these? But, before we proceed to inferences, science calls upon us, to analyse the contents of the characteristic which it has been the object of this essay to establish, to inquire what is implied in self-directive power. Let us but ascertain this, and we are in possession of the elements of human nature, more or less in detail.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE UNITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

By the aid of the logical principle that *existence implies all its conditions*—a principle, the validity of which cannot for a moment be questioned, it is possible to prosecute our subject in a scientific manner. It is possible to investigate with demonstrative certainty what is implied in self-directive power, what are its contents, what its constituents, and consequently what are so far at least the contents, the constituents of that particular nature—human nature—of which we have found self-directive power to be the characteristic.

Nor is the investigation tedious. One needs only to consider for a moment the contents of such a conception as self-directive power, in order to discover that besides Being or substance, which cannot but be held to be given where power is given, there must be in such a nature or essence, three elements as indispensable conditions to its existence, integrant elements in its constitution: there must be *unity*, there must be *activity*, and there must be some such sense of relation to other beings or things as *the power of believing*. Grant these three, and a self-directive being is constituted, or at least there are in these three all the primary endowments which are indispensably necessary to such a being. But if any of these be wanting, the possibility of self-directive Being does not as yet exist. Let us bestow ourselves for a little upon each of these components in succession.

The first which we named was *UNITY*, and this we may, therefore, in the first place discuss. As to its necessity in a self-directive nature, plainly there is no room for doubting it. Plainly

such a nature must be one Being or thing, in the strictest sense of the term. Such a nature must possess a true, an indefeasible, and a permanent unity. It must be indivisible and identical so long as it is a self-directive being, or is entitled to the use of the term "self" at all. Whether self-directive power may not belong, in a greater or less degree, to every being and thing which possesses a true unity, may be a fair and a very interesting question in philosophy. But there is no room for making a question as to the converse. There cannot possibly be self-directive power where there is not a true and an abiding unity. Unity in substance, from moment to moment, unity in duration, identity, is needed to the entire circle of self-directive phenomena. Identity is indeed that attribute which, more than any other perhaps, determines self-directed phenomena, and impresses their peculiar character upon them. Thus it is the very condition of consciousness, of thought. What is all thinking, all intelligence, but a process in which the unity of the thinking principle presides, and inquires, in reference to all other things that are submitted to it, for that unity which it has in itself, and which in an eminent manner constitutes itself? Yes; unity is the very key-stone of a reflective nature; unity is, as it were, the very foundation of its structure.

But here, while making use of such a term as structure, in reference to such a nature as that which is now inquired into, and in connection with such a term as unity, let us take great care to avoid all identification with bodily structures,—an analogy which, in consequence of our earlier familiarity and habitual engagment with matter, we are ever apt to assume, but which, when we do so, besides an inaccuracy which is very great, involves another great evil; for when we do so, when we reduce the spiritual to the material as the type, we in fact proceed—surreptitiously it may be, but not the less fatally to true philosophy—on the supposition that of the two, matter and spirit, the molecular and the simple, the divisible and the indivisible, matter is the older and more authoritative. We admit that inert natures are more venerable than self-directive natures, the dead more noble than the living—a fallacy which, though the very statement of it when thus put shows its incongruity, and though it has in fact no ground to stand upon more respectable than this, that matter has been our horn-book, still we

tend to invoke, with a view to explain everything, and that not as rhetoricians only (which were pardonable), but as men of science. The unity of a self-directive being must not be confounded with any sort of unity which a mere body can possess. Body universally possesses parts in extension; "unity" can never be predicated of body except abusively, and instead of "totality," between which and unity there is a most determinate difference. Not that we are able to form a distinct conception of unity when we attempt to view it in relation to space. In that case the conception of totality ever tends to substitute itself instead of that of unity. But the cause of this confusion is not the want of a determinate difference between the two ideas. The cause of it is the placing the idea of unity in a false position; for unity is not an idea of space at all. Nor should any being, of which unity is predicated, be viewed as placed in space. The idea of unity is obtained by the mind when looking inwards; and that of space is obtained when looking outwards. The two ideas cannot be viewed normally by a simultaneous act of intelligence. Their synthesis is forbidden. The idea of unity is the counterpart of that of space. From our customary habits of observation, however, which are eminently materialistic, and from the constant apparition in the mind of the idea of space in every case of observation by the senses, even as a frame for every object, as often as the attention is not entirely bestowed upon that object itself, it is next to impossible to refrain from locating in space whatever is admitted to the rights of existence; and consequently it is next to impossible to refrain from ascribing magnitude or extension, and therefore divisibility to everything to which Being is awarded. Against this habit, however, the philosopher will be on his guard, when it tends to interfere with his idea of unity, which is indeed one of the most precious possessions that intelligence has in its own right.

But not the analysis of the conception of self-directive power only, thus giving unity as one of the conditions indispensable to the existence of such a power, attests the fact of unity, as a leading attribute of the self-directive principle. There are many other arguments for it; and among these we cannot regard as a trivial one, the fact of the existence of the idea of unity in the human mind itself, holding that conspicuous place in consciousness which it does. That the idea exists, I presume no unsophisticated mind



will dispute. Now, whence can the soul have got such an idea? Not a single object in the outward, which any of the five senses could name manifests a true unity. It cannot be from outward nature that this idea is derived. The soul, therefore, must have it from herself. The soul herself must be the fountain of the idea of unity, its object, and its archetype. Yes; and so she is. And this explains why this idea exists so fully in the soul as it plainly does. She carries it about with her everywhere; and among all objects, be what they may, which are presented to her, her main intellectual engagement consists in seeking for unity. Nay, it is by a reference to this idea, and by the use of it, that almost all her knowledge even of external nature is constituted. Hence the idea of totality, of magnitude, of divisibility, of dissolution, of number. All of these, and many others, presuppose the idea of unity. Without this idea, indeed, there could have been no adequate conception even of body. Nay, the idea of unity extends itself into subjects, from which it might seem, at first sight, as if it must be necessarily excluded. Thus space, though the simple notion of it be an infinite extension, an infinite divisibility, is yet regarded by the mind as a unity also. Space manifests itself as essentially continuous and indivisible, as well as divisible. It may be portioned, but the portions cannot be separated, so that space shall not continue to be in the sections, as well and as fully as in the portions. Thus, even into the conception of that which has been shown to be the counterpart of unity, there is a curious intrusion of the idea of unity. And generally in every intellectual act and operation, and in every conception, there is, as has been already said, an unceasing reference by the mind to its own unity, not, indeed, as its own, but as that which exists. Hence the bringing together and the testing of all things, as to identity and difference. Hence all comparison, classification, generalisation, reasoning. In a word, there is nothing in psychology which comes out more distinctly than that the soul possesses a true unity, and is, in all its thoughts, in an eminent degree possessed by the idea of unity.

In opposition to this, the materialist maintains (and is indeed obliged to maintain) that the only unity in man is a unity of organisation merely, a unity manifesting itself in the brain, that centre of organic force where there is an equilibrium. And there can be no doubt that such a mechanical unity also exists

in human nature. There can be no doubt that in human nature there is a centre of dynamical force and action, as well as a centre of thought and of self-directive power. Nay, there can be little doubt that these two centres coincide, and that the centre of the organisation considered as a locomotive apparatus destined to be actuated from within itself, is the focus where the soul is emphatically present in its highest energy. It is not the statement of the organic unity and centre of force that is to be controverted or regretted, but it is the denial of the spiritual centre of force; for the affirmation of the former cannot be the whole of the truth. Thus, if intelligence demand unity as a condition necessary to its existence, as it has been shown that it does, and if no unity be admitted in connection with intelligence but that of organisation, then intelligence is only possible through organisation as its instrument. But if so, then organisation must have preceded intelligence in the order of existence. This is an inference from which materialism cannot escape. But is not such a doctrine distinctly contradicted by this fact,—that organisation is itself obviously and eminently a product of intelligence! Scarce an organ, and not an animal in the entire creation, but indicates design. Nor can we conceive any kind of structure on which we should feel justified in bestowing the name of an organ, unless it were a thing which manifested design, or consisted of parts which, though themselves unconscious, conspire to the accomplishment of some end. Now, design is a product of intelligence. There must, therefore, have been intelligence at a time when as yet there was no organisation to compass it. And the unity, therefore, which, as has been shown, intellectual action demands as a condition of its existence, must, then at least, have been a unity of some other kind than that which an organ, as for instance the cerebral system or the brain, may possess—an unity which, of what nature soever it may have been, could not be necessarily dependant on the existence of organisation, for it existed at an epoch when organisation did not as yet exist. To escape from this conclusion, there is no resource for the materialist but to deny that organisation displays design. But is not this to fly in the very face of common sense? What degree of evidence can be legitimately called higher than that which there is in favour of the doctrine that organisation manifests design? True, many thinking men, as for instance Bacon

and Descartes, the authors of modern philosophy themselves, have proposed that the consideration of final causes ought not to be mixed up with scientific investigations. But this they propose merely as a point of logical order; their opinion is not the denial of the fact; it relates only to the fit occasion for insisting upon it. And such an occasion I conceive there is here; for the consequence is most important. If the affirmation that nature displays design cannot be denied, then in that case intelligence is at once emancipated from all necessary dependence upon organisation. In that case intelligence cannot be merely a function of organisation. The unity which its action demands cannot be merely that of a cerebral centre. In order to the construction of such a centre (for it displays design), and therefore before it was constructed, there must have been in existence some other unity, from the bosom of which intelligence manifested itself at that epoch. The hypothesis of the materialist, therefore, that an organic unity is adequate to account for the phenomena or intelligence generally, cannot stand. But if we have found unequivocally in one case, or rather in a multitude of cases, as varied as the very creation itself, that intelligence operates from and by some other kind of unity than that of organisation, are we not called upon to infer that this is universally the case, and that cerebral centres, such as the brain of man, are available for the manifestation of intelligence only when animated by a unity of this other kind? Logical consistency, the analogy of nature, demand such an inference; for to assume two sorts of unity, or two sorts of substances possessing two sorts of unity, as the ground of the same series of phenomena, and these so peculiar as the phenomena of intelligence, is plainly illogical in a high degree. There are few points in philosophy which, when viewed with candour, declare themselves to be more certain than that the principle or Being which thinks must possess a unity of a higher order than that which is merely mechanical. Yes; few things are more certain than that in order to the existence of "the self" that is in a self-directive nature, there must be in that nature a true unity.

Now, from the establishment of this fact, a deeply interesting consequence to the prospects of humanity follows. In a word, if the self-directive principle in human nature, call it soul, or spirit, or monad, or what you please, possess an essential unity,

it follows, that from all that may, and indeed must, happen to the body in virtue of its compounded structure and the law of development, reproduction and decay, under which it exists, this self-directive or spiritual principle is wholly exempt. It is simple and one. It cannot be dissolved or decomposed. Its nature does not admit of such an event. It is analogous, not to the organised body considered as a whole, but rather to one of those last elements, monads or centres of force, which we may conceive to result from the complete analysis of body. And though it may be a question of pleasing speculation whether, if the body of a human being could be completely subjected to dissolution, so that every last possible element should be set free from every other, each and all would not, by this complete analysis and emancipation from adhesion and conglomeration, vanish, as it were, into the spiritual, and thus death in the hour even of his seemingly most complete triumph be literally swallowed up in victory; yet there can be no question that a being which is already absolutely one and simple, is, in the ordinary course of nature, indestructible also; and therefore that the soul, since such unity belongs to it, is truly immortal.

Nor is there anything strange, singular, unexpected, out of the harmony of things or the analogy of nature, in such a doctrine. On the contrary, even though there were no direct evidence in favour of the immortality of the soul, it would be necessary to imagine or postulate this doctrine, in order to explain in a manner satisfactory to reason, human life as we find it. The truth is, that human life, as it realises itself in this world, nay, even when conceived to do so according to the very ideal of what ought to be (which this world is very far from doing), still shows itself to be but a period of operation, of which an adequate product is nowhere to be found on this side of the grave. In the inferior animals the case is different. In them every operation is immediately followed by its product. They live but one day at a time, and every day that they spend in a state of well-being is complete in itself. Every such day is a complete period—a period of desire followed by action, and that in its turn by undisturbed enjoyment, closed by sleep,—the symbol of the death which awaits them when their organisation has completed the cycle of its functions. But it is not so with man. In virtue of his somatic relations, indeed, and as a member in the planetary system, and

consequently included in its periodicity, man does no doubt wake and sleep from day to day as mere animals do. But he cannot go simply asleep as they do. When he lies down at night it is with obligations for the morrow lying consciously upon him, to which futurity moreover, he finds the past also strongly bound by memory. The entire life of man is but one sustained period of operation. Down to the evening of life it is but as one day. And do we find, when that evening has arrived, that it brings the full wages of the day's labour along with it? No; it is certain, on the contrary, that, onwards even to the very verge of the tomb, life declares itself to be a period of operation and not of product, of sowing and not of reaping. And if at any time there be a falling away from virtuous effort and from looking into futurity; if, at any time, there be a resting in the present, it is not the soul that originates, or indeed even consents to, that stand-still and state of helplessness. The soul ever presses on. The life of man, therefore, viewed purely in the light of ethics, points to the continuance of his being in an after life as that which is necessary to render his Being complete, and to explain in a rational manner the character of the life that now is. It points to a Sabbath rest awaiting him hereafter, which here he cannot enjoy, though he is called upon to keep it holy in anticipation. The result which we have obtained, therefore, by the independent process of analysing the elements necessarily implied in a self-directive nature, is the very complement of that which general reasoning on the actual phenomena of human life leads us legitimately to expect.

The doctrine of immortality might indeed have been left at once to rest safely upon the basis of natural history. Thus, in the *Scientific Manual*, lately published by authority, for guiding the inquiries of -voyagers, one of those under the head of *Ethnology* is, "What are their views as to a future life?" It is not doubted but they have some views; and that rightly; for everywhere the belief in immortality is found to be one of the firmest and most influential motives of the entire human family. Not a race of men over the wide world, not a page in faithful history or geography, but bears witness in one way or another to the existence of this great conviction, as a first truth deep laid in the very breast of humanity itself. Beautifully did Vico lay this conviction along with these other two, the necessity of

religion and of regulating the passions (the three symbolised throughout the whole human family by the solemnity of funerals, of worship, and of marriages), as the grounds of civilisation: Beautifully have funerals been called "*fœdera generis humani*." And rightfully did Seneca, when arguing for immortality, and demonstrating the existence of this universal conviction in its favour, say—" *hac persuasione publica utor*." It is a most legitimate and valid evidence. But in the minds of men in general it exists only as a postulate. Now, though it may be true that all great principles are, after all, as held by the million, no better than postulates, it certainly belongs to science to translate truths out of this position to the utmost amount possible, and to give their rational grounds. And if, in the present instance, we have the means of removing the doctrine of immortality from the position of a postulate, it is plainly desirable in a high degree to do so. But if the true unity of the soul be established, immortality is no postulate. It is a necessary consequence of that unity. Nor is that unity a postulate, if what has been advanced in this chapter be in any measure sound. It is a condition implied in a most certain and general fact, viz., the self-directive power of man. Postulates are therefore excluded from the whole train of the argument. The doctrine of immortality is made to stand upon a basis which is truly scientific. And though, in a matter of such paramount interest and importance to man, it cannot but be a great boon to humanity, if the fact be given also in a way which sets aside all speculation and the possibility of doubting, as for instance by revelation (as is the fact); yet it is no mean office of philosophy if she can go a certain way, though it be not very far, in anticipating revelation, or in supplying its place to those to whom it is not given, or who, though it is offered to them, unhappily decline the acceptance of it.

That it is but a certain way which the argument here insisted upon can go is obvious enough, because it is only the immortality of the soul considered as a being or substance that it is good for proving. It cannot prove the immortality of "self." It cannot demonstrate the transit of consciousness over the grave; and yet it is this plainly that invests the doctrine of immortality with its chief interest, as any one may find in a moment by looking into his own breast.

It is not to be inferred, however, that philosophy has no proofs in favour of the penetration of our present consciousness, and of memory into the after life. This doctrine cannot indeed be proved by a reference merely to the unity or identity of the soul as a substance, nor perhaps can it be proved at all with the same degree of certainty that the permanence of the substance of the soul may be proved; but yet there is good evidence to show this much at least—that the preservation of memory and consciousness, as we have them now, is that which is to be expected, rather than any change in this respect which would prevent our future selves from identifying themselves with our present. On that argument, however, we cannot enter here, because it supposes certain psychological principles, whose truth requires first to be demonstrated; as, for instance, that one of the essential habits or constitutional modes of action in the soul is evermore to assimilate itself to the object which engages it, either merely representing that object, or more positively loving and being likened to it. Grant this law, and it follows then—when no external object is given for the soul's enjoyment, while yet its activity continues to exist and to act, under this law of assimilation,—it follows that in these circumstances it can only assimilate itself to itself—that is, it can only repeat and reproduce in the phases of being under which it successively exists, those under which it existed in former periods; in other words, it can only remember or live in memory. If, then, at death, the soul is placed in such relation with other objects that they do not engage it either at all or altogether, it must bestow itself entirely, or during the intervals of external engagement in this after life, in reproducing and remembering the actions, and possibly the scenes, of this. And thus consciousness must be carried through into the other world, and sustained in it. But this by the way at present. To impart to this view all the evidence of which it is capable, would require many pages and prolegomena. Perhaps, after the reader has mastered the views which are set forth towards the close of this volume, he may find himself competent, if he is well-disposed, to develop this argument for himself. Meantime let us pass on, having already, as we trust, made a certain contribution to the natural evidence for the immortality of the soul; not adding anything to the strength of that argument, perhaps, which in this respect has been often elaborated

with the utmost development and success already ; but adding something to its scientific character ; since, according to the views here offered, immortality is no longer to be held as an insulated boon or accident, or arbitrary appendage to human nature, which may or which may not be, but as a necessary condition implied in the award of intelligence and liberty—a condition implied in the fiat, that man shall bear the image of his Maker. Now, this is a thought which of all possible thoughts, is the most delightful by far ; because to bear the image of God is to bear the image of the ever blessed One, and is therefore to be blessed in the very right of being, than which surely nothing else can be conceived that is more desirable. Nor can anything be conceived that has more important bearings upon life and morality. Thus, if the possession of happiness by man depend on his realising in his own person the image of God, it is in vain that any one seeks for happiness merely in externals, or in possessions of any kind which are not his very self. Nor is this all, happiness being made to rest on such a basis, it follows that it can only be perpetuated by a life of benevolence co-extensive with the sphere of social relationship ; for true happiness is such a thing as is hurt, when it does not find itself returned and reflected by every Being around that is capable of it, and, therefore, whenever around, suffering is seen instead of enjoyment, it belongs to Happiness to extinguish the suffering if it can, and to replace it with enjoyment ; in other words, it belongs to the truly happy, it belongs to the ever blessed, to be wholly benevolent.



## CHAPTER III.

### THE ACTIVITY AND LIBERTY OF MAN.

BESIDES unity, another condition indispensable to the existence of a self-directive nature, is a true activity, a power both of acting and of giving a form to action, within the compass of self, and by self. A self-directive Being, in order to be able to vindicate a title to such an appellation, must have in it a cause of action; or rather, it must be itself a cause of action, and its activity, and the actions which it can cause, it must also have the power of determining, more or less. Nothing short of this is implied in the conception of a self-directive Being.

It is conceivable, indeed, and in reference to all embodied spirits no doubt it is a fact, that the mechanical force which keeps them organically agoing, is merely their share of the force which exists in the material system generally, and which, as it is spent by them from moment to moment in producing mechanical effects, is supplied from moment to moment from the air inhaled, and the food consumed. But, in order to render any such embodied species a truly self-directive Being, there must, besides this disposable mechanical force, derived from external nature, be in that species a self-possessed power also—a power to arrest or intensify, from within this spontaneous flow of force which it has in common with nature, and to change, new-form, or new-direct its action from within. If the existence of such a thing as self-formed action, if a beginning in the manifestation of power be admitted at all, it must be admitted as an endowment of such a Being, as is justly characterised by the attribute of self-directive.

It is true, no doubt, that we cannot picture to ourselves such

beginning of action ; it is true that the rhythm of thought calls upon us, as soon as any event or any kind of action is thought of, to conceive it as an effect and a consequent, and to affirm a cause for it, an antecedent to it, which is in some sense different from it, and, as it were, external to it. Let it be granted that the confluence in thought of cause and effect, and consequently a clear analytical conception of a self-directive power, free power or liberty is not possible to man in his present state of being ; still, such incapacity to conceive it, is no argument against the existence of such a thing, if there be adequate evidence in favour of its existence. Our conceptivity is not a match for the universe ; and to measure the sphere of reality by our ability to conceive in a determinate manner, or imagine its contents in an analytic form, is to exclude ourselves from the belief of all that is supersensual, and I know not how much besides. The question for philosophy, with regard to self-determined or free power, —more shortly, *power*, using that term in its true import—is not to decide, in the first instance, whether it can be figured in the mind, or discussed in a satisfactory train of clear and distinct conceptions, and after such pre-exercitation to reject it from the sphere of reality if it cannot be so discussed. The question for philosophy is, to inquire whether there be evidence for its existence. If there be, then plainly it is ours to accept and to hold it as a reality, however great the intellectual embarrassment in which our belief of it may involve us, and in spite of all the seemingly scientific inducements which may invite us to reject it from our philosophical creed as an unmanageable tenet.

Now, certainly, when we put the question as to evidence for the existence of Power, the answer on all hands is, that if there be evidence for the existence of anything, there is evidence for the existence of power. One needs only to look to himself, to listen to the voice that is for ever speaking in his own breast, in order to find a witness to the fact of power, that will not hear of its denial on any terms. That power exists, is one of the most imperative data of common sense, which will not refrain from mocking philosophers when they go about the denial of it. And, in fact, better far adopt the discipline of Pythagoras for life—better far be silent for ever, than emit such a tenet as that there is no such thing as power. The only question is, Whether there be not power in everything that exists—whether there can be Being

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without power. But that by the way at present. What we have now to insist upon is, that if there be such a thing as power or cause at all, then it follows from the conception of a self-directive nature, that power exists in such a nature—that such a nature is a cause—is that which, from within itself, can produce and determine action and produce effects.

But there is something peculiar in the character of the power which we have now to consider. It is not merely dynamical power; it is self-directive power, that is to say, power such, that in order to its existence, it is an indispensable condition that the action which is its product shall express itself in thought before it consummates itself outwardly. And here let us remark that, as this condition is absolute, so has it been absolutely secured. The movement of thought has been made to exist in such relation to mechanical movement that the velocity of its genesis is always greater; and it is therefore, from its very nature, always the forerunner of outward action. Thus, let the soul, in virtue of its self-directive power, determine itself at any moment simply in its own right as a cause, and in its own indivisible unity, this act of determination is no sooner accomplished than it expresses itself in two ways, viz., that which looks to thought and gives it, and that which looks to action and gives it; and these two are so related to each other, that no sooner does the spiritual change take place in the bosom of the soul which constitutes the action in its origin, but forthwith thought effloresces out of it; the outward action or event necessarily lags behind, nay, normally remains in abeyance, until the train of thought shall have fully deployed itself, and completed its course with respect to the action. This done, thought then closes itself by a peculiar act named a volition. And on the occurrence of this act of volition, or after this, though not till then (for a volition is its indispensable condition), the action at last realises itself outwardly; the entire production of the action is consummated. Such is the account of the normal development and accomplishment of action in human nature. Its characteristic is the interposition, between the first internal movement to act and the fulfilment of the act in the outward event, of a train of thought; and this, when fully developed, consists in a panorama of many possible actions relative to the occasion, among which the soul has to choose for itself, and to express that choice by passing a volition in favour of some one action. Sometimes

indeed, in man when under intense emotion (and usually in the inferior animals), the outward action comes fast and spontaneously, and therefore fatally in sequence of the emotion without the interposition of thought or reflection, and without the necessity of a volition ; but this is abnormal, in man at least, and need not now be considered.

This train of thought, which may be short or long, clear and distinct or obscure and confused, articulate or consisting in mere feelings, is usually named the motive of the action. Unhappily there is not in ordinary discourse a due discrimination between it and that act of volition consequent, in which the train of thought closes itself, and which is very distinct from all that has gone before. But since without this volition the action is impossible, the volition, not the original movement, it might be maintained in strict propriety, is emphatically entitled to the name of the motive of the action. The impulse, however, often is so named, and hence great confusion, and infinite difference and discussion, all of which might have been prevented by a preliminary analysis, and an agreement about terms. Towards this end then, it may be remarked that, as expressive of the fact that a volition has been passed, we have in the vernacular the term "intention," or purpose ; and we have also the term "inducement." Now, the latter would serve very well instead of "motive" as expressive of the thought, impulse, or feeling, in relation to the action before the volition has been passed ; and in this way, without coining any words, which it is next to impracticable to bring into a spontaneous currency, the use of the ambiguous term "motive" might be avoided altogether. And let us endeavour to avoid it in the sequel as often as we are free, that is, as often as we are pursuing trains of inquiry without reference to controversy. When we are writing controversially, we must of course use the same terms, and in the same sense, as our opponents use them. And to this we must consent for a little here.

For, from the state of things which has been described even in proving the self-directive power of man,—the advertisements, the shop windows, the eloquence, etc.,—quoted as illustrations in a preceding chapter, it appears that the power manifests itself in the individual who is to act, often seemingly as if it were but a reflection of the power of others to lead him. And, in consequence of this, it has been affirmed that self-directive power is

no better than a mere seeming and a self-deceiving, and that man is simply led, after all, as any object of mere material nature would be, which was wholly under the dominion of electricity or magnetism, if but consciousness were added to it. It has been thought that the liberty of man has been disproved when it has been shown that he uniformly goes by the strongest motive; and to meet this hypothesis we must here make some remarks on "strongest motives." As to the cases referred to in the first chapter, it is enough for us to say at present, that in all such cases a man is never led blindly or against himself, but, on the contrary, always by an argument which he himself, while at that moment conscious of his liberty, and possibly bent on vindicating it, holds to be sufficient. The motives or reasons, the inducements for acting, which present themselves, do not attack him or develop themselves capriciously so as to leave him passive and uncertain which of them all shall carry the day, until he finds himself drawn along into action in consequence of the operation of some one or more of them, in the choice of which he has had nothing to say. They all deploy themselves under his mind's eye, under the inspection of a consciousness, which is evermore consciously free to choose. They may affect him variously, some of them promising pleasure or advantage, if he will but realise the action they commend, others affirming the contrary, but still they all act in submission to him. Not one of them can force him nor forbid him an opportunity of making whichever of them all he pleases to be his own. When he has done this, *then* there is to him a strongest motive, but not till then. It is the man himself that determines which of all the inducements that present themselves to him, shall acquire the dignity of "strongest motive." And thus let a man follow all his life long the strongest motive in every case, he is not on that account the less a self-directive being. Let the cogency or the consistency of his choice be such that—given the circumstances in which he is placed, and the various inducements presented to him, his conduct can be uniformly and truly predicted by another agent similarly constituted to himself, predicted in such a way as the event never fails to verify—still in all this, there is no evidence of an absence of self-directive power or liberty, either on his part or on the part of him who predicts it. There is rather the manifestation of liberty acting in perfection, that is, seeing its own way clearly,

and competent, of its own choice, to make election for itself and for its own guidance of the laws of intelligence and the fitness of things, as if they were its own. The question of the liberty or necessity of human actions, is quite distinct from the question whether the phenomena of human conduct may be predicted like the phenomena of material nature. Such prediction (under such limits as human ignorance prescribes) is possible on either hypothesis. The true question as to liberty or necessity is, whether man be himself the immediate cause of his own actions, whether they arise out of himself, or whether they be merely continuations and particular efflorescences in his brain of the general agency of nature.

Now, the very fact that man acts by motives, instead of proving what it is supposed to prove, rather proves the contrary, proves that he is himself truly an agent, that he is free; for what is a motive? Viewed objectively, what is it but a design, a proposal or appliance to bring into action through himself, or by an appeal to his own choice, a being whom it is known to be impossible to bring into action contrary to himself or his own choice? and viewed subjectively, what is it but a promise to self of some good as the concomitant or consequence of the action to which it is a motive? and who puts the signature of strongest upon any motive but the man himself to whom it is the strongest? For what is the strongest motive in any case but that which proves to be so in the individual mind, that chooses to entertain it as such? It is only on his awarding to the motive this position, and in his consciousness or conduct consenting to this designation, that it becomes entitled to the name of strongest. Motives there must be in order to a self-directive nature, as has been shown. But they do not force themselves upon the man. They are in every case, on the contrary, to an indefinite extent of the man's own making. Not but a man is fatally the subject of many affections, of many desires and aversions, over which he has scarcely any control; but before any affection, desire, or aversion can compass an action in human nature, when that nature is in a normal state, (*i. e.*, when the man is in possession of himself), that affection or desire must succeed in evoking a volition. Not till after it has been thus sealed, can even the strongest appetite realise itself in outward action. In every case, before the man is determined how to act, the volition must have

been forthcoming. Nothing is better known than that you may propose for a man what you yourself may feel to be a motive of the strongest kind, and by all known means of sensuous or of intellectual persuasion, you may try to bring him into action by the force of it; but still do you not find that the power of choosing and deciding remains with himself after all? Yes; far deeper in himself than you or any argument of yours can reach. Given the motive with every possible advantage of bearing on the individual, still it remains for the individual himself to whom it is addressed, to say whether he shall act upon it or not. You may determine for me and for all men, which of all the ways that are open to us we ought to enter upon, or what consequences will follow our entering upon this or that; but you cannot prevent me from seeing and believing that other ways are open to me besides that which you declare to be incumbent—other ways which I may enter upon if I please. Nay, so inherent in the individual is a self-directive power, and so determined is human nature in consequence to have a will and a way of its own, that too too often that which is shown to be right and seen to be fit, is made to succumb to the might of this principle; and a man, instead of doing what the word of God perhaps, what all history perhaps, what the man in the breast perhaps, what the undivided voice of humanity, unite in proclaiming to be alone befitting, chooses to throw himself as a free agent into some ignoble passion that may happen to actuate him, and thus careers merely as an individual out of all order. Self chooses a way of its own for itself. Nor this always by a merely regardless play of self-will, as now conceived; but often with a semblance of reason, and perhaps a conscientious conviction that the course taken is the course which it was right to take. Suppose, for instance, that, at the present time, various motives influence me, and one of them at this moment proclaims itself to me, or is shown to be supreme, while yet I, as an individual, have in me another way, so that I would rather not take the step which at this moment is shown or seen to be incumbent upon me, I can stop and deliberate, and by engaging all my attention during the time thus gained in the invention of arguments in favour of my will, and in disparagement of the right course, I can develop arguments to countenance my delay, and even my refusal, to an almost indefinite extent. And how often does it happen that in

this way "the man in the breast" comes at last to be persuaded that, after all, what he confessed or pronounced at first, and in reference to this very case, to be supremely incumbent, is at last declared to be only generally incumbent, but not in this particular case! And thus ultimately a step is taken in a direction quite contrary perhaps to that which was on the eve of being taken but a little before. By a process entirely a man's own, he can thus shift about the strongest motive from act to act, and, in a word, shape his train of thought so as to educe and sanction the volition of that which it was originally his mind to do. Man is therefore in no degree a creature of necessity, because he always acts upon the strongest motive. It is these strongest motives that are creatures of necessity; and it is the man who, by the exercise of his own power, makes them to be so, as well as recognises them as such.

The same thing may be shown of volitions generally, in the ordinary course of their development. They are creatures of necessity also, but only because of the same fact in the nature of man, which makes strongest motives generally to be creatures of necessity, viz., the intrinsic power of the man in his own right to direct, to will or nill, as he pleases. Hence volitions never disappoint, but, on the contrary, always express a man as he is in his active disposition at the time. In every case, for good or for evil, it is the self-directive power which lies at the root of all personal and social activity. The external world does, indeed, impress the soul in many ways and produce many affections, which, as affections, are as purely under law and are imposed upon the soul as fatally as are the motions of the starry heavens. But as has been already stated, they do not, and except in cases of most abnormal excitement, they cannot, bring the soul into action, until she, after having witnessed and experienced always more than one of them, puts forth a volition in favour of that which is her own choice, and thus countersigns it by her self-directive power.

All this seems plain and certain enough, yet there are few questions in the philosophy of human nature which have been discussed with more earnestness, or have ended in more conflicting solutions, than the question, whether man be really in any measure a free agent. And yet, after all, is not this question one and the same with the question, whether the term liberty



have any meaning? Yes, plainly, the questions are one and the same. Yes, there can be no doubt with regard to this term, which is, indeed, the darling of the human heart, that it was a certain mode of acting possible to man, and cherished by him above all others which gave birth to it. Whatever it may import, and however much the thing it stands for may defy analysis, doubtless, the very existence of the term liberty is evidence of the existence of some mighty fact corresponding to it in human nature. Whatever be the idea which this term expresses, there can be no doubt that human nature is in possession of an original fact which that term expresses. Since, then, we are not at liberty to deny a fact merely because we cannot understand it, or give an account to reason of its nature, we might shortly say that, no doubt, man possesses liberty; for, if not, one of the most current and important terms in language, one which is held with affection, amounting even to the strongest passion which human nature knows, is denied to have any true import.

But for a proof of the fact of liberty we need not go to philosophy. We need not appeal to the structure of all languages, or to any thing which relates to the past. That there is liberty for man, the consciousness that dwells in every particular breast loudly proclaims. Common sense will not bear to hear the fact of liberty made a question of at all. From the philosophy of common sense, the speculation as to liberty or necessity is excluded. There is nothing which consciousness affirms more positively, more imperatively, than liberty. And therefore deny the soundness of her affirmation here, and it is nowhere trustworthy. Some other ground of philosophy than "natural light," or common sense, must in that case be found. But there is no other ground; and, therefore, deny liberty, and there is an end to all legitimate philosophy.

Let us not fail to remark here, however, that while the philosophy of common sense affirms liberty as a fact, it affirms it with great moderation, ever placing by its side certain other great facts which are equally doctrines of the same philosophy and which rest on the same evidence, such as the omnipotence and the omniscience of God, and the infallibility of his providence from all eternity, both for individuals and the species, as also man's inability in his actual state even to will with effect, and still more, to make good what yet may be, and he may even know

and feel to be right and holy. To reconcile these doctrines in a series of clear and distinct conceptions may perhaps be held to be difficult, nay, altogether impossible,—or it may be held to be easily possible, as, for instance, *first*, by calling to mind that, though God may allow to man that freedom in his will which is necessary to his responsibility, and is implied even in his human nature, yet He retains all actions which have any bearings upon the destiny of individuals, or of the world, so fully in His own hand, that not one of them is possible without His concurrence, sanction, or permission—or, *secondly*, by supposing that as liberty is a power which essentially implies development in special acts or volitions, so that development, though truly free and self-originated in man, may yet, like any other, be an object of Divine knowledge in eternity, and previously to the outward creation of any particular will ; so that, in awarding existence to certain wills, and not to others, the possibility of the occurrence of anything unforeseen would be guarded against as fully as if no such endowment as liberty had been allowed—or *thirdly*, by ascending into a region of thought more truly co-ordinate with such inquiries, viz., by excluding the idea of time altogether when we venture to enter the thoughts of the Divine mind. But all these by the way ; it belongs to philosophy, in the first place, to affirm all that there is adequate evidence for, quite independently of subsequent dialectics. For man to expect to be able to place and to view, in all their due relations, all the truths which yet he may have the means of reaching as individual facts, is to expect far too much. And to decline to believe the intuitive data of reason, because our logical power is not adequate fully to co-ordinate them, and to adjust them to each other in all their bearings, is plainly to reject the greater of two blessings, because the lesser is withheld.

But if liberty ground itself as a fact on the universal consciousness of the human family, and the structure of all languages, it may well be asked, How comes it to be disputed and denied ? What is the argument which can weigh in the balance against such evidence ? That it has been disputed, nay, altogether denied, and that by men of most logical heads too, must be admitted. How, then, it may be well asked, have they come to be able to deny that which is so strongly affirmed by common sense ? This seems a strange state of things ; to explain it, how-

ever, is not difficult. It is only necessary to call to mind that, whatever be the phenomena we are dealing with, provided only that they occur in the course of nature (and to this condition all the phenomena of thought, feeling, and volition conform), we cannot seize them otherwise but as the antecedents and consequents of each other. Now, no sooner is this done than we tend to view them also, if the sequence be natural and spontaneous, as each other's causes and effects. But the idea of a cause is that of an external force, that of an agency from without, which ensures and produces the effect of which it is the cause, or which, in ordinary language, renders that effect inevitable or necessary. Now, from this state of things it plainly follows, that no particular fact or phenomenon, in the whole circle of our mental operations, can be named, neither attention, nor volition, nor any other, but which may, when viewed in the place in which it makes its apparition, that is, with its own antecedents and consequents, be proved to be a member in this series, and therefore a thing of necessity. And therefore, when the question of liberty or necessity is thus treated, that is, under the tyranny of the law of Causation, there can be no such thing as liberty for man. Now while such is the result of this argument, it is, at the same time, not to be denied that this is a most respectable mode of argumentation. It is, in fact, that to which we owe all our scientific knowledge of nature. What, then, is to be done? Are we at once to grant its validity? Say that we do, say that we forget for a moment that the conclusion to which it leads in this instance gives the lie to all the languages of the human family, and to the living witnessing of consciousness in every breast, let us only see to what it leads. And for this purpose let us conceive it to be extended to the whole sphere of liberty, as it plainly may, and must be, if it be legitimate at all. Why, it cannot be denied that this very same reasoning which proves that there is no such thing as liberty for man, proves also that there can be no such thing as liberty for God,—in a word, no such thing as liberty at all. It excludes liberty from the universe. It annihilates the thing altogether, and declares the very idea of it to be a mere intellectual folly—a self-deceiving *jeu d'esprit*. But is not this a dreadful conclusion! It not only reduces man to the position of “a whirligig of chance and fate,” but it annihilates the possibility of morality in every form; nay, of person-

ality ; and leaves nothing for us to hold and to believe in, but a certain eternal system purely mechanical—God, nature, and man, all thrown into one ever-revolving system of merely dynamical causation—all the universe conglomerated into one vast objectless machine, whose operation is its product, and its product its operation !

But it is generally (and justly) maintained, that the demonstration of the injurious nature of the consequences of a doctrine is by no means an adequate logical disproof of it. And in the face of all these consequences, may it not still be affirmed that the argument from causation is conclusive against liberty as a fact ? Yes ; if the standing-place, or point of view, of that argument be admitted, if the legitimacy of the application of the law of causation to the question be admitted, liberty is disproved. If that argument apply to man himself, it is demonstrated that he is in no degree a free agent, but only a member in the chain of universal causation. On reviewing the argument, however, it will be perceived that it is not man himself, it is not that (be what it may) which one calls “ I,” “ me,” “ myself,” whose liberty the argument from the law of causation impugns and destroys. It is only particular phenomena of thought or feeling, each taken in its own articulate form and place—phenomena which, in the very act of being conceived or constructed in the mind, are of course rendered things of mechanism, and therefore of necessity. It is to these only that this argument against liberty applies. It takes no cognisance of the fact that the man manifests these phenomena. It grounds itself merely upon this, that these phenomena make their appearance in nature, and that in a series, each member of which appears to develop or articulate to itself that which follows. There are two grand facts, therefore, which this argument (from causation) against liberty omits to consider, either of which is sufficient to invalidate it. *First*, it omits the fact that all that train of mental phenomena on which it builds, and each of which in succession it shows to be necessary in relation to its position in the train of antecedents and consequents, flows out of the man as the fountain of all this activity ; and *secondly*, it omits the consideration that, possibly, this distribution in a series, this serial order in which the phenomena of mental activity usually present themselves, may, after all, be but a temporary or conditional arrangement, and, in fact, merely a product

of an analytical mode, or phase, or habit of the mind, proper only to that state of sensational or myo-cerebral form of existence in which man now is, but not proper to the soul considered as a catholic or pure Being, or power. If either of these conditions be found to hold good—if mental phenomena do not generate each other, but the man, as the true fountain of mental activity, gave birth to them all; or if, at their birth, they be not successive or spun out in a series, but simultaneous, some of them destined indeed to lag behind the others, and enter into consciousness later, and so to render analysis and the minding of one thing at a time possible, yet all of them efflorescences springing out of the mind in one moment of its existence, and each but a development of the other, or a mental equation of the same value, then the law of causation does not apply to the doctrine of liberty at all, or, at least, not more particularly than merely to give the man as the cause of his own mental phenomena; in other words, to give the man as a cause, that is, to give him as such an agent, as is in some measure, and in some respects, truly independent and free. Now, what has here been stated as possible is, I believe, the truth of the matter, so far as it goes, and, indeed, perhaps it goes as far as we can expect, into a question which plainly tends to transcend both thought and feeling. It may, indeed, be denied; but no one surely will pretend that man appears in nature, or depends on the objects around him, in such a way as to indicate that they are either his own cause, or the sole causes of all his activity. Man is manifestly an individualised being, and in some sense a truly active being. Something certainly begins with him. Something certainly is in him which is not in the elements around. If there be such a thing as power or liberty at all, it certainly looks as if it lay at the very root of man's being, and were the very *punctum saliens* of human nature.

Now, though it has been shown that the argument against liberty in man is destructive of liberty universally, yet this is not generally admitted: on the contrary, the possibility of liberty is generally granted. Of those who deny it altogether to man, there are but few who deny liberty to God. There is generally admitted to be such a thing as liberty. Now, do not consciousness and common sense affirm that it is possessed by man? Yes. And if the remarks just made be cogent, it needs only to lie where consciousness and common sense affirm that it does lie,

viz., at the very root of human nature, in order to be saved from the destruction which the argument from universal causation hurls upon it. It is in that case withdrawn from the position of a mere event or phenomenon, taking its turn along with others in the train of existence. It is withdrawn from being a member in a series of antecedents and consequents in nature. With regard to all of these, let it be true that they cannot in any case be thought of when they present themselves in a certain order, but as each other's causes and effects, and as such necessarily involving and educing each other; still liberty is safe. Let it but lie at the root of human nature, and then liberty attaches not to the category of attribute, action or phenomenon, but to the category of substance or cause. Let it but lie at the root of his nature, and then liberty has no antecedent in man but his Being, which, moreover, is not an antecedent. Let it but lie at the root of his nature, and his free activity has no determining cause but the substance in which it inheres, and out of which it pours itself according to its own nature. Now that substance wants no cause but a Creator, and, in the Uncreated, it wants no cause but itself. When reason has reached the idea of substance, it has reached a final landing-place where, if it is not content to remain, it is at least vain to ask any more questions demanding further insight. And liberty, if it lie at the root of human nature, and belong to the very substance of our being, is, and ever must be, a first principle, and therefore both a first and last word to reason. No argument built upon the law of causation can either prove it to be so and so or otherwise, or even reach it. There is no room for reasoning about it. It is simply a matter of fact. It either is or it is not; and there is both the beginning and the end of the question.

But having brought it to this, we are now in a condition to settle the point logically and definitively; for it falls under a general rule of evidence, viz., that by which matters of fact generally are ascertained. What, then, let us ask, is the evidence by which the existence or non-existence of a fact in such a case is usually and legitimately ascertained? Plainly, we are not to look to the external senses. The senses cannot give liberty as an object, even though it exists; for they cannot even give substance, much less such a condition of substance as liberty. How, then, shall we reach it if it exist? Shall we get into the very substance of the

soul and see whether liberty be there? Certainly that would be capital, if it were only possible. If we could but do this, and found not liberty, then plainly we should have to give it up; but if, on the contrary, we found it distinctly and directly, then, no speculative evidence could legitimately overturn our finding. Is it then possible to get into the substance of the soul and see what is there, and whether liberty exist in it or no? Yes, it is possible; it is done every day, every hour, every moment. It is done as often as a man is in possession of himself, and is self-conscious; for what is any particular form of self-consciousness but a perception of some fact existing in the soul at that moment? Accordingly it is universally agreed, that of all evidence this is the best; of all natural light, that of consciousness is the clearest. In fact, we cannot doubt of the reality of those things which it gives as its data. Thus, we cannot doubt that we ourselves exist, that we feel, think, reason, remember, as we find that we do, and are the same persons now that we were years ago. And yet, of all those undoubted facts, there is not one that is attested more strongly, or adheres more unalienably to the witnessing of consciousness, than liberty. Consciousness affirms liberty as intensely as it can or does affirm any fact whatever. By a long-sustained denial of it, indeed, in connection with some plausible hypothesis (such as materialism), which is incompatible with the admission of it, this point of native consciousness may be lost; in other words, by the establishment through custom and training of a creed which conflicts with it, and puts it down, the soul may perhaps cease to hold itself to be free, if not even to cease to feel free. But such alteration may happen with anything else as well as with liberty. If it ever occurs, it would certainly be recognised in society as a case of insanity; and the possibility of such an occurrence can be no argument against liberty as one of the data of the consciousness of human nature, and therefore no argument against its reality.

There is, therefore, liberty for man. The argument from universal causation which disproves it, is not legitimately applied. It does, indeed, disprove liberty if we admit the theory of mental phenomena, which it postulates. But that theory of mental action is a postulate, and, indeed, this argument against liberty proceeds only by a series of postulates. What, as has been already said, what will become of it if the phenomenon of sequence

and successive genesis in our mental phenomena be, after all, nothing more than merely a logical order, in which consciousness, when existing in an analytical phase, is obliged to take up these phenomena in obedience to that organic rhythm on which alone attention to one object at a time is possible? What if this spinning out of thought into a thread be only a phenomenon of embodied mind, nay, of the waking state merely? What if the successive be co-ordinate with the somatic merely, and do not belong to the spiritual and the pure at all? If so, the entire argument for necessity falls to the ground. Now, when we think of that form of intelligence to which, from the consideration of the forms of our own we are logically led; when we trace intelligence upwards into a state of perfection, or construct the ideal of intelligence, as we do when attempting to conceive the mode of intelligence in God,—when we find that in this case we part altogether with the idea of sequence, and hold both past and future to be gathered into the present, and all thought and feeling to be one simultaneous panorama in the Divine mind, the unity of which is the expression of his purpose; nay, when we consider the phenomena of mental action in ourselves while the organisation that attaches to the will is asleep, when we call to mind that a dream which was certainly developed in a moment, as, for instance, by the discharge of a shot—a shot which also awoke the sleeper, appears to him the moment he has it in his waking state to be a long story consisting of many successive incidents, which demand much time to relate them, when we call to mind even those things only (and this argument might be expanded to a great length), we shall be slow to hold the phenomenon of sequence, and the seeming genetic relationship of our successive thoughts and feelings, as a thing of equal depth in human nature with the fact of liberty, and to suffer our argument, based on the phenomenon of sequence, to shake the testimony of consciousness in favour of our freedom. But let us not press this argument here. Let us here rather content ourselves with rejecting the argument for necessity, because, though it may prove that this, that, and the other feeling, thought, volition, is not free, it fails altogether to prove that the man who emits or manifests these mental phenomena is not free. It does not touch the question of the man's liberty at all. Nor could it do so, unless it could show his immediate antecedent every time he acts;



to seek for which, in his case, is plainly as desperate as to seek for it in any case, and therefore amounts to the denial of the existence of cause altogether, and therefore denies the legitimacy of the ground on which the whole argument for necessity is reared. If it be not admitted that man is a cause, it is impossible to prove, nor could there ever have been the conception of another Being or thing as a cause, or consequently of a cause at all.

But the more particular necessitarian may, perhaps, appeal to the laws of suggestion as exclusive of liberty in every conceivable sense. He may say (which is indeed most true) that surely there can be no liberty where there is no thought, nor can liberty express itself otherwise than in thought, at least as a prelude to action; but if this be granted, he may then add, there can be no liberty for man, for all thoughts are suggested according to simple laws of most trustworthy constancy, such as resemblance and contrast, contiguity in time and place, etc., over which man plainly has no control whatever. Now, in this argument, doubtless there would be great weight if it were psychologically correct,—if these were indeed the laws of suggestion and the whole of them. But this, I apprehend, is very far from being the fact. Besides those usually enumerated (which are good so far as they go) there is a grand law of suggestion, provided, to all appearance, expressly to save the existence of liberty in detail, and to give a field for its deployment from moment to moment, which in the usual enumeration is omitted, though in the intellectual as well as the moral sphere, it be the most important of them all, and constitutes most especially the very rhythm of the reasoning process. I allude to the law of the negative, badly so named. This law is to the effect that no sooner is an object, an idea, or proposed action laid down or given, than the mind tends forthwith to construct or conceive its opposite and all that is not the original thing itself, while yet it belongs to the same sphere. To give an instance: "walking" is proposed to me, and no sooner does the idea echo in my intellect, than it belongs to that intellect, or rather to the will, to suggest the very reverse, and to leave memory to fill in, as fast as possible, all other known attitudes which fall under the general idea of "not walking," as for instance, sitting, lying, standing, etc. The presentation from without of one action, thus presents within me a whole panorama of possible actions. And so in other cases; on which, however,

we shall not enter here, as this law will fall to be maturely considered hereafter.<sup>1</sup> Now, nothing can be more favourable to the existence and exercise of liberty than such a law. It appears to be expressly provided, in order to give full scope for liberty, and to secure its exercise in life ; while yet, that it does no damage to reasoning, nor prevent trains of thought, whose value depends on their standing related to each other by a tie of necessity (*viz.*, resemblance) will, I trust, fully appear afterwards. When we are engaged in reasoning, the laws of resemblance, etc., then come in ; and when the design (the will) is to demonstrate, we select out of the panorama, in the mind's eye, the ideas which suit, and that on a principle of necessity, as must needs be, in order to the reasoning being legitimate and conclusive. But when it is not our reasoning but our active powers which we apply to the panorama, we are free to choose and to do this or that just as we will. Great is the interest and the importance of this grand law. It is, indeed, expressly the law of liberty itself, if such an expression can be admitted. It is the will manifesting its own free nature, its own determination to be free in spite of concepts or objects from without which are given to it, and which come on as if to limit it. But of this hereafter. Here let us content ourselves with remarking, that that liberty which man possesses at the root of his nature as an active Being, this grand law secures in the sphere of intellect.

There remains, therefore, for the necessitarian nothing to say, but that liberty cannot be admitted to exist, because it is inconceivable. And, indeed, if by conceivability be meant an aptitude for a determinate construction in the mind, it must be granted that liberty is inconceivable ; for this is the very condition of its existence. Is it then, at the same time, an evidence of its non-existence ? No ; that were a contradiction. It is no argument against the existence of liberty as a fact, that it is inconceivable or unimaginable. If it be, then we must also give up, not only liberty but all the objects of the spiritual world, all that exists in our Intelligence, all that have been emphatically called "ideas." With such extreme views, however, we do not propose here to contend.

<sup>1</sup> See Chap. ix.

## CHAPTER IV.

### OF BELIEF, AND THE LIMITS OF INTELLECT IN MAN.

BUT mere activity, though it be as truly self-outpouring, self-restraining, self-directing as can be; and though it be inherent in that which is a true unity, as indeed it plainly must be in order to realise its own existence, does not complete the idea of a self-directive nature. Such a nature demands another element. Such a nature demands, in order to be entitled in any measure to the name of a self-directive being, a self-relationship, or a sense or feeling of relation to the other objects which lie around it, in the system in which it is destined to play its part. How such a property can be constituted, or how it is constituted in point of fact, we of course can never discover; because it is itself the very instrument of discovery, and the only one which we possess, and must therefore always remain in the back-ground of every attempt to analyse it, and be a phenomenon in science which is essentially residuary. It may also be conceived as existing in many different forms and degrees of development, from that of a self-directive instinct of a purely subjective nature, which gives nothing but the existing state of self, to that of a clear and distinct perception of all things actual, nay, of all things possible, in one simultaneous panorama. But whatever the degree of its development, or the mode of its operation, this, in order that it may be of avail for self-direction, is constant and always necessary, that it must contain belief—it must give belief—it must be belief.

It might indeed be maintained, with equal truth, that it must contain feeling—give feeling—be feeling; *i.e.*, more or less uneasiness or enjoyment; and thus it might be maintained, that

the essence of the sense of relation, or of perceptivity in its most elementary form, is sensibility. But, on reflection, it will be found that sensibility does not exist in contrast with belief; that instead of being a rival element, it is in point of fact, and that most expressly, only a particular form of belief. In a word, enjoyment is a state of belief expressive of a state of well-being in that which is enjoying at the time it is enjoying; and uneasiness is a state of belief expressive of a state of ill-being. Sensibility, therefore, is that form or modification of belief which is an index to the individual of the state as to well-being or ill-being of his self-directive principle or activity, at the time when he is enjoying or uneasy. Sensibility is a very important species of belief. Of all beliefs, indeed, it is the most important; nay, its existence may perhaps be indispensable to the existence of a truly self-directed action. Still sensibility is only a species; while belief is the genus or general principle of relation in spiritual natures.

Of such value, however, is the institution of sensibility, though it may yet be said to be but the first step, or as it were the first power of belief, that it might of itself be sufficient for the guidance of a self-directive being all its days. For, while nothing can be better marked, or more easily distinguished, than enjoyment and suffering, their relations to the future existence and prospects of a self-directive species are equally well marked. Enjoyment being, as has been just said (in the absence of all complication of feeling and counter-indications), the signature of a state of well-being, and suffering (in similar circumstances) the signature of a state of ill-being—a species, which may not be altogether abusively designated self-directive, may be guided in the way of its well-being merely by being made alive to feelings of enjoyment and uneasiness from moment to moment, according as the conditions of existence in which it places itself from moment to moment, prove to be an advance in enjoyment, or a recession from it and an advance towards uneasiness. Thus a species, which may still be called self-directive, may be a creature of but one idea or feeling, or at the most of two, and still it may thrive. To the whole external world it may be wholly blind, and both to the past and the future it may be an utter stranger. Grant to it only a being, quick to injury, but yet duly tenacious of life, and place it in a medium (such as water) that shall protect it from all violent impressions when it mistakes its

way, as it must often do though only for a moment, and then this simple law of sensibility, even unsupported by any external sense, will be sufficient to enable it to maintain its life, and to pursue its well-being. And such appears, in point of fact, to be the whole extent to which self-directive power has been awarded to the manifold aquatic species in which the animal kingdom takes its rise. Not but they may have many points in the periphery of their bodies more sensitive to light than other points; but it is not easy to believe how these points can serve the purpose of what is commonly understood by an organ of vision. Of these simple creatures, the whole manner of life, and all the end they have in existence, appears to be merely to perpetuate existing enjoyment, and to flee from suffering the moment they feel the touch of it—a mode of existence which, if it argue great limitation in the creature, bespeaks, at the same time, great benevolence in the Creator.

But while such a mode of belief might be sufficient for the guidance of the lowest grade of a self-directive nature, many other higher modes are conceivable. Nay, the conception of that which is the very perfection of intelligence may, at least in some measure, be reached. If it could be fully reached, and that without doubt, great would be the advantage to metaphysical science and psychology; for we should then possess, as it were, a calculus, by which the phenomena of mind might be investigated, and to which they might be referred as their type. The psychologist would then be on the same vantage-ground as the mathematician. Great is the privilege of the latter in having for his theme a science which he can construct upon data which are at once truly homogeneous with the superstructure, and which lie wholly within the precincts of his own mind. By the purest intentions, and logical processes trustworthy in the highest degree, he is able to form conceptions with such distinctness, and to operate upon them with such certainty, precision, and success, as ultimately to construct for himself a world of abstract reality, possessing within itself intense intellectual beauty, and eminently fitted to impart intellectual delight to him who has mastered it, and made it his own. It has also this still higher recommendation, that should the mathematician be disposed at any time to leave the sphere of purely abstract thought, to leave the world of mere conception and engage with

nature, he is already prepared to enter upon the field—nay, to take possession of it at once, and that especially in the grandest walks, such as the starry heavens, which are the calculus of God. He needs only to place natural objects in such a position that they shall reflect themselves in the mirror of the formulæ which he has himself provided, and which he holds facing nature in his own mind, and forthwith the mechanism and the laws of nature declare themselves to an admirable extent. The mathematician is in fact (supposing his science perfected) put by it in possession of the conception of all possible forms and movements which are according to law. He is in possession of the type.

And great would be the achievement, and inestimable the advantage, could some type or organon of the same kind be constructed in reference to thought and feeling. Grant this, and psychology would then possess as a science all the dignity which now belongs to natural philosophy, with all that higher dignity which is intrinsic to itself as a science of the spiritual world. But this construction is not easy. Certain it is, however, that some facts pointing to what the type of intelligence must be, if not actually showing that type, are discoverable; and here let us shortly state them; as from that statement it will immediately appear that Intelligence, in order to be put in keeping with such a mission as ours, — namely, that of self-directive Beings, situate as we are,—must not be purely typical or perfect, and equally available for knowledge of all kinds, but must, on the contrary, be such as we actually find it in man,—that is, adapted to the acquisition of knowledge on certain subjects, and according to certain views only. In this way, even previously to an inquiry into the understanding and its powers, we shall reap the fruits which John Locke promised to himself as the product of such an inquiry, and which he has expressed so admirably in the Introduction to his immortal work, thus concluding,—“When we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success. And when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and made some estimate what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; nor, on the other side, question every thing, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood. ’Tis of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he

cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. 'Tis well he knows it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. OUR BUSINESS HERE IS NOT TO KNOW ALL THINGS, BUT THOSE WHICH CONCERN OUR CONDUCT. If we can find out those measures whereby a rational creature, put in that state in which man is in this world, may and ought to govern his opinions, and actions depending thereupon, we need not be troubled that some other things escape our knowledge."

But to return. Let us here ask, What is the condition of perception in a pure or typical Intelligence, such as has been conceived? Now, to this it may be answered, as obvious in the first place, that an Intelligence which realises the type of such a nature, or even approaches it, must obviously be complete in itself and want for nothing. Such a being must also know himself with all the distinctness which self-knowledge admits of. Nor this only. Whilst self must be sufficient for self, and in all its attributes clearly and distinctly perceived by self, so must self know all other things which may happen to be within the sphere of vision, and that not each by itself only, but all in their true relations both to the percipient and to each other, and that in one simultaneous panorama. In a perfect Intelligence, all things when viewed in reference to itself, must be equally present to it. The past, the present, the future—time and eternity—these ideas will not indeed be wanting, but they will develop themselves, not in reference to the percipient himself, but in reference to the things perceived by him. Even with respect to phenomena, or events which are, as we should say, in their very nature successive, a perfect Intelligence must be in possession of a simultaneous view of them. While we, on our part (for a reason which will presently appear), can be allowed a sight of them only by entering the wheel of time along with them, and by being carried round along with them, a perfect Intelligence must take up his position, as it were, in the centre of the system, and look out from it, himself unmoved, upon the whole revolving phenomena at once. To him the entire evolution of beings and phenomena in nature, and of events in history, must appear in one view. Not but that among these events themselves, and with respect to each other, there will be past, present, and future,

cause and effect, genesis and product, evolution and decay, in the eye of a perfect Intelligence, just as there is in ours. But in reference to himself, all must be equally present. *Simple vision*, in a being whose perception is not modified by the insertion between the soul and the outward world of an optical instrument or organ of sense, such as the eye, which invests with sensitive, and therefore with peculiar interest, the objects which intrude themselves through this channel, thus throwing all others, as it were, into the shade, and stigmatising them as absent and past *direct perception*, uninterfered with by sensation or subjective regard accompanying,—must give everything that we call past or future in equal brightness with that which we call the present. In a perfect Intelligence all must be present. Attention must be all embracing. It is also discoverable with respect to such an Intelligence, that unless from the first the panorama which is actually viewed embrace the whole field of the possible, as well as the whole field of the real, it belongs to it (supposing the principle of volition, as well as of intelligence, to be perfect also) to carry out its conceptions thus far; for short of this there is no natural limit to the ceaseless activity of thought, which is even in ourselves essentially creative of more (at least after some data or other have been supplied). When the whole universe of the possible has been developed, a limit does indeed declare itself, viz., that of the impossible, which, being self-contradictory, is also self-destructive; and, therefore, the sphere of thought is bounded on all hands by a region of no-thought. But, short of the complete development of the whole sphere of the possible in the mind's eye, no limit to knowledge and conception appears in a perfect Intelligence. Nothing less than this, therefore, is implied in a just conception of *omniscience*, or the condition of the intellect in a perfect Intelligence—the whole of the possible, together with the whole of the actual in the mind's eye, in one orderly simultaneous panorama, on which an all-embracing attention is bestowed.

And here some very interesting results offer themselves as to the state of the sensibility corresponding to such perfection of perceptive power: as for instance, *first*, that during the epoch of the development of this panorama, there must be a full tide of enjoyment; *secondly*, that in order to impart perpetuity to this full tide of enjoyment, the panorama provided for the eye of omni-



science must not be a crystalline or congealed system of things, however bright and beautiful, but a system of living beings and ever-changing phenomena, such as we find creation, so far as it is known by us, to be. But let us not dwell on these topics, since they rather belong to theology than to our theme, and, moreover, do not admit of being truthfully discussed without invoking the aid of Revelation.

Enough has been said to show, that the typical condition of Intelligence would not be at all suitable for man during the pilgrimage of this life. To be possessed of a simple, unbiased perceptivity, to be possessed of omniscience, or even of a panoramic view of all that may be known before life is over, would quite frustrate our mission, and be quite incompatible with our well-being. A self-directive being, whose calling is to act a part in the midst of a material system, under the guidance of sentiment,—a moral being, whose it is, not to stand still and contemplate his position and prospects, but to move on at all events, and one step after another, with always one foot only on the ground,—must not be allowed to know too much or see too far. The past may, indeed, be left open to him without detriment,—nay, if to a certain extent only, it may with the greatest advantage; but he must not be permitted to see into the future. To foreknow coming events would prostrate and paralyse every motive to action, and utterly destroy the interest of life. It would be wholly incompatible with the constitution of humanity. Only imagine a family circle or fireside, each member with a conscious record in his own breast of all the lineaments of his future life, all the circumstances of his death—and husband, wife, and child, brother and sister, all with a perfect knowledge of each other's destiny in time and in eternity! What a change from the happy economy of the family as it exists now under our present limited perception of the future, in which every thought, after efflorescing for a little as thought, embosoms itself in the heart, and comes out in living beauty in the delightful form of affection to gladden every eye by the magic of sympathy, even before it has found words in which to express itself! Suppose simultaneous knowledge in man, and in that case every thought, instead of coming, as it does now, like a welcome visitant from the ideal world on the delightful wings of hope, to fan pleasingly away the passing hour;—every thought, coming then from the world

of stern realities, with the dismal tread of Fate, would go only to chill and petrify the heart. Suppose unlimited perceptivity in man, liberty would cease to breathe, action would sink into mere automatism, life would become a mere dragging on of existence and a drudgery.

The only kind of life that is in harmony with perceptivity in perfection or omniscience, is that in which the power corresponding, instead of being bestowed upon self, is spent in works of creation and providence. But this is not for man, at least creation is not; and though doubtless it is the excellence of a man to be a providence within his own sphere, and is indeed the only condition in which he can be truly the child of his heavenly Father, yet as man can be a providence only by acting, and not, like God, simply by willing, it follows that whatever paralyses action in man, destroys also man as a fellow-worker with Providence. When viewed in reference to the well-being of others, therefore, as well as his own, the perceptivity of man in his present state of being must be limited.

And what though the amount of ignorance on speculative points may be great, in which this necessary limitation of our perceptive powers may incidentally involve us! It is enough for a good life, if means be given us whereby we may become acquainted in due time with the objects that lie in our way, and the phenomena and effects which they are calculated to produce; so that we may be enabled to chalk out for ourselves, with due discretion, our own line of life among them. The less a man sees of what he has nothing to do with, the less will he be liable to be bewildered and go wrong. The beau ideal of perceptive power, in reference to our well-being considered as merely self-directive beings, would be, when it presented nothing to us but what was open to us, and in the way that we should go.

Such an extreme limitation of perceptive power, however, were not suitable to such an economy as that of man, into which the idea of probation and of merit enters. To admit of virtue or merit, objects sometimes alluring to what is wrong must be presented to the mind, as well as objects inviting to what is right—or else the access of wicked spirits must be granted to practise upon the ignorance of the innocent, which is much the same. Perceptive power in man, therefore, if on the one hand it must be so limited as not to show him everything that is around,

behind, and before him, yet must not be so limited, on the other, as to show him only one object at a time. In those animals whose guidance is purely instinctive, it seems probable that one object at a time is all that is ever given to engage their attention. But to man, before he can realise his nature as a being whose calling is to liberty, a certain latitude of perception, and doubt as well as belief must be allowed. Objects in moral azimuth must be given as well as those which are in the meridian of right conduct.

What the exact amount of intrinsic perceptive force proper to the human soul may be, cannot be discovered. Revelation every where intimates, that a great enlargement and exaltation of mental functions awaits us in the after-life. And the most sublime school of philosophy, though a stranger to revelation, has endeavoured to establish the same view, and to show that "this life is but a sleep and a forgetting." Meantime, it is instructive to know, that our intellectual powers must be limited, else we should be unfit for the lives which we are expressly sent here to lead. And if it happen in point of fact, that besides earnest thoughts about conduct, we may attain to a certain amount of knowledge that is purely speculative, we ought surely to accept it as a gratuity in a spirit of thankfulness, and to use it only for the purpose of innocent recreation, or of moral elevation. To quarrel on the ground of perceptive differences in things that lie wholly beyond the reach both of common sense and of demonstration, is to be truly forgetful of our nature, and to disgrace our humanity. Nor can any speculations, however fine, excuse in any case a neglect of active duty.

Seeing, then, that even at best our vision is so narrow, shall we limit belief more than the law of our being calls for? Shall we, for instance, refuse belief in the existence of everything except what appears to the senses? Shall we, on this ground, refuse to believe in God and spiritual natures, even down to the fact of our own souls? By pursuing the argument of this chapter, it will be found that the whole of the sensitive system has been framed expressly to qualify man for being the self-directive being which is his calling, not for defining to him the sphere of reality. Hence it is that the eye is given to see only bodies, nay, only inert masses, only such objects as, when lying in man's way, might obstruct his progress. Nothing can be more foolish

than to deny, on the ground of their being invisible, such beings and things as do not possess either inertia at all, or else so little of it as could form no impediment to locomotion. Hence, also, it is that the ear (or eye given for darkness) is affected only by objects which are moving or exerting force, for these alone need to be guarded against during the periods designed for repose in man. Hence, also, the reason why the nostrils and the tongue are affected only by soluble substances; for it is soluble substances only which can be either useful or injurious to the nutritive system. Hence, also, why contact is necessary in order to the exercise of the sense of touch; it is only when bodies are very near, that the knowledge of their actual forms comes to be of any importance to man. So long as they are at a distance, it is their masses only which need to be considered. In a word, the senses have been organised not to report upon existence generally, but specially upon such objects as lie in our way; and that only in their bearings upon our bodily well-being and conduct. The senses are in no degree co-ordinate with existence generally; nor were they meant to give either full or disinterested views of the universe. The views they give are indeed absolutely true so far as they go, though the judgment often comes to false conclusions by their use, as, for instance, when we judge that the heavens revolve. Thus, when I find by my senses that a bit of gold is yellow and heavy, these facts are most absolutely true of a piece of gold in the position in nature in which it exists, that is, lying upon the surface of this earth, and in relation with my eye. Were it out and all alone in the universe, it is indeed true that it could not be heavy; and were there no eye to see it, it is equally true that it could not be called yellow. Before there can be weight, there must be two or more bodies mutually to attract each other; and before there can be colour, there must be a percipient to appreciate and declare colour, as well as a coloured body to give it. It is therefore true that when a body is spoken of or conceived as coloured, it is spoken of or conceived of in relation to its appearance, in relation to a percipient. But of the body held as existing in this relation, colour is predicated with absolute truth; and the same of sensible qualities generally. All the cognizable, all the conceivable properties of things, are properties of relation; but so are the things themselves. No one thing, if it existed all alone, possibly could be what it is

now. Each thing now existing is what it is, because all things now existing are what they are. There is universal connexity, universal transfusion. The senses, in giving truly the relations of bodies to themselves, give truly the properties of bodies in the relations in which they exist in nature, when they are looked upon, known, and remembered. To say that we never can know things as they are in themselves, is no doubt most true ; but it is to say no one knows what. The remark seems, at first sight, to be very wise. But notwithstanding this, those who discourse about " things as they are in themselves," will find it hard, if they think deeply, to come to an understanding of their own meaning. Our intellect is very limited ; but, as I have here endeavoured to show, it must be limited, else we should be unfitted for our mission in this world. And reason, when rightly used and kept in seclusion from a corrupt will, in so far as it goes in the clear light of common sense and of demonstration legitimately conducted, is absolutely truthful. While, therefore, it is suited to the uses of this life, it is not unworthy of a better. And that there is another in the background, follows also from our characteristic, as I have indeed already endeavoured to show in the chapter on immortality.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS.

THE ground, or, as we have more usually designated it, the characteristic, of human nature, is self-directive power; but if this doctrine possesses any real value, that value must mainly lie, neither in the mere affirmation of the existence of this power nor in the vantage ground for a scientific analysis which it supplies, but in contemplating the actions of which that power is the source. Any power, be what it may, when viewed apart from its manifestation in action, is next to nothing to us, and almost inconceivable; and it is, besides, of no moral or practical interest, though we had the intellectual means of discoursing about it. Let us then proceed now to the consideration of the mode of action which the self-directive power in man is destined to produce. Nor let it be thought that the field which is thus opened upon us is indefinitely extensive—too vast to be even fairly touched upon here. The possibilities of human action are indeed all but infinite, but not so the proprieties of human action; for man does not exist at large in the universe, nor has he been left to choose his own place in creation. A definite position and range have been assigned to him. He has been constituted a member of a certain economy, which is very grand, but which is, at the same time, in no inconsiderable degree modifiable by himself for better or for worse, according to the bearings of his actions upon it. If, then, the well-being of an entire economy be a greater good than that of some individuals, more or less, who enter into that economy, the self-directive power of man is not left without a law for its guidance. Plainly, born into this world as we are, and standing in the midst of those around us, as we do, the first law of human nature, the duty of every man, is to

conduct himself so as to perform his part in maintaining when it exists, and in restoring when it has been lost, the order and well-being of that economy which has been so far placed under his providence. If man be essentially a self-directive Being, appointed to exist under certain relations with other Beings, from which, however, he may depart if he please, plainly the first law of man's Being is, that he do all that he can to maintain these relations. In a word, if man be free, and at the same time a member in a system which he may, as he pleases, knowingly keep right, injure, or restore, the first law of his being is *uniformly right conduct*. Yes; the grand mission of human liberty, in this world at least, is to place itself voluntarily under law, and thus to consecrate obedience and render it truly venerable by making it the soul's own choice.

How right conduct is to be discovered, does not as yet appear; but that is not now the question. We may, in the meantime, safely assume that as man has been called upon to direct his own steps, so also has he been provided with the means of doing so rightly. At all events, given the actions necessary to keep or to bring an individual into his true position, in the economy of which he forms a part, or to bring that economy into a right position with respect to him, and to maintain the order of the whole, nothing can be more certain than that his first, his whole part, is to intend with all his heart, and to perform with all his energy, the actions indicated. Right conduct, and that purely in virtue of its own claims, and at all events, is the first law of man's being. Such conduct may perhaps, in the state of probation wherein we now are, imply a struggle, a protest, nay, a declaration of war, from which there is no legitimate discharge, and in which to lay down our arms is to renounce our right to liberty. But there is no help for this.

Apart altogether from the pleasures and pains which have been associated with existence—apart altogether from the exalted enjoyments which the goodness of the Creator has attached to the maintenance and the restoration of order, and the misery which He has made to follow from disorder—apart altogether from the wonderful institution of sensibility, there is certainly something intrinsically better in Being than in mere nonentity or nothingness; as also, something intrinsically better in the order and well-being of that which exists, than in its disorder and ill-being.

There is, therefore, in the nature of things, something which lies deeper, and is as it were more holy, than mere sensibility, viz., Being and order, which is the safeguard of Being. And, therefore, a free or self-directive being (if he had the means of knowing, independently of the leadings of sensibility, what was right to be done in any case) ought to have an eye, when framing his conduct, not to his own enjoyments or sufferings, nay, not to enjoyment or suffering at all in the first instance, but wholly, purely, solely, to order. He ought to have an eye simply to the upholding of the economy he belongs to, ever preserving before him as distinct a view as possible of that which is right and holy, to the exclusion of all besides, in the first instance at least, and ever insisting upon it, cost what it may. Nor is this a mere abstraction in deontology. Human nature, even as it now exists in the midst of the abounding wickedness of this world, witnesses to the reality of this view as the law of our being. Thus it is only when the heart divides about an action, and begins to balance between it and something else, that the idea of pleasure or pain comes in, and takes a part in deciding what the forthcoming action shall be. When a man, in the whole of his heart and energy, is bent upon an action—when, in a word, a man realises, in reference to any action, the ideal of an active being, then, at that moment of earnest intention he knows nothing either of pleasure or pain, nor thinks of it. The action itself, or rather its accomplishment, absorbs his entire personality, and is everything to him. It is only when the action is over, or when his earnestness begins any how to flag and fall away, to divide and oscillate between the outward and the inward, the objective and the subjective, it is only then, that self and the thoughts of enjoyments or sufferings come into the field of view. Whenever sensibility appears in its legitimate place, it is always in the wake of the resolution to do right, not as an antecedent or motive to it.

Considering the extreme quickness of the human soul, however, to pleasure and pain, and the extreme interest of these feelings compared with all others, it is only to be expected that men in general will usually be guided in their conduct by a regard to sensibility, or a concern for happiness. Nay, considering the interest and importance to a man of his own happiness, compared with that of others, it is further to be expected that men in general shall be guided by a concern for their own individual



happiness. The actual motives of human conduct, therefore, and its modes, must be very various ; and the scientific treatment of the subject, in the actual condition of the world, extremely difficult. But let us not enter here more minutely upon the subject ; only let us constantly affirm, that as there ought to be, so there may be, and in order to the most exalted virtue there must be, a determination to right conduct for its own sake, simply from a regard for order—a veneration for law. Nothing short of this is the nature of man—the duty of man.

But it is time to guard against the supposition which these remarks may perhaps have engendered,—namely, that right conduct costs more than that which is not right ; in other words, that the law of rectitude and the law of sensibility are at variance with each other. But such an inference were a grievous error. The first command of God to man no doubt is to respect His institutions—to venerate His laws, cost what it may ; but no sooner has any man heartily consented to this, the charter of his being, the law of his Maker, than he learns from experience that the same voice which, objectively considered, says “do this,” subjectively considered, says also, “and live,” or be happy ; for the mere intention to venerate law, the mere resolution to do what is right and holy, apart from the actual performance of it, repeats itself in the breast as enjoyment. The laws of rectitude and of sensibility, far from being at variance, exist in most harmonious sisterhood. But still be it never forgotten, that before this harmonious co-ordination can be permanently established and maintained, the law of rectitude must evermore take the lead, and form the van in the march of life. The only right and safe place for sensibility is in the rear.

This may seem a severe doctrine, savouring too much of stoicism ; but that it is not so in reality, immediately appears. From the co-ordination of these two laws—the law of rectitude and the law of sensibility, it follows that, when the law of rectitude imposes no line of conduct, nor suggests one action of several more than another, then it is safe, nay it is right, to choose that action which sensibility prefers, provided that sensibility in so choosing be truly guided by its own law. When a man cannot find his way as a member in the system of the universe, he may choose his way as a sentient individual. Or when, of several ways which he sees before him, all are equally in moral

order, in so far as he can perceive, he may rightfully look to himself for that which he shall perform. Not that he is left in these circumstances without any law for his guidance: on the contrary, the question here is by no means so difficult as when the outward world must be looked to. In reference to the outward world we were able to affirm only, that right conduct must consist in the development and maintenance of the true order of the moral system; we were not able to lay down the points wherein that order consists. But in reference to the system of the individual, the world of personal sensibility, we are able to say wherein order here consists; and, therefore, also wherein right conduct consists. There can be no doubt that order in the sphere of pure sensibility, consists in that normal deployment of our personality of which a state of spontaneously attendant enjoyment is the index. And, therefore, in reference to the private or personal system of man, right conduct consists in the pursuit and perpetuation of happiness, and in the avoiding of suffering. Care must of course be taken not to confound merely induced enjoyment with that which originates truly in the soul (as, for instance, the agreeable sensation in which certain conditions of the organisation, or of particular organs, may involve the soul), with the enjoyment which takes its rise in the soul itself. But within limits which a man who is honest with himself may easily discover for himself, it still remains true that the law of right conduct for an individual, when acting purely as an individual, is the law of enjoyment, the pursuit of happiness; for this is the law of sensibility itself, the well-being of sensibility itself, and it cannot but be right to realise it.

Nor should the name of duty, on the right occasion, be refused to the pursuit of happiness. Duty cannot in any case be anything else but ready obedience to the laws which we are placed under. And where various laws present themselves, all claiming obedience, the point of duty can never be anything else but obedience to that law which proclaims itself to be supreme. Now, as has been stated, and as is indeed obvious, the well-being of sensibility itself, and consequently its law, is the pursuit of enjoyment. Whenever, therefore, nought else appears in the bearings of any intended action, but its effects upon our own sensibility, then, to maintain our own happiness when it exists already, or to endeavour to restore it when it has been anyhow

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lost, is not only the duty generally of a sensitive creature considered as such, but, under various solicitations to the entertainment of various feelings, it is the point of duty. Often, indeed, in this sinful world it falls to be one's duty to entertain, and even to cherish, thoughts to which suffering unavoidably attaches, thoughts with which enjoyment is wholly incompatible; and these, therefore, ought to be entertained, ought to be cherished, and the suffering which belongs to them ought to be patiently borne. But never ought suffering to be entertained, or cherished, or borne, for its own sake. Even with regard to repentance, which is, indeed, necessary and good, and before God daily incumbent on every man, it is not to be entertained or cherished merely for the sake of the suffering, but only for the sake of the thought that is in it—a great fact—impressively taught by the gospel, though set at nought by many sincere professors of Christianity. Thus, in the gospel it is provided that repentance, after having been but once deeply experienced in the soul, shall forthwith be transfigured into penitence, that is, shall receive an infusion of such joy as may be truly said to overbalance the suffering that is in it—a joy taking its rise partly in the forgiveness of God, and the self-forgiveness which is the echo in the soul of the forgiveness recorded in the soul's favour in the upper sanctuary, and partly in the Divine love which it belongs to such a frame of mind to awake and sustain. However great, therefore, may be the favour in which asceticism may have been held in former ages, or begins again to be held in our day, it is ever to be maintained as a point in morals, that except in so far as it exists for the sake of mental discipline and self-control, the ascetical regimen is quite contrary to moral order. The voice of the Godhead and Humanity united, and that which is the duty of every man, is to anoint his head and wash his face even when he is fasting.

It may, perhaps, be thought that the application of the term duty to the pursuit of happiness, is an extension of that term which common usage does not justify, unless it be applied, as it often is, ironically; because the use of the term duty ordinarily implies an effort in which personal enjoyment is sacrificed more or less for the sake of some higher consideration. But this is a view of duty which is far too limited. Why should not the term be used to signify what is due to one's self as well as what

is due to others? Nay, there is absolutely occasion for the sacred name of duty here, for though it may seem that there can be nothing so agreeable to any man as to endeavour to maintain, and when it has been lost to restore, his own happiness; yet are there not a few persons in the world, who in their inner frames voluntarily devote themselves to distressing thoughts. By the aid of fear and of anxious or dreary anticipations they voluntarily invoke a state of suffering, and do all they can to maintain a state of misery, or to call it back into their breasts, when kindly nature or the grace of God has supplied more cheering thought. Such a practice is even held to be most religious, and that not among heathens only, but among Christians also. If, therefore, it be right for every human being to do what in him lies to maintain his own happiness, and to restore it when it has been lost, provided only that while so doing he has made sure to fulfil all his social duties, and all the duties of an enlightened piety at the same time, it is not superfluous to insist on this point, it is not wrong to vindicate, for the perpetuation and just pursuit of private happiness, the name of duty. It is, indeed, a very conceivable, nay, it is a very usual thing, that the line of a man's duty as a member in the moral system as it exists around him, may not coincide with that line which a regard to his private happiness at that moment might dictate; for the moral system to which we belong exists in the present epoch in a state of extreme disorder, and thus a duty of a higher order may affix the signature of wrong upon any attempt to maintain or to restore one's own happiness at a particular moment. But supposing various lines of conduct to be open, all with equal claims to be right, then it is not only lawful, let us repeat, but it is a point of morality, to choose that which gives the best promise of private happiness.

Let us not fail to remark, however, that on every occasion on which one begins to make his own personal enjoyment the object of his direct pursuit, too great caution can scarcely be exercised; for, as has been shown, the institution of God, the true order of nature, and the first principle of morality, instead of being the direct pursuit of happiness, is the observance of right conduct, leaving it to happiness to follow spontaneously in the wake. In fact, the direct pursuit of enjoyment, instead of being the general law of human activity, or even always lawful, may, and very

often does, lead to ruin. A man may kill himself by excess of enjoyment. The truth is, that enjoyment may be had not only by the right exercise of our powers as self-directive beings, not only according to reason and by the discharge of duty, but by an appeal to our appetites, and merely by throwing ourselves into our organisation as an apparatus capable of imparting enjoyment. Such a result becomes possible from these two facts, *first*, that whenever and wherever the soul is allowed to deploy its spontaneous activity without effort, there is enjoyment, be the means what they may by which that spontaneous flow of soul is induced; and *secondly*, that the union between the body and the soul is so intimate, their movements so parallel, that when the initiative is with the organisation, when through any congenial stimulus, the vital activity of any organ or of the entire organisation, is developed and exalted, that of the soul is developed and exalted also, and follows in its course. Along with all normal deployment of the organisation, therefore, there is enjoyment more or less. Thus, that I may neither be averse to introduce into my body dead matter from without, nor grudge the trouble, since food is indispensable to the continuance of my organic life, it has been provided that, by the act of eating, when food is needed, when we are hungry, certain organs shall be brought into a state of most congenial deployment. Now the soul, though it often takes the lead and determines the bodily action, is always affected by that action and follows in the wake, and is thrown into arrest or flows congenially as the organisation does. Hence, in the act of eating, there is to a hungry man, a congenial flow of soul as well as of organisation; in other words, there is enjoyment. I may, therefore, if I please, eat not for the sake of food, not for the sake of supplying fresh material for the waste of life, but for the sake of the pleasure that eating imparts. And thus generally, the organisation,—instead of being merely maintained as an apparatus provided for supplying disposable mechanical force to the soul, in virtue of which the latter may take her place and acquit herself with credit in a mechanical economy which is in no small degree placed under her providence,—the organisation may be made an instrument merely of pleasure. And since it is always at hand, it is only to be expected that it shall often be resorted to for this purpose and put merely to this use.

But is such a use of the body lawful? No: plainly it is not; for pleasure taking its rise in bodily action, is given only as the index of bodily well-being, or of a state of progress towards it, as pain, on the other hand, is of bodily ill-being, or of a falling into it; and to regard these sensitive accompaniments of certain bodily states, not as indices, but as ends, cannot but be to fall away from our true nature, and to make a very bad use of a very great benefit. It is nothing less than to prostitute the body, as is, indeed, most significantly told by the course of nature itself; for every man who thus devotes himself to merely organic enjoyment, turns out, sooner or later, to be his own destroyer. Nor can it be otherwise; for the body being an exquisitely but delicately constructed machine, it is obvious that if its action be urged beyond a certain degree or a certain time, lesion or complete destruction must be the consequence. But, until the lesion has actually taken place, there will be no remission of the enjoyment, such as it is. When a nerve is lacerated, or pressed, or anyhow impaired in its function, then, indeed, there results a state of fixed attention in a certain direction, which is quite incompatible with the *laissez aller* of organic enjoyment, and is, indeed, itself a state of uneasiness, which may be most intense; in a word, there is pain. But till this takes place, the more the action in any organ is normally exalted, the more enjoyment there will result; for mere enjoyment is merely the spontaneous deployment of the soul's activity, whatever the source of the motion. Enjoyment does not, of its own accord, look into causes at all, nor respect them at all. It is merely that which flows with the flow of the soul's life, and ebbs with its tide, or rather, it is the very flow itself, as it reports itself in consciousness and tells upon it.

And hence a most important fact in human nature. By being embodied, the soul is placed in a state of probation. Nor is this an evil. No. To say so, were all the same as to say that virtue and merit are evils; for both these things imply, not only self-mastery, considered as an untried potency, but self-mastery realised in the face of difficulties. Now, such difficulties, and the opportunity of making self-mastery real, it is our somatic engagements in the present state of our being which principally supply.

And thus satisfactorily do the first principles of the moral

economy come out in a scientific point of view, when we regard the soul as one element in our nature and the body as another. Of materialism, on the other hand, it is not unjust to say that it absolutely fails to explain the first facts of our moral nature. Yea, even this very notorious fact itself, that bodily indulgence is destructive of health and life. For, if enjoyment were really nothing more than a certain state of the body, as the materialist maintains, why should enjoyment be in the interest of health up to a certain point, beyond which the enjoyment goes on no less, but the health goes off? Plainly, if enjoyment were a simple function of the organisation, the two ought to vary together. Whatever gave pleasure should be good for the health, and always in the degree that it did so. But such an inference, though necessary under materialism, is quite contrary to experience. The difficulty vanishes only when it is denied that enjoyment is a function of the organisation; and the phenomenon of debauchery is explained only when its enjoyment is laid down as the regardless state of consciousness inevitably making its apparition in the soul, when fully deploying her activity, whatever the circumstances;—following, in this case, in the wake of the organic vortex, and, in virtue of her infinitely greater aptitude for movement, enjoying the whirl of the organisation all the more, the more rapid it is, and, it may be, the more destructive to itself, under the application of the stimulus. The law of nature, no doubt, is, that bodily enjoyment shall be an index of bodily well-being and health. And plainly a most benignant institution such a law is. But, like all the laws of our material economy, there is an apparatus by which it shall be carried out, and that apparatus is such as to provide only against those derangements of the organisation which are apt to occur in the course of nature, and these are always cases of the predominance of inertia—cases of under-action. Although, therefore, a man may be over-exciting his organisation, the enjoyment which attaches to the deployment of its activity will go on; nor will he obtain any intimation from the law of sensibility of the material injury that he is doing, until some chord snaps. It is reason and conscience that are given him to look to for his guidance, not mere organic sensibility. And why should it be otherwise? If man is by this arrangement placed in a state of trial, he is at the same time ennobled, and virtue is rendered possible.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OF MAN AS A MEMBER OF THIS WORLD, AND THE ORGANISATION.

SUCH, then, are the essential elements of a self-directive nature, the internal conditions of its existence, first, *unity* or simplicity; second, *activity* or inherent life self-determinative of particular actions; and third, *the sense of relation* or *the power of believing*: the first securing *immortality*, the second *liberty*, and the third *intelligence*, and all taken together, constituting such a Being as is usually known by the name of a Spirit or a Spiritual nature. The emphasis which has been put, however, upon these attributes, plainly implies that there are others which exist in contrast with them, and which cannot but have some apparent claims upon human nature, otherwise it would not have been so carefully fenced against them. In a word, it is obvious that there are in relation with human nature, such things as death, necessity, and stupidity, as well as immortality, liberty, and intelligence. Not yet, therefore, have we arrived exactly at human nature, as human nature is possessed by us, and known to us on the surface of this planet. And indeed it is obvious that the analysis which has been given of a self-directive nature, gives us such a nature only in the most general point of view, only as a disposable member of the universe, capable, so far as appears, of existing in a state of well-being in a variety of different worlds, if different abodes should be assigned to it. There is nothing in any of the attributes that are essentially implied in a self-directive Being, which goes to limit its dwelling-place to any determinate state or order of things, as, for instance, to this world. But it is with this world that we have, at present at least, to do; and, therefore, we must farther



consider whether something else besides unity, activity, and perceptivity, be not essential to a self-directive Being, in order to qualify it for fulfilling its destiny, in such a system as that to which we at present belong. Now, that something else is required immediately appears. Thus, this world of ours is a mechanical system in which inertia and gravitation rule. And hence it appears that a self-directive Being, in order to be able to manifest itself in this system according to its nature, and to play its part in it, must not be sent into the world quite naked and altogether unattached to the material system; for, in that case, it would not be a member in it, but only a free spirit, as it were, accidentally present. In order to be a member in a material system, that spirit must be somehow intimately linked with matter. But yet it must not be so clothed with matter, as to exist under the necessity of always holding indiscriminately to whatever body happened to be nearest to it. In neither of these cases would its destiny, as a self-directive Being, be accomplished. In the former, it could not enter into the system, or manifest itself in it at all, for it would have no means of mechanical action; in the latter, it might be often or even always in a state of imprisonment, and every attempt to accomplish its destiny as a self-directive Being might be frustrated. That a self-directive Being may be able at once to manifest itself, and to play a part in a material system, accomplishing its destiny as a self-directive Being, it is required that a definite volume of matter shall be assigned to it as its vehicle or dwelling-place, and its organ of manifestation or symbol in the material system. Nor is this enough. It is also required that this abode shall be moveable in obedience to the intrinsic self-directive principle which occupies it. In a word, a self-directive Being destined to take a part in the economy of this world, and duly qualified for accomplishing this destiny, must have a body, and that body must be so framed or organised as to constitute a locomotive apparatus.

Thus the method which we have adopted in aiming at a knowledge of mind, supplies also a theory of the body. Psychology, as thus treated, points to the construction of a Rational Anatomy. According to the view which has just been given, the body of an animal, when considered as appropriate to the individual, and in reference to its principal function, is a locomotive apparatus designed to manifest, in a mechanical system, the self-directive

force which animates it, and to enable that force to fulfil its destiny as such. Moreover, out of this simple fact, it immediately appears how the whole system of the organs must arise. Thus, being necessarily material, and destined for a planetary abode, the body of an animal cannot but be more or less heavy, according to the greater or less quantity of matter that is in it, and the greater or less intensity of gravitation in that region, where the field of its life is destined to lie. Here, then, is an obstacle appearing at once, and lying right in the way of its being a simple locomotive apparatus, or apparatus moveable by mere volition, or in a manner wholly spiritual. Here is a state of things which demands at once, that if the body is to be locomotive at all, it can be so only mechanically, it can be so only by being constructed into a locomotive machine. Levers, therefore, or some equivalent dynamical instruments, must be provided, as also a supply of mechanical force to work these levers, disposable by the will or self-directive or spiritual principle within.

Hence, as the instruments required,—the muscular system, with the skeleton and the integument, to give it form, fulcra, and protection, as we actually find in nature.

Hence, as the source of the force required,—that molecular structure which constitutes organisation, and which, by a continual series of decompositions and recompositions, develops from the atmosphere and the food a supply of disposable force, both for its own conservation and for the purposes of locomotion.

Hence also the alimentary and the respiratory apparatus, which this generation of disposable force demands, in order to restore the inevitable waste from materials not wholly suited for doing so.

Hence also a nervous system, or system of centralised conductors, by which the whole organic mass may be brought into relation with the self-directive principle, and more especially those parts designed for locomotion be placed at its disposal.

Hence limbs of some kind. In a word, the grounds of a rational anatomy present themselves. A satisfactory, and as it were geometrical opening is obtained, into all the most interesting branches of physiological science.

Thus, by viewing the body as primarily designed to be the vehicle of the spirit—by viewing it as a locomotive machine—by beginning with the muscular system,—the whole presents itself as an orderly fraternity of organs, all necessary to accomplish and

sustain one grand function, and all explained by that function, when taken in connection with the conditions of existence under which it is to be exercised. The conception of the body as the vehicle of a self-directive being, whose mission is to play a part in a mechanical and material system, such as that around us, explains everything.<sup>1</sup> In this way may a rational character be imparted to special anatomy, such as has already, with no small degree of success, been imparted to general anatomy, by arranging the tissues according to their genesis from each other. But of this enough for the present.

It appears then that a self-directive being, in order to be qualified for taking a part in this world, must have a body—must be a piece of complicated machinery, articulated together as much as possible into an unity. But such an apparatus cannot be, without its being easily hurt, and liable to go wrong. Hence it is obvious that it must be placed in as intimate relation as possible with the self-directive being which animates it. Their well-being must, as far as possible, be made mutually dependent. A being thus delicately housed, cannot be allowed to live freely and at random, or to be left to become altogether absorbed in its own consciousness, or its own speculations. In such a case it might precipitate the body into ruin or destruction the first day of its existence. In a word, a sensitive organic system is called for, if it can be at all constructed,—that is, a system in which the well-being or ill-being of the organisation draws as it were that of the soul in its wake, and which is so closely and intimately united to it, that, while the soul *sees* the changes of the outward world, it *feels* those of the body. Now that it can, we know full well by observation, with which remark, however, we must leave the subject here.

Thus far the analysis of our characteristic can carry us on sure footing in our approaches to an understanding of human nature. But such is the richness of possibilities in the idea of a self-directive or spiritual being, and so great the variety of such beings which are legitimately conceivable, that our method conducts us rather to the construction of a spiritual economy in general, than to that of human nature in particular.

<sup>1</sup> Except the peculiar character of the cerebral system, which appears to have a peculiar function of its own,—viz., the development, as well as the entertainment, of “the soul that rises in us our life’s star,” on which, however, not a single remark can be made without arduous prologomena in monodology, which cannot be even touched on here.

Thus, as has indeed been already shown, a self-directive being may be guided in the way of its well-being merely by feelings of enjoyment and of suffering from moment to moment, according as the position in which it places itself is an advance towards a state of well-being, or a recession from it. It may be a creature whose whole object in life is to perpetuate its own enjoyment, and flee from suffering the moment it feels the touch of it. To the whole external world it may be utterly blind, and both to the past and future it may be altogether a stranger.

But the external world also may be given. To the self-directive Being external senses may be imparted, so that enjoyment and uneasiness may develop themselves, not merely as consequents of a certain affection of the organisation, but also as attaching to the perception of objects more or less in the distance; and with regard to action, more or less in the future or the past. And thus the self-directive Being, instead of being altogether self-enclosed and guided by pleasure and pain realised in all their force and fulness in the present, may be guided by pleasure and pain in prospect,—that is, by desire and aversion. And this is a form of sensitive life which actually exists in nature to a great extent.

Again, it is easily conceivable that a species may be so much higher in the scale, that, instead of only one desire or aversion developing itself in the face of external nature, several shall do so simultaneously, of which one in particular shall carry the day, and determine to action, in virtue of its being dynamically the most powerful of the group.

Again, it is conceivable that, while the same state of things continues to exist, and several desires manifest themselves simultaneously, influencing the individual in different ways, one of them being the strongest, or all of them equally strong, as the case may be, a principle of another order (such as moral approbation) may be provided, destined to sit authoritatively in review and judgment on all the others, from that which is dynamically weakest to that which is strongest, and that without paying any respect to their relative strength, but only to their relative merit or goodness, as estimated by itself.

Again, we may conceive a self-directive being of a nature so purely intellectual, as to be led into action, not by feeling or emotion at all, but solely by a regard to the consequences of

actions, foreseen by comparing them, in anticipation of their being realised, with the fitness of things, and the ultimate order or disorder that will result.

Or we may conceive him to be led into action, by habits formed by practice, enforced by his teacher, based upon a perception in the latter of the fitness of things; or perhaps upon some such rule, as that all extremes, both in action and in passion, ought to be avoided.

In short many hypotheses are conceivable as to the actual constitution of a self-directive form of life, and as many of course as to the rule of life.

Thus a self-directive Being may propose to himself immediate enjoyment from moment to moment as his only aim. Another may prefer a more remote enjoyment to a more immediate one, because of its being better worth when it shall arrive.

Another may aim at nothing more selfish than relief from uneasiness, either present or in prospect,—the rule in all these cases being of a purely subjective nature.

Another may propose to himself, as the rule of his life, obedience to an external authority, without regard to consequences, such as the law of his God, the law of honour, etc.

Another may go by the dictates of reasoning: the fitness of things may be his rule.

Another may embrace, in the constitution of his active nature, a regard to several or all of these rules. In a word, whether we consider the actual form of life, or the rule of life, possible to a self-directive being, we obtain such a variety of results as points rather to a world of self-directive species than to any one species, and shows that to find what actually holds in human nature we must have recourse to the observation of it in detail.

In one feature, however, do all the forms and rules of active life, which have been hinted at, agree, and which it may be well to notice here. They all agree in this, that feeling—a capacity of enjoyment and uneasiness—must lie at the root of all of them. Varying states of consciousness to this extent at least are indispensable to all such varying states of action as shall not be merely mechanical and fatal. Even in the case of the most perfect intelligence by us conceivable, it is impossible, so far as we can see, that mere objective perceptions could of themselves prove adequate to influence him to the choice of a manner of active life, if

this pure percipient were quite free to act, or not to act, just as he pleased. Thus, if all were seen by him to be right before he started, and the starting promised neither any pleasure nor any relief from uneasiness, to both of which he is supposed to be an utter stranger, what motive could he have for bringing himself into action at all? And even although something were perceived by him to be wrong, or out of order, we cannot help supposing him to be influenced by desire or obligation, by hope or fear, or some form of feeling, some state of sensibility or other, before we can conceive him duly influenced to repair the injury. Say that he is influenced by a pure objectless volition, he is even in that case influenced by a moment of pleasure; for the act of volition, especially when most free and objectless, is eminently one of enjoyment, and indeed is enjoyment. The most purely intellectual Being conceivable must still be touched by sensibility before he find it worth his while to enter upon any action, or make any effort whatever. Every being that has a head must have a heart also, else he is quite thrown away, and finds nothing to do.

It is conceivable indeed that one might be moved to act according to the fitness of things, rather than otherwise or not at all, purely from a regard to order; and indeed of all conceivable motives, when intellectually viewed, this is the noblest. But in this term "regard," the existence of sensibility is supposed and confessed. And indeed how could any being prefer order to disorder, or any one thing to any other thing, if he were altogether a stranger to sensibility? He could feel no difference between beauty and deformity, between light and darkness; and if he felt no difference, how could he find a difference? In human nature the knowledge of identities and differences generally is obtained only by feeling. We can give no reason why we hold objects to be different, which does not at last prove to be an appeal to the fact, that they affect us differently. If, therefore, there were no affections, there could be no knowledge of identities and differences, and therefore no knowledge at all. Judging then by all that we know, sensibility,—that is, perceptivity alive to the state of self at least, whatever may be the extent of its external reach, must lie at the basis of the intellectual system of the universe. But in arriving at such a result, is there any compromise of the dignity of intelligence? No; for what is sensibility, as the term is now used? It is nothing less than the soul's con-

sciousness of her own state as to well-being or ill-being, given not indeed as such in the form of a distinct conception, but given in a form which is surely far better and more effective in securing her well-being than any mere conception or representation can be,—viz., enjoyment as the index of well-being, and uneasiness as the index of ill-being. Sensibility, therefore, as the term is here used, instead of standing in contrast with intelligence, and as an attribute of a lower grade, is only a case of consciousness, and that the most important that can be conceived.

## CHAPTER VII.

### OF INSTINCTS, APPETITES, HABIT, CUSTOM.

It is only to be expected of a Being who has been placed under so many relations, and who is so essentially active as man, that his activity shall manifest itself in a great variety of forms. Let us therefore now proceed to notice the chief of these; and as a classification is indispensable for the purposes of science—while yet a true or truly natural classification of phenomena which are essentially cyclical and confluent is impossible—let us, without any prefatory remarks of a critical nature, arrange the various constitutional forms of human activity, or the active principles of human nature as these forms are usually called, in that series which represents man as raised on the animal kingdom, and as the crowning species. Not but that an order of discussion exactly the reverse, an order presenting man first in his relation to God, would, in many respects, be preferable; but where our object is not to instruct the reader in a known doctrine, but to persuade him to adopt a new one, such a method would not be suitable. It would throw us at once among the greatest difficulties and the deepest mysteries of our nature. To proceed, therefore, according to the humbler method, we may take up—

*First*, those forms of activity or active principles which arise immediately out of the condition of the organisation, which do not demand an accompanying representative or conceptive power, and which manifest themselves fully in the lower animals. They go by the name of instincts, appetites, etc. They might be called organic demands, but there is no single term which is fully comprehensive of them all.

*Secondly*. Those which arise immediately out of the presentation of an external object or its remembrance, which imply representative, but not necessarily reflective power; and though



found more or less in the animal kingdom, are yet most fully developed in man. They are usually named affections and desires, as also passions and emotions. But none of these vernacular terms possesses scientific precision.

*Thirdly.* Those which, besides representative power or memory, demand also imagination and reason or reflection, and are peculiar to man,—viz., the emotions of the beautiful and the sublime, of the ludicrous, and of moral approbation and the reverse.

*Fourthly.* That which, in the presence of imagination, reason, reflection, constitutes a power of choosing, of vetoing, or of letting any or all the others run on to action as it pleases, and which, therefore, preserves man in the midst of them all, the self-directive responsible Being that he is,—in one word, the will.

With regard to self-interest, which has sometimes been ranked among the active principles of human nature, though it be doubtless an end proposed very often in the world, yet it is not a principle, or a special form of activity. It is simply a particular operation of intellect,—viz., that in which thought bestows itself upon the inquiry, which, of all possible ways of acting in a given case, is most likely to secure the greatest advantage to the actor, that advantage always lying in the realisation or development of his nature in some one or more of the ways which have been already specified. Dismissing self-interest then as not a principle or institution in human nature, but a product of cogitation, let us proceed to notice shortly those active principles which are truly constitutional, and not popularly resolvable into any others. And first as to the instincts and appetites, or organic demands.

Of these the most remarkable are those which possess periodicity, and which thus serve to unite man with the planetary system, in whose revolutions that periodicity in a right order of nature takes its rise.

And among these, first, we may remark *the demand for sleep*, a well-known feeling, which returns normally every night, and which, if not allowed to subside into slumber, soon grows into an intense uneasiness, comparable both in the distress which it gives and the fatal effects which it brings (if the sleepiness continue) to hunger or thirst. From the ease with which this demand of nature may be gratified in all ordinary cases, it has indeed escaped the classifications of psychologists. Nor have

physiologists bestowed upon it adequate study. Consequently not much can be affirmed with certainty respecting it. I shall in this place, therefore, only propose a few questions:—1st, Does not sleepiness take its rise in a loss of balance, or of antagonism between the disposable mechanical force in the cerebral and that in the myo-cerebral systems, more popularly in the brain and in the muscles, whence the external senses being no longer kept in a state of tension or directed outwards by the *vis à tergo* in the cerebro-spinal system, the myo-cerebral action becomes, as it were, introverted, and the eye more especially comes under the dominion of reflex action? 2d, Does not a state of attention, which, when viewed most generally, is one with the waking state, demand a special myo-cerebral rhythm; and of that rhythm, is not the open eye the index and the expression? 3dly, Along with the destruction of this rhythm, and the upturning and closing of the eye in sleep, does not the mental activity lose the analytic habit proper to it in the waking state, and acquire a wholly synthetic or panoramic vision; and is not such vision proper to a spiritual principle in its own right, as a simple Intelligence and mirror of existence? Along with the analytical condition of thought, consciousness, in consequence of the invasion of sleep, does indeed vanish of course at the same time, and therefore that which is our only infallible instrument of discovery fails at the very moment of the coming on of that phase of mental existence which we wish to discover; we cannot hope, therefore, to be able to answer the deeply interesting question which has been put, by the direct affirmation of consciousness. But neither yet are we wholly without evidence. Thus do not the phenomena of dreaming prove that the mind during sleep possesses a panoramic or simultaneous vision? How explain otherwise what may be experimentally proved,—viz., that an amount of vision or of incident may take place during sleep in a moment (as, for instance, on the discharge of a pistol, the report of which awakes the sleeper), which when the waking state—the myo-cerebral rhythm of analysis—has been re-established by the act of awaking, it requires a good time to relate and some minutes even to conceive in order to narration? Do not the phenomena of somnambulism indicate also the same radiant state of perceptivity, when the mind is emancipated from this rhythm? And are not the disputed facts of clair-voyance worthy of a scientific investi-

gation in this point of view? That thought, or the material of thought, may exist, while yet it does not exist in consciousness, or form part of the contents of memory, is abundantly proved. Now, of such thoughts when not in consciousness, what is the condition in relation to time? If they could be seen or known at all, would they not be seen and known all of them at a glance, and in one simultaneous intuition? Would not the perceptivity, if it could but enter into this sphere, prove to be all-knowing within it? In point of fact, however, in all normal states of existence, thought in this condition is in the mind, as in a well of unfathomable depth, from which it can only be drawn up by the laws of suggestion; and as it is with ordinary frames of being only that we have here to do, let us pass on,—not, however, without commending the pursuit of the inquiry here touched upon both to the physiologist and the metaphysician.

But not the demand for sleep only ought to be considered as a peculiar appetite, awoke constitutionally by our organisation considered as a dynamical machine. To this place, in a psychological system that aims at being true to nature, ought also to be referred a demand of an opposite kind,—viz., a *demand for bodily action*. Thus when the myo-cerebral or muscular system is fully charged with disposable mechanical force, when there is high health, and when yet voluntary action is through any cause forbidden, there is felt a great uneasiness, not to act this way or that way in particular, but merely to act generally, merely to bring the muscles into play. This, the young of all animals display so fully, and one is himself so often conscious of it, whether under the genial influence of good health, the charm of a spring day, the mountain air, the sea breeze, or other exhilarating influence, that it is unnecessary to insist upon it. It is not, indeed, denied. But then it generally finds its place in psychological systems under the designation of a desire for action, perhaps by the side of a desire for knowledge or the like, whereas it does not intrinsically rise to the rank of a desire at all. A desire is something more than merely an uneasiness immediately relieving itself in organic action. A desire is a state of mind which, along with an existing uneasiness, looks into the future, contemplates a change of position in relation with something else, and promises itself enjoyment when that change shall have been effected. For the construction of a desire a certain amount of

thought is required. But the instinct of which we now treat is most beautifully displayed where thought cannot be supposed to enter, as, for instance, in the gambols of lambs, the antics of kittens, and the kickings of the merest things that will bear the name of child. It is not to be forgotten, indeed, that the demand for action in the mind is still stronger than it is in the organisation; for in the mind it is never exhausted. But these are two facts in our nature of an order very distinct from each other, and which ought not to be confounded. Not but it is true that the one usually entails the other. Voluntary muscular exercise, usually draws the sensibility in its wake, and gives pleasure, which may rise to the highest pitch of glee. And, reciprocally, the mind thrown into vivid play by any cause, forthwith involves the organisation in its wake, and there is sensible organic emotion even in cases where the will has lost its power to move the muscles. Such co-ordination, however, is neither necessary nor constant. Intense spontaneous bodily activity often exists without any thought at all; and the most delighted student is often wholly indisposed to take even the muscular exercise necessary to health. Still there is normally a harmony between the actions of the mind and those of the body, each inducing that in the other which is representative and analogous. The sentient action in the mind moves parallel to the dynamic action in the body. The latter is indeed what remains of the former when Being has flowed so far from the fountain-head as to constitute matter, and the virtue of sensibility has gone out of it. But nothing is more essential to the understanding of human nature than a firm holding of the difference between the action in the body and that in the Soul. The instinct of which we now treat, therefore—the organic demand for action—ought not to be confounded with enterprise of mind,—the sporting of the lamb, with the ambition of the hero. It is of different origin, and bears different fruits. Still, however, it is not to be undervalued. It is appointed under the guidance of Intelligence even to take a lead in determining the destiny of man.

To see this, let us consider that our organisation is so constituted that this love of muscular play, when it develops itself in a manner normal at once with the organisation itself and with the intelligent Soul which animates it, gives two grand modes of action,—viz., first, that of the loins and limbs; and second, that of

the arms and hands, which being both co-ordinated with reason, *i.e.*, with a purpose, give, as the first normal form of the instinct of action, the demand for *travelling*, and as the second, the demand for manipulating, that is, *industry*. All independently, therefore, of the urgent necessity which in certain states of society there may be for them, or the knowledge, the conveniences, or the luxuries, they may be made to minister, there is a provision in human nature for rendering travelling and industry spontaneous and congenial. On this subject much that is interesting and important might be said. But here let us only make one remark as to the order of the development of these two instincts, viz., that the demand for travel ought in a right order of nature to be earliest and most transient, industry to come after and endure longer; for the organic strength of the loins and limbs culminates sooner than that of the arms and fingers. The fitness of these organs for manipulating, indeed, remains unimpaired till a late period in life. Thus by this instinct—the demand for bodily action—the ground is laid for two enterprises in life, which, as will presently appear, the two appetites that we have next to consider ultimately necessitate.

The locomotion of a heavy mass, such as the human body, can only be effected by the application of mechanical force; and in effecting locomotion that force must be spent. Hence, under every conceivable hypothesis as to the way in which the disposable mechanical force of the animal system is generated, there is a necessity for a continual supply of fresh force to the system; in a word, there must be a continued nutrition of the system. For this, the instinct of sleep, which has been already considered, is the laying down of the ground; and food and drink are the means. These must, indeed, be made very sure, else life must plainly be very precarious. Hence occasion for other constitutional uneasinesses besides those which have been mentioned as yet,—uneasinesses which shall recur when food and drink are wanted; and in a word, hence a necessity for some such institutions as *hunger and thirst*—feelings culminating in the throat and changing into enjoyment when the presence of a bolus, either liquid or solid, in the fauces, stimulates the adjacent myo-cerebral apparatus to an act of deglutition, and thus introduces the fuel and water into the system which the engine requires in order to its continued action or life. To this part of the system belong also

those other uneasinesses by which we are prompted to evacuate those remains of the food which cannot go to the repair of the body, or to the maintenance of respiration, and which might be considered as appendages to the appetites of hunger and thirst. Here also might be added those which have good air, a bath, and above all a congenial temperature, as their objects. But on *the demand for warmth* we need not dwell in this rapid sketch.

Now, however, we find at once an occasion for the exercise of those powers of travel and of industry, for which it has been already shewn that a provision has been made in the instinctive demand for action, which has been attached to the muscular apparatus. In consideration of the periodicity of those plants which yield the most trustworthy food, and of the variableness of climate, the demands of nature for food and warmth impose on man the necessity of accumulating a store and of constructing a shelter or house. Such is all the excuse which nature gives for *avarice*; and yet, when exalted by the imagination, it is to these appetites that the estate, nay, all the wealth of individuals and of nations, is owing. Thus, though so humble in one point of view, yet so important and influential are the appetites, in determining the actual pursuits of men.

It may, however, be questioned whether, under the stimuli of hunger and thirst, of cold and the demand for corporeal action only, man could ever emerge from the savage state, or keep from falling into it. It is not in these appetites, but in another, that civilisation takes its rise and society becomes possible; for copying much from the two great conservative appetites of which the waking state (or life in the individual responsive to the whole world), and the satisfying of hunger and thirst are the functions (and the upright attitude, a certain craving, and the act of deglutition, are the myo-cerebral rhythm corresponding), combining both and yet curiously parting both, is another great appetite in which, not the outward world and an individual, but two individuals of the same species, find themselves in such relationship to each other, that each is for the time the whole world to the other, and both are in possession of an appropriate myo-cerebral rhythm, in virtue of which—just as in the former case new cells were added to the existing individual to repair his individual waste, so in this case, a new cell of a peculiar character is generated—an embryo cell from which a future individual

proceeds, and the race is kept up in spite of the ravages of death. Such is *the sexual appetite* and its function.

Nay, not only is the race thus kept up, but ever tends to increase, and that beyond the means of comfortable subsistence in any given locality. Such is *the law of population*. And what is its obvious teaching? Plainly that the human family is destined to diffuse itself ever more and more, until it people the whole earth; for which immediate inference from the law of population, a sanction by the Creator is instantly found in the fact, that man alone of all terrestrial species has been so constituted, that he can live and thrive in all climates, wherever rain falls or plants will grow. Hence the grand question in the order of nature for a people who are pressing on the means of support is not one merely of police, with a view to discover how the law of population may be frustrated with the least serious consequences; as, for instance, by the regulation of *prostitution*, which is the European fashion: or how, after having been allowed to realise itself according to nature, its fruits may be got rid of, as, for instance, by regulating *infanticide*, which is the Asiatic fashion. Nor is the case well met even by able discourses in favour of the advantages of forethought and the preventive check. These are good, no doubt, so far as they go. But this is not the normal solution of the problem of population, which I apprehend will still accomplish its law in spite of all discoursing, and, sooner or later, press the population in every pleasant country upon the means of comfortable subsistence. The only legitimate solution of the law of population is to be found by looking to the teaching of the law itself, and that is the world-wide diffusion of the human family; and, therefore, the way for a people to meet want when it presses upon them, is to cultivate a taste for the world, to consider the diffusion of an over-crowded population as one of its first social duties—a duty in which all, both those who remain at home, and those who diffuse themselves, should heartily concur. In a word, the teaching of the law of population is *emigration*. This is the grand question for over-populous states. Nor will a state of social well-being be possible in any such state, until *colonisation* is looked upon, not as an occasional expedient to meet a present evil, but as a standing institution to which an honourable rank is assigned among the institutions of the nation.

Under the law of the instinct, then, which we are now considering, it is the destiny of a people ever to extend their borders, and here many interesting results present themselves; some of which let us now shortly notice. The border over which the people must extend itself may be either a frontier, or it may be waste land, near at hand or beyond seas. As to the normal mode of diffusion in the former case, the laws of the instincts do not readily give it. Several hypotheses are conceivable, justifying speculation on the subject, and indeed necessitating it. But supposing the diffusion takes place towards waste land, some principles are apparent from the laws of the appetites and instincts themselves. Thus, from the instinct of organic action, it follows that, in a right order of nature, it is young people that will leave for the new country, for it is in comparative youth that the demand for travel develops itself—a happy result, since it is then also that ambition is strongest, and the ties of association weakest. Say, then, that a youthful couple leave, or rather since man is social as well as domestic, say that several leave together; the land of their adoption reached, it follows from the law of the development of the demand for action, that the love of travel will in due time go off, and that of manipulation or industry only remain. They are now, therefore, to distribute themselves over waste land; and substituting the doctrine of equal rights, instead of the manifestation of pugnacity, a transformation which it belongs to humanity and reason to effect, the instincts teach, that a family by thus settling down in a waste and unappropriated land, establishes a right to as much of it as is required for the satisfactory support of that family in return for as much industry bestowed upon it as is congenial and easy. All this is plain enough. There is no difficulty about property at first. But soon afterwards, when the law of population begins to tell there also, and the family increases so that the parental estate is no longer adequate for the equally easy support of all the children now growing up, and becoming successively ready to ally themselves in marriage with other families, and so to bind the whole society together in blood relationships, what is the teaching of instinct as to the distribution of the family then? To discover this, it is to be considered that the eldest son is the first in the family who attains to strength and a demand for action, as also, as has been shown, to strength of limb earlier than



to aptitude for industry. The order of nature, therefore, appears to be that the eldest son should first leave the paternal roof and move onwards. The true right of primogeniture, where there is abundance of unbroken land, thus appears to be that of the first choice, among all the surrounding lands which remain unappropriated. And so on with the other sons in succession. Whence it will result, that the paternal estate shall remain as the home of the daughters and the younger sons, ultimately the unmarried daughters and the youngest son; while he, having this charge, is, by being thus left in possession of the parental home and fields, not called upon to engage his industry in building a house or in bringing in more out-field, and is thus free to bestow all his attentions on his sisters.

Such are some of the results which may be deduced, though it must be confessed not with indisputable certainty, from the laws of the appetites. Nor these only; it is even possible to press the inquiry still a little farther. Thus, say that the land to which these families emigrate is not altogether waste land, but the hunting and fishing ground of indigenous tribes, the laws of the appetites teach something in this case also. Granting anger to the indigenous tribes as well as to the colonists, and consequently granting them both the fact of rights, and a sense of their rights, which is but anger restraining and allying itself with reason, it follows that the natives have a perfect right to the territories, in the possession of which they are found by the colonists on their arrival, for the purposes for which they possess them. The natives cannot be dispossessed by force without an act of injustice. But it is not, therefore, incumbent on the colonist to abandon these territories; for they are capable of supporting in well-being a much greater number of human Beings than they actually do support when in the hands of aborigines, or ever can be brought to support by savages. The law of the diffusion of the species, therefore, the law of population, gives the colonist a sanction to remain where he has landed—a right on the strength of this fact, that he is cultivator, while the savage is a hunter or fisher merely. This is a reasonable ground. It is worthy of respect by humanity. The order of nature, therefore, is the formation of a friendly treaty between both parties; the aborigines retaining the right of fishing and hunting, all the uses they have previously made of their territory; the colonists insisting on

that of cultivating it. Now, from such a state of things, what is to be expected when all proceeds according to law? Why, it lies in human nature, when existing in a normal state, or possessing even savage freshness, always to adopt such improvements as are palpable. The aborigines, therefore, ought to imitate the colonists. But this they cannot do successfully without instruction and implements. Hence it belongs to them to apply to the colonists for these things; and hence ground for a new treaty, of which the purport will be, the *apprenticeship* of the aborigines to the colonists. And thus we see the domestic relation of master and servant taking its rise quite legitimately, while, from such an origin, it also fully appears that perpetual servitude is wholly excluded; and much more *hereditary slavery*—a shocking violation of the first rights of humanity. It were easy to show, also, especially in that case where a people overstep their frontier, and pour themselves in among their neighbours, how *domestic service*, as well as agricultural apprenticeship, must take its rise; but this subject need not be pressed, and these remarks are merely hurriedly made, as illustrations of a method by which something of the certainty of science may perhaps be introduced into the discussion of questions, which are usually regarded as subjects of speculation only, and indeed too often treated merely in a declamatory way.

The sexual appetite, however, does not exhaust all the social instincts of human nature. There is another which is equally elementary, organic, and anterior to all intellectual inducements, that, namely, by which men spontaneously form themselves into groups, and herd together. There are no doubt a thousand good reasons which occur to a man, as soon as he is capable of reflection, why he should associate himself with his fellows and live in society; but the existence of society has not been left to be determined by the discoursing of reason, or to depend on any compact which men may choose to enter into with each other. Man is social by nature. The part of reflection is rather to moderate than to develop *the demand for company*. This demand is very strong in the veriest childhood, and is not wanting in the fool, though he be incapable of a single thought. Yes; only give the fool leave, you will find him at church and market, at every marriage, baptism, and funeral in the parish. Hence he is after all a symbol of that which goes farthest to con-

stitute humanity, and is dearest to human nature; and it was not a movement of barbarism, but a fine spontaneous feeling, containing high reasons embosomed in it, which led our forefathers to protect and cherish the fool in the family, and give his bones a place beneath the altar. The fool is the antithetic of man as a pugnacious animal. Many psychologists have maintained pugnacity to be so predominant in human nature as to trace everything to it; but even pugnacity itself is social. No man ever yet fought his way into solitude. So closely interwoven are all the active principles of human nature, that it is possible in some measure to affect the genesis of them all from any one. Certainly pugnacity was an unhappy choice, however, as the basis of all. Its true place will, I trust, appear hereafter.

That the principle to which society is owing belongs to this part of our system, and is not, as it is usually conceived to be, a desire,—*i. e.*, a motive involving forethought and fixing on an outward object to be sought after,—that it is merely a relief from an existing uneasiness which it belongs to solitude to create, is proved by the fact of the existence and influential operation of the social principle throughout the whole range of animated nature. It is often strongest indeed where there is least power of reflection. In the sheep, for instance, it completely supersedes and replaces even fear. In some birds it is so intensely strong, that solitude soon brings a broken heart and death to them. Its powerful operation may also be observed in fishes. Of insects I need say nothing.

Nay, not only does the social instinct extend between individuals of the same species—it extends between different species. There are animals which, though not of the same kind, somehow find themselves to be agreeable to each other. There can be no doubt that the domestic animals find comfort in man's presence. In this country, where the temperature is so high that a covering can be no object to man or beast, the dogs persist in lying under the table when the family is seated round it; and when the room is empty, they take many a beating before they will give over lying on the couches, where they saw members of the family resting before. The kittens, too, insist upon the lap, here as elsewhere, and scarcely pur but when fondled. Yet it remains true, that the social instinct exists chiefly between individuals of the same species. It is not like chemical affinity, but rather like the attrac-

tion of cohesion, which indeed represents it far down the system of nature.

But while the social instinct fulfils its locomotive function, in bringing individuals together, and keeping them in society, there remains still another to be noticed here, which produces other effects, not more important certainly, but still more interesting in a psychological point of view; for to the instinctive sphere of our nature must be ascribed all the phenomena of direct *sympathy*, or spontaneous imitation. These phenomena may be, and no doubt often are, the products of reflection; and in human nature never are they awoke on the somatic aspect of man's being, but forthwith they evoke and elicit thought, and clothe themselves in it. Still it is a grand mistake to regard sympathy as a moral principle, and still greater to regard it as the principle of morality. Sympathy shows itself in the spread of panic, convulsion, and many phenomena from which every form of intelligence is entirely excluded. Sympathy, as that term is commonly applied in actual life, is only the spontaneous or involuntary falling into uneasiness on the beholding of suffering in another. It is purely an instinctive, almost purely a somatic, act—an act of spontaneous repetition in one sentient being of a state existing in another, to whom the mirror of the soul is at that time turned. It is merely one Being held by his nature to imitate without intention, or repeat, and indeed possibly against his will if it oppose, the state of action or feeling in the circle in which he finds himself. It belongs to the most elementary framework of our nature, and manifests itself far down the stream of material nature, under the name of the law of induction or influence. It does no doubt prelude and prefigure the affection of love, and that affection never rises in an embodied species without being accompanied by the phenomena of sympathy and imitation. Still there may be sympathy when love is impossible; and though it may be developed to a great height, by invoking the aid of imagination, yet it may also arise without it, and in a way that is purely instinctive. As the existence of society itself has not been left to depend on the reflectiveness of man, but has been secured by an instinct, so has an instinct been provided to impart harmony to society when it has been formed, viz. the sympathetic, the imitative, or, in other words, the educational principle.

And hence we are able to explain the great prevalence and

the often absurdity of fashion ; for, plainly, it belongs to the imitative instinct to give rise to the phenomena of *fashion* ; while it is only to be expected that they shall be often absurd ; for nothing else is to be looked for from an instinct when operating in an artificial state of things. In the genesis of a fashion the love of novelty no doubt enters, as well as the instinct or spontaneous demand of nature to imitate ; but the love of novelty rather causes and explains the change of the fashions than the existence of fashion. Besides, the demand for novelty might itself be regarded as merely an instinct also, since it is but the lowest form of curiosity, which in its turn is an uneasiness that arises immediately on the back of sensation, and which it is one of the principal ends of sensation to awake. But we are already transgressing the generic character of the motives to which it has been announced that this chapter is to be devoted. There can scarcely be sympathy or imitation without at the same time a conception of the object which is inducing the change, and which is assimilating the individual affected to itself. By these phenomena, therefore, the phenomenon of representation is introduced, and in them we may conceive it to be precluded.

But before we close, let us not fail to remark, that if, through the influence of the love of novelty, curiosity, or a trace of intellectual life, the fashions change very often in certain societies, there are some others where this stir in life is wanting, and where the fashions do not change. There are also some fashions which are found to be so congenial that there are no countries in which they do not hold their place permanently. Fashions, in this case, bear the name of *customs*, and constitute most important elements of society among all peoples, the whole among some. In this country, for instance, the people have scarcely any higher idea of life than the observance of their customs, and even the abolition of a tax which supersedes the customs which used to be observed in collecting it, is considered as great a nuisance as the imposition of a new tax. Great is the power of custom. Even in the West it has been said to be a second nature, and the remark has been generally responded to as a statement of the truth ; but here, in the East, whatever it may have been in ancient times, it is not a second nature now, but almost all there is for nature in man.

Nature may thus be supplanted by custom, and thus we are

introduced to the consideration of *habit*,—certainly one of the most interesting of all psychological phenomena, and one of the most instructive. And here let us make what few remarks on the subject are necessary to our plan; for the genesis of habits is fully explained by the existence of natural appetites and instincts. That there are states of feeling in which the mind is involved in virtue of the specific organisation of the body, and the existing state of specific organs, cannot be doubted. In fact each appetite and instinct is the psychical expression of a special myo-cerebral rhythm which enters into the natural structure of the individual. If, then, by any means, as, for instance, by practice or exercise, a certain group of organs or parts can be brought repeatedly into consensual action, and kept to it, so that a consensual nutrition of them shall follow and they be thus bound together organically, and though as a result of exercise, yet not differently in a physical sense from what they would have been had their consensual nutrition and rhythm taken place in the course of nature or of embryonic development, plainly in such a case the psychical phenomena of an appetite are to be expected, in connection with the action of that group of organs,—*i. e.*, the myo-cerebral rhythm thus established will, in certain circumstances, be subject to a state of tension, in which it will demand a specific action, and will give uneasiness until that tension is relieved by the consummation of that action. And if anything occur, or is presented to the senses, which commences that rhythmical state, the organism will tend, perhaps with insatiable or invincible force, to complete its act. Thus a man who has long practised snuff-taking often finds himself in a state of uneasiness; and association letting him know that it is a pinch of snuff that he wants, if he think of a snuff-box, and still more if he sees one, the thought may set him a longing. Nay, he may have carried the practice of snuff-taking so far that the respiratory muscles concerned, which are naturally disposed to rhythmical and consensual action, may periodically assume a state of tension or of psychical anticipation of snuff-taking, so that the box is suggested and resorted to, without being either named or seen. And all this in much worse cases,—yes; so that the eye, instead of being merely open to the truth and loveliness of nature, shall, through the tyranny of bad habits, roll about perpetually in a liquid element of lust.

And here let us for a moment review the motives which we have just been noticing, with a view to discover, if we can, what is the general character of them all. That they are not desires,—that is, motives promising future enjoyment, as well as expressing themselves in an existing uneasiness,—has already been incidentally shown; and that this is the fact must be admitted. Not but in a highly perceptive being such as man, who is ever looking into the future, they must generally if not always clothe themselves in thought, and thus manifest themselves as desires. But still in their simplicity the instincts and appetites are merely uneasinesses depending on the existence of a certain myo-cerebral rhythm, which organically tends to consummate and relieve its tension by some special action, such as the closing of the eyes with relaxation of the whole system, or mastication and deglutition, etc. They merely insist on the accomplishment of their actions, come what may. They do not look before them. They are blind to the last degree. And hence the fearful aberrations to which they can lead when, instead of keeping each other in mutual check, some one careers. But hence also a constitution eminently fitting them for accomplishing their objects, all independently of the hazards of ratiocination, and of the mere will of the individual. Thus is the existence of the individual from day to day, and of the race from age to age secured.

But is there no general name in vernacular discourse for a motive of the order which has now been described—viz., a general uneasiness to accomplish a certain action, not arising from the contemplation of the action or its consequences, but from within the individual, and simply urging him to accomplish the action? On consulting one's self how he expresses such a state of feeling, it will be found that in such a case one uses the term "must." One feels under an "obligation," not moral indeed but natural. In a few cases only can the will be brought to bear with sufficient force during the period of organic demand to re-establish liberty. Sleep often completely overpowers the will, as does also restlessness, as well as hunger and thirst, the love of company, etc.

Now from such a state of things it plainly follows, that let a man be persuaded that any act which flows from an instinct, either natural or acquired, is good or moral, and he must then feel urged to do it with all the sanction and firmness of moral obliga-

tion. And hence plainly, when reason and conscience are low, an opening for the complete perversion of humanity and the ruin of society. Thus let a man but succeed in persuading himself that the design of our appetites is not to accomplish those specific ends which have been pointed out, but to give enjoyment, and then the pursuit of enjoyment in this way presents itself to him with all the claims of legality. What though it may point to adultery as the terms of its highest gratification, he feels obliged, goes on, and even fancies himself a moral hero in running the risk of encountering an outraged husband.

And hence also the readiness of the merest heathens for death in support of religious practices, which after all are but customs, and which want altogether the sanction both of God and of conscience. Having been taught in earliest years that these practices are holy, and having been trained to them, the motive in after-life to maintain them has all the characters of the most sacred obligation.

It is not by the information of consciousness, but only by the consideration of the history of its genesis in his life, that a man can distinguish in an impression whether he owes it to custom or to conscience; and hence the value of "religious experience." Hence, also, the difficulty of effecting the conversion of men, however high and holy the rational and moral recommendations of the doctrine proposed compared with those which are held already. It is only in the very few that Reason is a match for custom and prescription. For the well-being of the many, therefore, for the mass of a people, right training, a good education, must be the grand desideratum. Hence, also, all new doctrines, when proposed to masses, ought to be proposed for *adoption* by them—that is, proposed in as friendly relations with those which these masses hold sacred already as truth will allow; and all new rites and ceremonies ought, as far as possible, to be adjusted to those in use already. The method which a regard to the lower principles of human nature suggests is the very opposite of that which a regard to the higher proposes, and much discretion in the reformer or missionary is called for, if his object really be to effect a change for the better.



## CHAPTER VIII.

### OF THE EMOTIVE SYSTEM OF HUMAN NATURE.

LET an object present itself which is finite, and which exists in direction or in succession, in space or time, so that it may be distinctly conceived, but which is not in any special relation with our well-being, as, for instance, a mathematical figure, a stone, a cloud, it is then simply seen. It may consequently be remembered, thought of, or reasoned about, but it is not otherwise interesting to us. It does not awake an emotion. The influence of the object is so small as to demand no more mental action in return, than that which constitutes an intellectual phase of mind. The object merely gives itself to the mind in its evidence, and it is merely met on the part of the mind by belief in return. In being so met, it is indeed forbid to confound itself with the mind; it is told to keep its distance, and is beheld or held as manifesting itself; it is held as a being or thing distinct from the mind, and when and where it is. Nor this only. In virtue of that constitutional and spontaneous synthetic deployment between the mind and nature, which is always going on, and in which the mind is always aiming at the embrace of every feature in every object, an object, if it be conceivable, is in being held conceived also,—that is, its various points and cognisable lineaments which are given by the action of the organs of sense in the veriest minima of knowledge, are by a spontaneous synthetic play of the mind unified. The multitude of impressions which sense supplies is in a twinkling taken and held by consciousness as one state of mind, lost, indeed, in the presence of the object when the object is present, but representative of it when it is gone. There is, therefore, in the act of observing any object in nature, be what it may, more or less

deployment of the soul's activity ; now, this considered in itself as viewed by consciousness, is sensibility. And therefore, perhaps, no conceivable object, however uninteresting or unrelated, can be one of perfect indifference or of purely intellectual regard ; no cognition can be altogether apathetic. Still, however, all this may be without emotion.

But other cases of the presentation of objects to the mind, either by the senses, the memory, or the imagination, are obviously possible, wherein the development of sensibility must be much greater, the accompanying feeling much more intense ; not merely a trace of uneasiness such as the act of attention gives, nor merely a trace of enjoyment such as the act of conception gives ; but uneasiness or enjoyment intense and absorbing. Such development of the sensibility must, in fact, occur whenever the two forces of evidence and belief above described, which concur in the act of perception, are not balanced. In all such cases there must be a perception and something else. Along with the engagement of the intellect, there must be a residuary phenomenon in the sensibility. Besides a want of balance, there may also exist between the object and the percipient, either of two relations, both of which must be productive of special feeling as well as mere belief. There may exist a relation either of harmony or of discord, of agreeableness or disagreeableness ; and in both cases it is to be expected that belief shall take on a peculiar character, and not be called any longer merely by the name of belief, but of some special feeling, such as love or hatred, or the like, in which there is always belief, no doubt, yet something more also. Two cases may occur in which the equilibrium between object and subject does not exist, viz., that in which the object is overimpressive or overwhelming, and that in which the mind is overimpressive or overwhelming, of which last moreover there must be two important varieties according as the object, in so far as it does affect the mind, affects it agreeably or disagreeably. Thus, by an analysis of the conditions under which conceptions take place, we are led to infer the probable existence of a series of modifications of belief, or of the mind as a believer accompanying the conception of different objects. These are generally spoken of as peculiar states of the sensibility rather than of belief ; but between these two views there is no difference. To me it appears most scientific to con-

sider belief as the normal state of the mind, viewed as sensitive, as that degree marked temperate on the scale of feeling. But if it is thought preferable to view "feeling" as the generic term, and "belief" as one among many species of feelings, the difference is not worth disputing about; only it ought not to be forgotten that wherever there is feeling there is always belief.

But without further generalities, let us now proceed to develop the characteristics which the various feelings or states of belief anticipated in relation with agreeable or disagreeable objects, must possess, appealing to nature at the same time with a view to their verification, or the reverse. And with this aim let us begin with that one of the series which is simplest,—viz., the overimpressiveness or overwhelming action of the object upon the mind. And what, let us ask, will be the state of feeling in such a case? To this it is to be answered, that as that balance of power between the outward object and the mind whose attention it has secured, on which the formation of a clear conception of that object depends, does not exist, so the power of conception will be apt to fail in such a case. There will fail to be a clear conception of that which is felt to overwhelm. But if so, then something more; for it is the formation of a clear conception of an object which defines and limits belief as to that object. Wanting such limitation, therefore, in this case there will be an unbounded outpouring of belief about the object,—which might be also inferred, simply from the great impressiveness of the object. Of this case of developed sensibility, then, these will be the two constituent features, in so far as the mental activity is concerned:—1*mo*, a failure to conceive distinctly what the object is; and, 2*do*, a sudden and unbounded outpouring of belief about it. But will this be all? No; that this is a state of ill-being in the soul is obvious. It belongs, therefore, to instinctive nature when thus affected to attempt its remedy. But how are we to expect this attempt to be made? To find this, it is only necessary to consider that the ill-being is occasioned by two facts, *first*, the overwhelmingness of the object, *secondly*, the failure of conception. Therefore the cure plainly is,—*first*, to escape from the object; and, *secondly*, to conceive such things about it as are possible. As to the outward manifestations of this state of the sensibility, then, one of them obviously will be an effort to escape from the object. And what will be the character

of such conceptions as it will be possible to form of it? Be what they may, plainly they must represent it as overpowerful—as overwhelming—shall I not, in a word, say, as terrible? And does not this deductive process verify itself in all the characters of the emotion of *alarm* or *terror*, and explain the features of that emotion? Yes; and hence we can understand why a touch behind, a silent step in the dark, darkness itself, and especially the thought of death, should be so alarming. In these cases there is an impression from without wanting a corresponding conception from within to limit the sudden burst of belief which the impression causes. As to death, it seems the very annihilation of the conceptive power itself; and, therefore, the leaving the soul hopelessly to alarm,—which no doubt it would be if the conceptive power of the soul were paralysed, while yet the impressiveness of objects and the life of the soul were continued.

From this theory of alarm we are able to see how very wide may be the range of this emotion in the animal kingdom; as also, that those animals which are feeblest, both in organic and mental strength, and therefore least able to save themselves by physical force or stratagem, must be the most truly alive to it.

The function of this emotion in the economy of nature appears; for its genesis is such that it shall develop itself whenever an animal finds itself among objects which are not commensurate with it, or which are strange to it, and therefore inconceivable by it. Now of all objects those are the most easily conceivable which are the most familiar. The function of alarm, therefore, is not to hurry the subjects of it from objects that threaten to overwhelm them anyhow, but to provide for their retreat to their homes. Yes; among familiar objects alone can the timid find refuge from alarm,—a feeling this to which even man, though so high above the species we are now considering, is by no means a stranger. Simple alarm is, therefore, an institution for preserving the lives of the feeble, and for restoring order. When it is combined with the power of conception in spite of it, and the power of reflection, it softens into fear, ascends the psychical scale, and by-and-by gives rise to *prudence*, and I know not how many excellencies.

Were we to attempt to give the full series of forms in which this emotion manifests itself, I believe it would be necessary even to include *attention*; for what is attention but a composed state of *watching*? in which term the idea of alarm already enters. The

butterfly, resting on the flower, I should suppose, defends itself from the entomologist only by its susceptibility to alarm. It can surely have no idea of danger, no anticipation of death. And while the man of science is still at a distance, so that the papilio is nowise disconcerted, what is its psychical state when looking at its dangerous lover? Can it be aught but attention? Then as the man of science steals nearer, does not that which was merely attention in the insect before become watching? And when he is very near, does not that watching become alarm, and the insect is off? By this single emotion, as appears to me, in its different degrees of development, produced almost mechanically by the alarming object, according perhaps to some law of the distance, the animated creation may be to a great extent preserved in life and kept each species at its own home.

But the reverse of the conditions which produce alarm may also occur. Not the object, but the mind, may act overpoweringly, and that either towards objects in general, or towards particular objects. Say, first, that it is towards objects in general. The mind overmatches them all. It is not held in check, much less is it intimidated by any of them. What, then, are to be expected to be the phenomena of such an expansive glowing state of sensibility? To find this we need only to call to mind that it lies essentially in the nature of the soul ever to seek to develop and deploy its powers to the utmost. The life of the soul lies in activity, and the well-being of the soul's activity lies in action. The soul, then, which is not kept in check by the objects around it, but overmatches them, must ever tend to self-development to the utmost degree possible, to pass by all, rise above all, and still push onwards, upwards, or downwards, according to its bent. That such a constitution of the feelings must differ from alarm in every feature is obvious; and not less in this than in other respects, that when it succeeds—nay, even when engaged in laying plans for success, it must be a state of glowing enjoyment. But what is this frame of mind? Under a merely psychical point of view, is it not *daring* or *courage*? Under an intellectual point of view, is it not *ambition*, the principle of all progress and civilisation, and when rightly directed the noblest attribute of humanity, and that which makes the hero? Thus the first couple of emotions which we find in human nature, taking them in their most generic forms, and under intellectual designations, are *timidity* and *ambition*.

From what has been said, however, it appears that, besides its general form, ambition must have two special forms, according as the object which it is bent on overpowering is congenial and kindred to itself, or disagreeable and injurious. In the former case, it must contemplate with pleasure the object which it aims at surpassing; and while it strives to leave it beneath or behind, will pass it without injuring it. In the latter case, it will tend more directly to overpower that object, as by thrusting it out of the way or annihilating it. But do we find in nature facts corresponding to these inferences? Need I detain the reader longer without asking, Whether they do not exactly describe, the former *emulation*, and the latter *anger*? These emotions, therefore, according to the view now given, are the two hands of ambition; and so long as they are kept open, and each bears only on its proper objects, all is well;—anger is as legitimate as emulation, and as vital an element in the moral economy. But in the actual world how often, alas! does the ambitious man clasp these his hands together, and instead of being actuated any longer by a generous emulation, and a noble indignation, distinct from each other, and each bearing on its proper objects only, run his ambitious and resentful feelings into one, confound both them and their objects, and become envious and revengeful!

And thus we are introduced to *anger*, which, however, may obviously exist apart altogether from a generally ambitious disposition, and may in fact have a range in the animal kingdom as wide as alarm itself. To a sentient being in the position in which he is, and without a trace of ambition, objects may present themselves in an attitude or aspect so disagreeable or injurious, that the activity of the beholder shall forthwith tend to overpower them. Now what must be the psychological phenomena in this case? Plainly, there will be no sudden outpouring of belief towards the object, as in alarm. There will, on the contrary, be rather a withholding of it from the object, as unworthy of being so generously met, and a bestowing of belief upon self. There will tend to be a state of strong self-belief or dynamic egotism. The object of the emotion, and his actions, will be interpreted in reference to self; all will be construed in respect of injury. This emotion will tend to out upon him, to thrust him out of the way, or to destroy him. Such is the natural issue of anger.

But anger may be restrained, and when it is restrained, either

by prudence, on the one hand, or the fear of doing an injury, on the other, it is not difficult to see that there must result a highly intellectual emotion; and what is it but a *claim of right*?—a truly noble, but yet, if the theory here given be sound, a dangerous frame of mind; since, although it always professes to build on reason and conscience, it may yet be at bottom nothing better than merely anger restrained more or less by prudence. Hence also we see that anger, as a potency at least, enters into a *sense of justice*. And, therefore, like alarm, it has the range, not only of all the animal kingdom, but of all human nature, now occasioning the merest pugnacity, now animating the noblest demands.

The relations of alarm and anger are, therefore, very curious. The proper response to anger, in him who is the object of it, is alarm. The two are opposite poles of simple emotion; and most curious it is to remark how fully they agree, and yet how completely they differ. The organic rhythm which each establishes is singularly like that of the other in some of its features; the very reverse in others. They are like back and face of the same thing; the one the systole, the other the diastole of the heart, which in alarm shrinks and flutters, in anger bounds. Both may be co-extensive with all animated nature. Let us not scruple to add, that, according to this theory of these emotions, every impression from without, which catches the Soul in ignorance, must first be more or less an occasion of fear; when presenting itself for easy conception thereafter, it must be one of joy; and only after an oscillation (perhaps too feeble to be caught by consciousness) of both these emotions can it cease to be an occasion of feeling, and become one of purely intellectual regard. The fits of hysterical patients and others, who are slaves of mere psychical emotion, verify these views.

In noticing the relations of these two emotions, alarm and anger, it may also be remarked that there is a case in which they both run into one—that, namely, in which, instead of taking their outgoings in overt action, they eat inwardly, and spend themselves in thought. In this case, both go to constitute that too well-known state of mind named *hatred*, which thus may be regarded as the impotence either of alarm or anger, but which it is enough thus to notice in passing, as it is no element of unfallen or normally constituted humanity. Besides, it is not for us to enter on details in this place. Let us, therefore, only remark

further, that from what has been said, it appears that man, considered as an individual, is the subject of only two grand emotions, the one self-repressive, the other self-expanding; the former a general alarm or timidity constitutive of prudence in all its forms; the latter, a general anger or ambition, constitutive of a vast number of the phenomena of human nature, from the lawlessness of insult and revenge, to a nobly-sustained claim of right or sense of justice.

But even these are not entitled to be regarded either as truly original or truly ultimate states of human nature, viewing them as in development. They are only means appointed for the attainment of a certain end, viz., the restoration of order, and they come into play only when there has been a departure from that state of things which it is their function to restore. If, then, it be the duty of psychology to describe, if it can, human nature when existing in a normal state in the individual and in society, there is no place for the affirmation even of these emotions except as potencies. The normal state of the sensibilities appointed to be in all and over all, must be that which it is the function of these two emotions to restore, when through any cause a state of universal well-being has been lost. Now, what this is has already been stated, and indeed appears from the mechanism of these two emotions themselves. Thus, in alarm, the energy of the mind in relation to the object which engages it is in defect, in anger it is in excess; the state of well-being, therefore, is obviously that which lies between the two, that in which the object and the mind are duly commensurate, and just balance each other. But this, as has been shown, and as appears in the very statement, is not a state of emotion, it is a state of pure intellectual repose.

Is this, then, the whole of human nature in its most elementary conception, intellectual repose within, supported by the potency (or possibility, if an occasion arise) of prudence on the one hand, and of ambition on the other,—or rather, taking these elements in their purely psychical forms, is human nature all comprised in the conception of intelligence in the supremacy, with alarm on the one hand, and pugnacity on the other? Yes; if man could be viewed merely as an individual, if man were normally a solitary being, this were all. But even these attributes imply every one of them, that man is not a solitary being in nature. They imply that he exists in relation with other beings and things. But for



this fact, he could neither see, nor think, nor fly, nor fight, and because of this fact, he is constituted the being that he is. And these, subjective, self-developing, or conservative emotions are designed, not for their own sakes, but only to serve to keep or to bring each individual into his right place in the system, that he, being there, may be in right order for obeying or acting in harmony with his nature as a member in the system, or rather let us say generally, as a Being;—for all Being is social and systemic, and each individual supports all others, and all depend on One. Yes, a balance of energy between the “me” and the “not me,” has been provided for, by the institution of the selfish emotions, only to secure the condition most favourable to the intellectual deployment of the individual and to his happiness, to the end, that he thereafter may have nothing to do but to obey fully the grand law of Being. But what is this? *It is, that every Being in the universe which is truly individualised, while in virtue of its constitution it maintains its own specific form and characters, shall carry out this action to the limits of the sphere within which it can manifest itself; and therefore, first, in maintaining itself as an individual, shall tend to liken all others to itself, more or less, according as they are originally more or less kindred and analogous; and secondly, shall of course tend itself also to be likened to them under the same law, by their influence upon it.* This grand law can be here only announced. But let the reader study it for himself, he will find that all physics and philosophy is but a continued illustration of it, almost all the ascertained laws of nature but particular cases of it. In this place we have to consider it only in its bearing on the moral economy and sensibility of man. And what is this? Plainly, when viewed as operating upon a man from without, it is to the effect, that all beings and things which manifest themselves to him, shall, at all events, impress him with their likeness; and possibly not merely impress their likeness on him, but move his feelings also in harmony with their own, more or less, according as they are more or less congenial, or he more or less capable of a responsive movement. But to be thus impressed, what is it? In the lowest degrees of the affection, *i. e.*, in reference to such objects as are most dissimilar to our own natures, is it not to obtain a concept, image, or representation of objects? And, in reference to those that are kindred to us, is it not to love them also? Not alarm, therefore, nor anger, is in the right order of emotive nature,

but only *love*. Anger in the subject, to which alarm is the normal response in the object, is but the guardian and protector of love.

But to feel love is to realise the grand law of being on one side only. To realise that law to the full and be in actual order, one must be loved as well as love. And what will be the psychological characters of the affection arising from the fact of being loved, or being the object of love? It is obvious that it must be in the highest degree similar to love itself; for it is in fact nothing but its return, repetition, or echo. Accordingly, we scarce find a vernacular term for it as a general affection in our nature, though there are terms enough for its special forms, and still more for the want of it, as we shall find when we come to speak of the desires. The term *complacency*, however, describes it well enough. Love, therefore, and the consciousness of being loved, or complacency, are the grand emotions proper to a state of social well-being.

But such being the origin of love, it is obvious that for the maintenance of moral order, while we are thus engaged in loving and in being loved, all must be kept so as to be truly love-worthy. Nay, this is plainly the more important consideration of the two, and the ground of both, for if all be love-worthy, a general loving follows as a matter of course. But how is a man to be constituted and kept truly love-worthy? Plainly not otherwise than by being what he ought to be, and doing what he ought to do, or (as it may happen) suffering as he ought to suffer. It is by his standing true to human nature. And how is this to be accomplished? We find a special institution for it. Such is conscience, "the man in the breast," and its precept, "venerate thyself." By conscience it is that love is prevented from running wild, which if left to itself it could not fail to do, since love lies in likeness, be to what it may. And here let us remark, that in a state of moral order these two affections form of themselves a complete system, nor is there need for any others. Conscientiousness is adequate to preserve the individual, love to preserve the system, and both together to give universal harmony. And truly delightful it is to contemplate the destiny of the universe under such a constitution.

Thus it belongs to love evermore to assimilate the Being loving to the Being loved. The entertainment, even of a loved image in the heart, transforms the lover into the same likeness; and it is in undergoing this change spontaneously and uncon-

sciously, that the main charm of loving lies. Love, therefore, though, when all is right, it be a truly statical emotion, is yet an educational principle also. And granting that it fixes itself upon such objects only as are truly love-worthy, which alone, in a right order of things, it can do, then the direct influence of this affection is to form him who loves the truly amiable, to amiableness also, to transform the beholder of moral beauty into the morally beautiful which he beholds. And hence, for the recovery of the whole human family, nothing more is needed but a perfect type of humanity, whom all may love with undivided heart. Grant such an object of love, and grant the disposition and the power in all men of loving such a Being supremely, and then all will be gradually transformed into the same image. Humanity will be regenerated and restored. Nor this only. Supposing a hierarchy of Beings rising in successive stages of moral beauty towards an all-glorious One, who sits upon the throne, and supposing all orders of these Beings to be accessible to the love of each other, then, the institution of universal love, while it gives delight to all, must ever operate in carrying upwards the whole system of Beings towards perfection, each by loving them being likened to those nobler Beings who are above him, and who cannot but influence his admiration more than his mere equals can. And hence, since God is immutable, the sustained operation of love must ever tend to give as its limit, the approach of the finite, the conditioned, the imperfect, the modifiable, to the infinite and the all-perfect. And at all epochs, in the existence of such a system, the modifiable and the finite must range itself round the immutable and the infinite, so as to form a system of which He, who changeth not, is the centre; and looking towards Him in the repose of Divine love, and with the contemplative eye of delighted piety "beholding, as in a mirror, the glory of the Lord, all must be transformed into the same image, from glory to glory." Is the moral universe, then, destined to return, as it were, spontaneously into the bosom of God? Yes; doubtless if there were no other law in the universe but the law of love. But there is another. Besides the law of love, underneath it, and as its ground, we have seen that there is the principle of volition at the very root of the Soul's life; and of this principle the well-being consists in its being left free and let alone. There is also an identity-sustaining power in every Being, of

which the assimilative influence that begets love, is but the extension or operation in distance. The tendency to universal assimilation, therefore, stands upon the fact of universal individuality. And love, therefore, provides only for universal harmony ; it does not lead to identification and absorption ; it can never destroy the cosmos by effecting its regress into God ; nor is it conceivable how any law could do so, or other power, but the fiat of Omnipotence. Under the law of love, all Nature generally, and the Soul of man especially, must bear the image of God, but nothing more, except the reflection that there must be of it ; for this image must be reflected back in all directions, so that man shall bear the image of nature on his bosom also, and nature no less bear, in all her features, the impress of humanity. There must, when this grand law, which is the very rhythm of the universe, is fully realised, be universal harmony and responsiveness. But so long as God sanctions the individualities He has created, there can be neither confusion nor absorption. Such results as these are products of desire, not of pure love. Pure love does not absorb its object, or tend to do so. The language of pure love, with respect to its object is, Leave it there in its beauty, and leave me here to gaze upon it, and behold it evermore. How could love tend to extinguish individuality, since it cannot even exist where there is not more than one ? The Indian theologies, therefore, are all wrong in this. But not in all things. Thus they say, and say with great beauty, that this world of ours is the world, not of love, but of desire ; and on this fact, let us now touch.

Let us ask, before we proceed further, what is *desire* ? And this let us illustrate in reference to love, which has given occasion to the question. Desire, then, takes its rise in this, that, except only those objects which are formed expressly for the sake of being loved or admired (for admiration is the name for the love which we bestow on objects that are not capable of love in return ; as, for instance, a piece of symmetrical architecture, or a beautiful face), except those objects which it is the mission of the fine arts to accomplish, there are none upon earth which are wholly and permanently in a condition either for loving fully or for being fully loved. There is no such thing on earth, either in the individual or in the system, as perfect well-being and order. No sooner does love awake, almost in any case, but forthwith wants or defects, either in the object loved or in the subject loving,

present themselves in the field of view along with the affection. Either the object is not present, or we have not full access to it, or it is not our own, or it is disagreeably circumstanced, or it has a fault, etc. etc. And thus, along with the enjoyment which the love gives, there comes over the mind a certain uneasiness at the same time; and the Soul, while she perpetuates the affection which she has, and the enjoyment which it brings, aims also at such a change as may do away with the want which makes her uneasy, and may fully realise the affection which, in consequence of that defect, she can enjoy only in part. In a word, the Soul desires. Desire is not, therefore, an elementary affection of mind, like alarm, anger, or love, awaking spontaneously and directly in the bosom of a conception. A desire is merely an emotion in abeyance, which cannot in present circumstances realise itself, but can only aim at it, feeling uneasy from the effort. Remarks of the same kind apply also to *hope*, through all its grades, from confidence to despair. Thus hope is merely desire, with a certain infusion of belief that that desire will be realised; *confidence* the same, with strong belief; and *despair* the same, with the contrary belief. Of these states of feeling, therefore, all-important though they be, we need say nothing here, where our object is analysis only, and not popular discourse.

But, though the desires are merely functions and products of other powers of mind, and merely express emotions in the condition of not being fully realised as yet, they are, as has been stated, of extreme importance in this world, and, in the progress of our inquiry into the emotive life of man, we now fall in with them. And here, let us ask, which of all desires, according to the preceding theory of the emotions, must be the first in a right moral order of things, or a moral order which has departed from perfection only so far as necessary to give field for the rise of desire? To find this, it is only necessary to call to mind that the well-being of the whole moral system is grounded, in so far as man is concerned, on conscientiousness, on veneration for law—veneration for “the man in the breast.” Now (omitting for the present the desire to worship, which, according to the views of this work, ought to be the most deep-seated of all the desires peculiar to man in a right order of things, but which cannot be even touched on here), from this relation of “the man in the breast” to the individual, compared with that relation in which

the world stands, it appears that the first of all truly humane desires must be, *the desire to do right*—the desire to maintain moral order, to venerate law, to act justly and kindly. In such a desire humanity must, in a right order of things, immediately express itself, and that because of the instant solicitations of the appetites and instincts; for they are nearer to the Soul than the external world, and are quite regardless of all moderation and rule, and simply drive at the attainment of their objects, and their own consummation in the enjoyment of these objects, without regard either to temperance or the rights of others at all. Hence in human nature, supposing its reflectiveness fully developed, an uneasiness, arising from a conscious temptation to do wrong, but, along with this uneasiness, an enjoyment belonging to the contemplation of doing what is right—in other words—hence, a desire to do right. Let us not fail to remark here, however, that the desire to do right does not fully express the state of the Soul in the face of any given action or intention which has bearings upon the well-being of individuals or of the system. Such an action is no sooner conceived, the conditions in which it ought to be performed no sooner present themselves, than there is felt to be, not merely a desire, but an obligation, to perform it. Nor will these two motives bear to be identified, though psychologists have often attempted to do so. In fact, on comparing the two, it will be found that obligation is a much simpler motive than desire. It is not both an uneasiness and a pleasure, such as desire is. Obligation is wholly and purely an uneasiness—an uneasiness to act in a certain way. The anticipation of enjoyment, when the action shall have been accomplished, does not enter into it at all. There is no after-thought, no calculation in it at all. And no wonder that such should be the character of the motive on which the maintenance of moral order is devolved. To leave moral order to depend on a motive such as desire, into which a consideration of consequences enters, would not be safe; because the re-establishment of moral order may often demand as a preliminary condition, the enduring or the inflicting of much suffering, while beyond this perhaps the actor may not have intelligence enough to see; and, therefore, if he were allowed to look to consequences, desire to act could not be felt—his motive to right conduct would fail in its mission. Therefore, instead of being left to

mere emotion and desire, the moral economy is secured by the institution of moral obligation—a mysterious *vis à tergo*, imperatively urging to actions of a certain character, and imperatively forbidding others. But as this motive involves deeply the reason and personality of man, as well as the mere emotiveness and sensibility of his nature, further remarks upon it must be delayed for the present. We are now in the sphere of mere emotion.

By the institution of moral obligation, or veneration for what is right, the moral hero is given to the world. Here, then, let us ask what is the telling of moral heroism upon others who are ingenuous spectators of it? And does the answer require many words? No; plainly it is love to the moral hero, love to him who in his conduct aims at honouring humanity. In the actual world there is indeed much love which is not based upon goodness, but still he who loves, whatever the ground of his affection in point of fact, always tries to persuade himself that it is goodness that he is loving, and thus does homage to the principle which we affirm. Love, therefore, is that which normally meets, and in meeting rewards true goodness. Nor can any other reward be conceived which would be so great as love; for it belongs to love to heap benefits on its object till that object be so full that its well-being is every way complete. Not that the moral hero asks for love when he proceeds to his heroic deeds. No; he acts from out of himself, and simply because the man in the breast declares that it is for him to act as he is going to do. Still, however, it is true that when love on the part of others is withheld, or apprehended to be withheld in answer to greatness of conduct, there is a great want,—there is the want of that which ought fully to be. It is, therefore, only to be expected that there shall exist in the breast of the moral hero, or the truly good man, as the reflex subjective demand consequent on an act or consciousness of moral heroism, when that act has been accomplished, and the hero is free to draw his breath and look around him, a desire to be respected, supported, esteemed,—in one word, to be loved. Nor does nature disappoint this expectation. This is, in point of fact, the first of all the reflex demands or desires of the social economy of human nature—the demand or desire to be loved. And thus it is beautifully provided that the individual, in manifesting himself as such, shall also be made to feel the sociality of his nature; and by being kept alive to the

charm of companionship and sympathy, be kept from extravagance, and the True Heroic never suffered to degenerate into the Quixotic. Such is the true origin of the desire to be loved. But let us not fail to remark here also, that though its legitimate ground and normal mode of development be in the heart when asking to be sustained in the noble and generous thoughts and deeds which it conceives or achieves, yet the desire to be loved may take its rise in much lower considerations also, and, indeed, even in the purely somatic arrangements of our nature. All things concur to the production of this desire; and, indeed, in some form or other it actuates every man, as well as every woman, more or less; and by trying to force its object, irrespective of goodness, it is, as we shall presently see, the cause of almost all the deceitfulness, and very much of the misery, of society.

But before noticing some of its most usual forms in the world, let us notice some of the desires which arise from the demand in human nature for entertaining the direct affection of love; for many objects are to be encountered, which are not in a condition to be loved, though love tend normally to embrace them, and which, therefore, instead of granting fruition, can only awake desires. Such, for instance, is the case of the wretched, and that apart altogether from any consideration of the cause of their wretchedness. The wretched cannot be loved. Love is the emotion proper to a state of well-being, and it demands a state of well-being in its object before it can constitute itself towards him. What, then, as to the love of the wretched? What does it belong to the institution of love to effect, when an object of an order that ought to be embraced by the affection, as, for instance, a fellow-man, presents himself in a state of wretchedness? Plainly, in order to accomplish its mission—love must first make good in him the condition of its own existence. It must first relieve his wretchedness, and bring him to a state of well-being. This object accomplished, he may then be regarded with complacency, there may be love; but not till then. But what does this imply? Plainly, it implies that love carries *benevolence* in its bosom, and insists upon charity as the condition necessary to the well-being of the heart that loves. The language of the heart is, Let there at all events be kindness; and then love comes, when through kindness wretchedness vanishes. And hence we see what the real measure of effective benevolence is. It is the amount of



true well-being produced in those who are the objects of it. And hence we have a rule by which to construct and test all schemes of benevolence; for well-being, according to our present use of the term, is quite a definite idea. It is the possession of humanity in its fulness. It is not only physical but moral well-being. It is not merely wealth, but love-worthiness also. And hence it is obvious that every form of benevolence which merely proposes relief to an existing wretchedness, and terminates in relieving it, fails of the true mission of benevolence, and very possibly contravenes and frustrates higher laws of order and of providence, and throws the law of love into collision with moral obligation. For such a serious thing as wretchedness is not sent into the world for nothing. It has always its cause and its mission too; and this should be remembered and respected not less than that of enjoyment. Merely to rid some one of an existing wretchedness anyhow, is not the duty of benevolence. The special object for which benevolence exists, is to transform its object not merely into a happy, but also into a love-worthy being. In order to this, the first step no doubt is to relieve his wretchedness. But the matter ought not to be left to rest there. Benevolence ought never to be manifested merely for pity, but always for conscience' sake—not as an homage to that sympathy or imitativeness which we have fatally in common with the whole creation, but as an act of humanity and brother-love. This done, benevolence does far more than merely relieve wretchedness. It never fails to command the respect, the esteem, the love, or as it is in this case called, the *gratitude*, of him who is the object of it. Now, to be grateful, is to love in return; and, therefore, where well-being returning by the labours of benevolence, manifests itself in abounding gratitude, benevolence has gone far to accomplish its mission. Moral order is so far at least restored. There is love, and love in return.

And here there meets us the question in the theory of ethics, as disagreeable as it is strange, viz., whether benevolence be not, after all, merely a case of selfishness or intentional self-serving. But we have no occasion to argue this point. The only question is, What are the facts of our mental frames? Now, though it be most certain that one can never do right, nor act according to the promptings of his true nature, without benefiting himself, though it may be known by reasoning and experience, as well as believed on the word of God, that all things work together for the

good of the good man ; yet nothing can be more certain than that benevolence is a fact in human nature, and that he who is benevolent has in his eye, when he loves or pities, the advantage of another, and aims at that and not his own. On reflection, he may find that in being benevolent he is acting for his own advantage ; nay, while he is benevolent he may be conscious of this double charm that there is in such conduct ; nay, this fact a reflective man may invoke as a motive for being beneficent to others in cases where benevolence is wanting ; but still, nothing in human nature is more certain than that man is capable of seeking the benefit of another as well as his own. If it be said that he does so only because he is a short-sighted creature, and that if he saw the entire machinery of benevolence, he would find that in being benevolent he was in reality acting ultimately for his own interest, this is nothing to the point, though it were true. But it is not true. The benevolent man is indeed acting *also*, but not *ultimately*, for his own benefit. It is general order, not individual enjoyment, that is the last word of the moral economy for us. I say "for us" not "in itself," because in itself the system is cyclical, and there is no last word at all ; unless we say "God," which sacred name is, however, in the order of nature, not the last word, but the first ; "the glory of God" is the last.

But how, it may here be well asked, can the soul, in a world like this, so full of wretchedness, and with so many in it who are neither love-worthy nor responsive to affection—how can love be maintained ? Will there not be a continual risk in almost every sphere of action of its fleeing away from active life in its own neighbourhood, and of its betaking itself to some retreat or shrine, there to outpour itself, all unchecked by the painful realities of life, upon its chosen hero, saint, or idol ? Yes ; society in every form verifies this apprehension. But love thus bestowed is thrown away. It cannot accomplish its mission in this way. Still—love will not stay with the world. What then is to be done ? There is but one cure of the evil, and that is a fervent love to God, with the well-grounded assurance of the love of God in return. Grant this, and the soul that is thus sustained is qualified for exercising love and benevolence on earth, in the face of every repulse. The most disagreeable object in that case fails to subdue the soul's sensibility to kindness. Humanity in that case is viewed in its every walk as a most sacred institution ; in even the

most wretched scenes there is found to be something that is redeeming. Anger and egotism are banished by the power of the Divine love that is felt; a sustained spirit of adoration excludes every tendency to alarm, and God is everywhere "a home, a haven, and sabbath" for the soul.

But though love is so often in this world, especially in crowded cities, allowed to manifest itself only in the form of charity or pity, yet this is not always the case. There are many forms of true love in this world; at some of the more conspicuous of which let us here for a moment glance.

Thus, within the precincts of the family, and morally constitutive of it, as well as the fountain of all its charms, there is that dearest of all the affections of earth, wherein the somatic relations of human nature are enlisted in the service of love, and of which *conjugal love* is the full expression.

Similarly constituted and similarly supported by the earnestness of instinct, and not less touching and dear to the heart, there is within the same precincts *maternal love*.

There is also *parental love*, in which the simple affection is seconded by the right of property in its objects, softened by pity, and cheered by love in return.

Here also *filial love* manifests itself; and this, when the family becomes the nation, constitutes *loyalty*.

But in filial love a trace of fear enters, which increases as the object of love becomes more powerful. And thus we have, when answerable to a just conception of God, the emotion of *adoration*, more generally *veneration*. And when the love goes out of it, and the fear remains, *superstition*.

To this place also, in our sketch, belongs the emotion of *wonder*, which, however, is not entitled to that pre-eminence that has sometimes been assigned to it, being rather a nascent than a fully developed form of sensibility, and rather a jumble of love and alarm, than a primitive institution in human nature. When it rises into *admiration*, it is indeed, worthy then of all consideration; but admiration, considered as a simple emotion, is not distinct from love. It is simply love towards objects from which love in return is not expected.

Leaving the domain of fear, and returning again to the light, we find simple love counting on love in return, expressing itself

in *friendship*, of which the most comprehensive form is *patriotism*, from both of which *philanthropy* differs, in that it does not count upon love in return.

We find mutual love also expressing itself in *the church*, which is a friendship based on religious communion; *the army* which is a friendship based on the sacredness of heroism, and which marries itself to patriotism, in the institution of *national guards*. Great is the friendliness of humanity. And hence the insupportable suffering that there is in exile and solitary confinement.

Such are some of the fruits of the heart's demand for loving. But still more manifold are the fruits which are produced in the world by the heart's demand for being loved. It is this that determines the ordinary forms which ambition assumes, and, therefore, the characteristics of individual men.

Of these, the first form is *the love of glory*, which, either as the love of fame, or of praise, or of esteem, may be said to lie at the very root of the social system, and to be the first and most prevalent of all emotions. And indeed, when viewed in all its forms and influences, this desire will be found to be mainly constitutive of the actual form of society. The little one who is indifferent to praise and blame, is not a child; and the man who cares not for the respect at least, if happily not the applause of others, is not a member of society.

And here also *honour* presents itself; for what is honour but the demand of the heart to be regarded as love-worthy, by the maintenance of the principles on which the perpetuation of brother-love or friendship depends? In this it is that honour is distinguished from the principle of rectitude. Honour says, Venerate "the friendship." Conscience says, Venerate "the man in the breast." And hence we may see the possible agreements and differences of these two motives. Thus, when the principles of the friendship are those of justice and humanity itself, then conscience and honour must say exactly the same thing, must demand exactly the same actions. But that they may also differ widely is obvious, because a friendship may be grounded on any principle. There may be a brotherhood for highway robbery or assassination; and, in such a case, he who is to act honourably in the position in which he has chosen to place himself, may feel called upon to conceal, nay, to commit, the greatest crimes.

As another of the forms of the desire to be loved, *affability* also is worthy of notice ; for what is a genuine affability, but a loving disposition indirectly working for love in return ?

If, on the other hand, there be merely the aiming at love in return, without the existence of love in the heart that aims, then instead of affability there is merely *plausibility* or *address*.

Hence also *flattery* ; though flattery may have many other motives, some of them amiable, but all of them stupid.

Each of these emotions has its own peculiar rhythm. Thus honour being a conservative principle, invokes the potency of anger, and expresses itself in that rhythm which is named dignity. Affability being simply humane, its rhythm is purely that of love, viz., grace, a cheerful listening, responsive carriage.

But here an emotion presents itself, borrowing from fear, as honour does from anger, and constituting *modesty*. Modesty is the apprehension of not being held to be love-worthy, expressing itself in a rhythm of most exquisite loveliness. For what is the blush on the cheek ? It is the colour of anger-at-self for not being love-worthy. And what says the down-cast eye ? It bespeaks penitence and implores forgiveness. Meanwhile the neck, suffused, like the cheek, with the colour of anger, and carrying itself with an air of uncompromising dignity, proclaims that the fault or feeling which has caused the blush, is but an accident, and indicates a tone of sensibility which is charming beyond all expression, and makes modesty to be the most powerful of all emotions for awaking that very love, the apprehension of the want of a worthiness for which gives occasion to the emotion.

Modesty carries the spirit of penitence or forgiveness (that is, the entreaty to be loved, though not love-worthy) in its bosom, and is essentially affectionate. But when engagement with self, when conscious guilt forbids this, the emotion changes complexion, and now there is *shame*. This emotion, however, considered as a normal institution in human nature, belongs to reflection and conscience, and must be reserved till afterwards.

Tampering, and that too often successfully, with honour, affability, and modesty, and invoking the rhythm of each by turns, *coquetry* now comes into the field. It is emotion simulated by art. Its express object is to awake love, yet without the sanction, either of loving first, or any promise better than a false one, of loving in return. It would be well, therefore, if coquetry were

known and noted, as soon as it presents itself upon the stage ; nevertheless this discovery is often made too late ; and, meantime, there ensues a comedy to the coquette, and a tragedy to the caught. The coquette triumphs in a disgraceful victory.

Coquetry, when it is without art, becomes *vanity*, which, therefore, is often a perfectly honest thing, ingenuously out-spoken in these simple terms, "Only look at me, and see how love-worthy I am !" But this will never do. Where there is no love on the part of the vain person towards those whom he addressed with a view to elicit their admiration, the exhibition which he makes of himself is simply ridiculous, if it be not disgusting. And even where the vain person is also amiable and affectionate, the display of vanity must be very well supported, before it produces the desired effect. A well-sustained *ostentation*, seconded by a genuine affability and personal charms, does indeed accomplish wonders in the ball-room or on the promenade ; but modesty alone has the sanction of nature. Modesty bespeaks the truest love-worthiness, and, curious to say, it does so in the very act of denying it to be actually possessed ; but in so denying, modesty is merely affirming its own exalted idea of the love-worthiness which ought to be, in the bosom where a human heart is beating.

It is not legitimate to aim directly at being loved after any fashion whatever. To be loved is indeed an imperious demand of the heart in order to its own well-being ; but the only lawful way to attain this object, is to forget it, to cherish generous thoughts, to perform noble deeds, and to love all that is truly love-worthy. The being loved will follow, but it will not force.

We have now seen this great demand of the heart, the demand to love and to be loved, in a great variety of forms, almost all of them clouds, however, in the emotive atmosphere of human nature, which, in a right order of things, continues wholly transparent. We have seen this emotion allying itself with fear ; we have now to remark that it sometimes also allies itself with anger, and then there arise emotions of a most serious, and even fatal complexion. Thus say that the circle of affection is closed, or is held to be so, that each one loves and is loved, so that all is well ; and say that now another interferes, offering his love to those whose love is engaged already, and seeking to be loved in his turn. Naturally, in such a case, there arises, in him whose place the intruder aims at taking, the apprehension that the latter may

destroy the existing state of well-being, may break the existing circle, and stop the sweetly flowing current of mutual affection. Hence the apprehensive one, besides fearing more or less, naturally also feels angry, and thus he becomes the subject of a triple emotion, composed of love, fear, and anger. This is *jealousy*. No wonder, it is so destructive to all concerned. Still, however, from this theory, it follows that jealousy is not necessarily malignant. It may possibly be both legitimate and have a good ground and a lawful end to accomplish.

But another case of the infusion of anger may occur, which can never be legitimate. Thus say that the circle of affection is not closed as yet, and that several individuals are aiming at the love of the same object, the same glory, praise, esteem, love, or good, be what it may, and while some succeed some one fails. Then he who fails, is but too apt to feel angry also. He feels just as if the very effort to complete the circle of affection had sanctioned him to act as he might have done innocently, if that circle had been closed. He is actuated by *envy*, an emotion which never can be legitimate, and which is always malignant.

Both jealousy and envy consummate themselves in *revenge*, which is anger having recourse to cunning, to compass its destructive ends. But this is contrary to the law of emotion, which is to act frankly and fast. Revenge, therefore, is never legitimate.

But the breaking or failure of the circle of affection, may have still another issue. There may be no thought of revenge, no malign feeling at all, no place for jealousy at all. The lost object of affection may merely haunt the mind that has sustained the loss without the possibility of return. Now, in thus haunting, it is apt somehow so to change the mind, that all loving dies away, all society becomes tiresome, even nature loses all her charms, and the Soul is left without a motive. All curiosity also dies away. There is no wish nor any heart, for willing anything. The light of life is gone out. The Soul has grown a stranger to all joy. She is also a stranger to all distress. She takes no interest in life. But when it has come to this, the spiritual part fails to give that quickness to the nervous system, which is necessary to embodied existence. The powers of life fail. The body becomes emaciated; and the scene is closed by death; which is accepted with indifference. Such is the broken heart; and of this there are, I believe, in the world a far greater

number of cases than is generally supposed, not perhaps in reference to that special form of affection which aims at conjugal love as its consummation, but in reference to "the bubble reputation," etc. Men die, in short, for not being loved in the way they want. Let us not pretend to tell the secret of the other sex.

And what is the cause of all these evils? If the preceding theory be true, it is all because men do not stand on the principle of rectitude, because they aim only at such share of glory, fame, praise, esteem, reputation, in a word, such love, as they can at once make good for themselves. Neglecting the principle of rectitude as the grand regulator of affection and the parent of all reciprocities that are legitimate, they resolve to strike hands with love directly. Instead of being determined to do right, come what may, they are determined to love, and be loved, come what may. That principle, which is the manifestation in man of the grand social law of Being, is too strong for that which is the manifestation in man of Being as individualised, and as holding immediately a title from God. Desire is too strong for moral principle. Feeling is too strong for faith; impulse too strong for reflection. Man lets himself live too much the life of the lower animals; while yet he misses the well-being to which they attain; because the multifariousness in the contents of man's consciousness, bewilders him, so that he knows not which of all the motives that present themselves to go by;—intellect in man dissolving and cutting in pieces the instincts, which in the lower animals possess their integrity, and which, thus possessed, serve so admirably the mission of guiding them infallibly to all the well-being of which they are capable.

But that man possesses a definite psychical constitution, as well as an intellectual or reflective one, follows distinctly, if the views of this Essay be admitted as true to nature. And here let us attempt, in a few words, to give a view of what that constitution is; for plainly such a view, if it be a sound one, is knowledge of the most important kind. Yes; let but a man possess a clear and distinct knowledge of his own moral constitution, within a compass of thought so short that it may exist at all times in his mind as a simultaneous or panoramic conception, and he has a type which he may apply to himself in any circumstances in which he may find himself placed in the course of life; he has a canon by which he may regulate his conduct, an organon by which,



with the aid of providence and grace, he may construct his character.

First, then, viewing man as rising out of nature at the fiat of the Almighty, and forming the crowning species of the animal kingdom, we see him carrying along with him the various *appetites* which are necessary to the healthy development and maintenance, in all their somatic relations, both of the individual and of the species, by the method of succession. We see him also carrying along with him the guardian *emotions* of alarm and anger, qualifying him for fighting or for flying, as the case may demand; and, under the regulation of *reflection*, rendering him capable of prudence and enterprise; but, for the same reason, leaving it possible for him to fall in his conduct below that of a mere animal; since the appetites and affections, in being placed at the disposal of thought, have necessarily ceased to be self-regulating and mutually corrective, and therefore assertive of temperance, as they are to the full in the lower animals.

Thus endowed, man is emphatically called upon to enter on a life of love. It has been shown that he has been provided with the means of prudent enterprise on lower terms; and it is obvious that, in following objects of appetite, either normally or extravagantly, enterprise may have a wide field. But here is a higher field for enterprise; for to love and to be loved is that which is specially expressive of humanity.

But love, whether in its active or passive voice, is not a regulative; it is, on the contrary, simply an imitative or assimilative principle. It may serve to keep society united in the bonds of mutual sympathy and support. It may be the parent of much enjoyment. But to secure love, and at all events to consecrate it to the cause of moral order, an ideal of moral excellence must be given,—a standard which shall not itself be a mere product of love,—which shall not vary with the attractions of society from time to time,—but which shall be a permanent standard or type of love-worthiness. And such is the principle of rectitude. Such is conscience. And here we arrive at the central fact in the nature of man, and the ultimate, when viewing man as raised on the animal kingdom, and its crowning species.

But when we change the point of view, and regard man as given by God to the world, and all animated nature as the crumbs of the festival of man's inauguration, permitted to con-

tinue in existence for the sake of the enjoyment of which they are capable, then that principle which our former method gave us only as the last, is now given as the first. Considered as coming from God, the first principle of humanity is the candle of the Lord in man's breast,—Reason, Conscience, the Principle of moral rectitude, and of common sense.

And what next? Conscience given as a guide for the principle of self-development or ambition, the moral hero whom this makes is given to the world. And he, on his part, is met, as the recognition of his presence, by the love of all around him. This, then, is the second great fact in human nature, viewed as in a normal or unfallen state—love to the good man; in abstract form, the love-worthiness of moral goodness.

And here let us remark, that the moral system, considered as a system of government, or a retributive system, is already complete. In being loved the good man cannot but be rewarded; nor can any honourable conception of a reward be formed but that which it belongs to love to confer. All the rewards which goodness can ever be entitled to, can never be more or greater than those which perfect love, when it has the means, bestows; for the very first demand of love, even in order to its own well-being, is that its object be fully in a state of perfect well-being, and, therefore, that nothing be wanting to its complete happiness. To be meritorious, is merely to be deserving of the awards of love. It is implied in being love-worthy. In the idea of merit there enters, no doubt, the conception, that the love-worthiness has been earned or maintained in the midst of temptations to fall away from it; merit is, therefore, a case of special love-worthiness. But to suppose that the doctrine of merit and reward does not belong to the doctrine of love-worthiness, and the awards which it is the part of love to bestow on its objects—to suppose that merit and reward stand out in our moral economy as an independent *quid pro quo*, is but a sorry notion.

The first idea of humanity, then, when viewed in relation to God, yet wholly terrestrial, is composed of goodness in the individual, responded to by love to him, and consequently happiness conferred on him, by the circle around; which when generalised, gives universal goodness and mutual love in and over all; and this may be regarded most especially as the moral sphere.

Expressed in the form of desire, it gives these three, as ani-

inating the breast of every individual in the community :—1st, The desire to do right. 2dly, The desire to love and to be loved. 3dly, The desire to confer happiness ; for that desire ever lies in the bosom of love, though love itself be not desire.

Now this, I think, is all that is characteristically human. And these few principles, with fear and anger as their guardians,—with ambition as their spur,—with the appetites and instincts dictated by our somatic relations to determine them towards specific objects,—and with a double-deep but ever-flitting consciousness capable of seizing the whole of one's own nature, yet only in shreds and patches, so as to open an ample field for the exercise of reason and choice ;—these few principles, dissolved in intellect, and floating on the boundless ocean of volition, give rise to all the variety which history and human life display.

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And here our first descent into Human Nature comes to a close ; here the analysis of our active powers terminates. But this it does not without opening another sphere of still higher interest—the intellectual sphere—the sphere of those higher principles which impart to Human Nature its truest dignity, and which are destined to sit in judgment on the appetites and passions, and all that is merely psychical. At these higher principles, therefore, let us now glance. Nor let the reader apprehend that this will complicate our inquiry. Intellectual phenomena are still manifestations of activity, and instead of a complication, a very simple theory of these phenomena appears to me to be now before us.

## CHAPTER IX.

### OF VOLITION AND PERCEPTION.

THE will, the principle of activity in man, originally free and ever attempting to break through and regain its liberty, we have seen in the preceding chapters variously confined and placed under law ; as, for instance, by the investing organisation, in the appetites ; and by surrounding objects, chiefly our fellow-creatures, in the emotions. Let us now, in a few words, inquire how the activity stands in its relations with objects whose bearings are more general. Happily no new principles need to be introduced ; but, on the contrary, a very simple theory of intellectual phenomena presents itself. Yes ; notwithstanding all its admirable variety of phenomena, and its apparent multiplicity of faculties, the human mind, when viewed in its last analysis, gives only two, which are essentially distinct and entitled to the name of principles. These are the faculty or principle of VOLITION and that of BELIEF, the former the original source of all our active, the latter of all our intellectual, powers. It is well worthy of remark, indeed, that there is not a single process or product of mind which is not due more or less to both. But, by the due co-ordination of both, with each other, and with the positive relations in which man exists, without invoking any others, all the powers and processes of intellect may, I think, be explained.

Moreover, even this view of the mind at its origin admits of a still greater simplification, for the principle of volition and that of belief, though they are essentially distinct in their nature, yet are not distinct as co-ordinate principles. Nor, indeed, ought belief in strict propriety to be called a principle at all. Belief is rather a phenomenon than a principle ; nay, a phenomenon of relation merely. Belief is merely a phenomenon which manifests itself in a Being, whose principle is a Will, when that Being is

placed in relation with such other beings or things as are capable of constituting along with it an intelligible system. The position of belief in the logical or intellectual system of the universe, is analogous to that of gravitation in the mechanical or material system. Both are equally universal, equally constitutive of the phenomena of their respective spheres ; yet still, both exist only because the materials of their respective systems exist. If there were but one body or particle of matter in the universe, it is impossible that it could gravitate or manifest gravitation ; and so also, if there were but one mind, existing in absolute solitariness, and in its own absolute unity constituting the universe, it is impossible that it could believe or manifest belief. Perhaps, though alone in the solitude of space, a body might indeed be said to possess gravitation potentially, and so might a mind be said to possess belief potentially, though it constituted the whole universe ; but for the actual apparition of either gravitation or belief as facts in nature, there must be in nature a plurality of objects. These being given, however, then these powers, whether of gravitation or of belief, can manifest themselves, and are forthwith adequate to maintain all things in a system, mechanical in virtue of the one, intellectual in virtue of the other.

More deeply laid at the root of the system is the principle of volition. Like everything else which is brought to the surface so as to admit of being discoursed about, it must indeed, when handled by us in the present form of our Being, belong to the category of phenomenon ; but it is at the same time more deeply seated, and approaches more nearly to an expression of the very life, nature, and essence of the mind, than anything else that we can reach. Willing is not a phenomenon of relation, but of inhesion in the individual mind, and the first and most vital manifestation of its very substance. Recurring to the analogy between the material and the mental, we may say that the principle of volition is in the mental what the principle of inertia is in the material. As a particle of matter would still be inert, though there were none but itself in the universe, and could not lose its inertia without losing its nature as matter at the same time ; so a mind, though it were all alone, and alone constituted the universe, would be a principle of volition, and could not cease to be so without losing its spiritual nature.

We are thus led to the principle of volition as that which lies

at the very fountain-head of all intellectual phenomena, and of human nature itself, and is primarily constitutive of it. Here, therefore, let us state what the nature of that principle is, when thus conceived as existing in the conditions of greatest purity and simplicity, and as yet untrammelled by engagements or relations of any kind. Nor will this require long time, since its nature, so far as it is discoverable by us, stands only in these two facts,—*first*, that it is perfectly free; and *secondly*, that its well-being consists in self-deployment, either by entering on a new phase of being, or of self-repetition (remembering), as the case may be. By saying that it is perfectly free, is meant that it is not, when viewed in itself and apart from its somatic and other engagements, under any law imposed from without; unless the condition, just laid down as that in which its well-being consists, be construed as a law. And even this condition the Will is free to traverse, if it propose to itself another object, not its own well-being; but this only within limits, of course. Thus, the action which belongs to it as a living Being, and which this law of its well-being ever tends to carry on and develop, it can, when viewed apart from all relations, check or new direct as it pleases; but it cannot put a stop to it. This is obvious, for such a stop would amount to death by suicide, or even annihilation. Now, that the Will could not possibly effect this appears at once; for the act, or at all events the power which accomplished the extinction, must survive the extinction which it accomplished; and, therefore, the principle of volition be still alive after it had destroyed itself, which is absurd. Within such limits, however, the principle of volition, when viewed in itself and anterior to all engagements with other beings and things, is perfectly free.

But we have here to consider this principle and the mind, not when existing thus all alone, but when existing under the manifold relations of the actual system of things. We have, therefore, to consider it when existing in relation with God and the world, under one or other of which heads all things that exist may be classed. And now, in order to our progress, it is necessary to ask what is the world, and what is God, in relation to the principle of volition—bold questions indeed, yet such that it is not impossible to give modest answers to them, answers such as are at all events sufficient for our purpose.

There is, indeed, a general consent among thinking men as

to the answers which are to be given to them. Thus, as to the world, it is generally agreed that it stands to God in the relation of a creation to a creator; it is a voluntary product of God. The world is, therefore, a manifestation of a principle of volition; and this, though existing in the Almighty, and therefore in infinite difference from the human mind, is still a Principle of Volition, a Will. So much then as to the relation of the world to volition: it is a manifestation of it; and hence we are able to explain, what is otherwise certainly a great secret, viz., the fact that the whole material creation, not less than the spiritual, gives as its ground in the last analysis nothing but powers, nothing but centres and lines of force, of various orders. If matter be a product of that which is essentially a power, viz., the Divine will, the law of the homogeneity of cause and effect, leads us to infer that matter will itself be a thing of power, or manifest power. And, at all events, though it consisted of other things besides powers, these could not be cognisable by us, since if a principle of volition, a power, be the ground of our Being, Power must be the type of Being to us; and power conceived either as in exercise or in a state of mere potentiality, the dynamical or the statical, that is, power (or cause as commonly conceived) or substance, must in the last analysis embrace all the ideas we can have of Being in its ground.

But what as to God? Though the inquiry is bold, yet the answer is not ambiguous. We cannot, in reference to Him to whom we ascribe the universe as his creation, escape from the conclusion which we have arrived at in reference to the human mind, viz., that the Principle of Volition lies at the root of the whole spiritual system, and is the deepest fact which we can reach in the nature of Godhead, no less than in the nature of manhood. A Principle of Volition cannot indeed operate, cannot give rise to any product whatever, but forthwith there is belief, there is intelligence; so that when we speak of the Divine Will rather than the Divine intelligence as the root of the Divine nature, we lay down a merely logical order; and it must not be supposed that there ever was a moment when God, in the exercise of his free will, acted apart from, or irrespective of, his intelligence. But so long as the analytic habit of our minds obliges us to view these things as successive, the first place, according to the views of this work, ought to be assigned to the

Principle of Volition, to the Will of God. It thus appears that however diverse in reality, and even as known to us, God, the soul, and the world, may be, yet there is a certain ultimate agreement in all the three, and therefore in all things whatsoever; while yet no system of philosophy can be further from our views than pantheism, since according to us, that in which alone all things meet and agree, that which they either are or which they manifest, is a principle of volition—a principle which, as soon as it becomes multiple, expressly demands individuality and liberty attached to various centres as the very condition of its existence, and which therefore being given, individuality, and liberty associated with it, are necessarily given at the same time, and therefore pantheism wholly excluded.

These things granted, we are able to affirm something definite as to the nature of belief and evidence. *Belief* is that which takes place in a spiritual being (or principle of volition) when that being is in relation with others, or with objects (powers) which are the products of another. *Evidence* is the manifestation of one principle or product of volition to another which is in relation with the first as such, and that which opens its eye. Hence—

1st, God manifests himself to man, in virtue of His being the Supreme Will, the Almighty; and hence it is that notwithstanding all the impediments that are in the way, arising partly from the muffling action of the bodily envelope, partly from human guilt (in consequence of which men do not like to retain God in their knowledge), still not a race that has any feeling at all, but is fully under the dominion of religious impressions. And hence it is that, for a people or an individual to renounce religion and throw off the allegiance and the worship of God, is at the same time to renounce humanity in its noblest and most necessary observance; for piety, according to our view of things, is the first and most characteristic element of well-being in human nature, the first of all man's privileges, duties, and obligations.

2d, The world manifests itself to man, in virtue of its being a creation or product of the will of God, existing through that will, and embodying and manifesting that will. Otherwise it were wholly occult, and inconceivable, not to say incognisable.

And hence the reason why the world, while it is seized and held as something existing, is never seized or held by common sense as a thing existing independently or absolutely, carrying



the reason of its existence in itself, but is on the contrary held by all mankind as a system manifesting design and providence. And thus two of the most remarkable and important laws of belief in human nature immediately receive a happy explanation, viz.,—1st, the universality of religion ; and, 2d, the demand of intelligence for a final cause, or useful end, or sufficient reason in everything, in other words, the demand to find that everything is the product of a Principle of Volition.<sup>1</sup>

But from these views it also follows, that wherever there is belief, there is the encounter of the influence of two or more principles of volition with each other, or of an object or objects which manifest such a principle, with such a principle. There is the intrusion of one power upon another. But it belongs to the very nature of a principle of volition to resist such an intrusion ; for the well-being of a Will, as has been shown, consists in perfect freedom and self-deployment, while every such intrusion, in so far as it actually takes place, must necessarily impair liberty, and modify self-development. Hence, a new feature or phenomenon in the bosom of the soul. While she acknowledges, in virtue of her aptitude for belief, that which impresses her, and thus attains to belief or the state of believing, she must also, in virtue of her determination, as a principle of volition, towards liberty and individuality, resist that which impresses her, and keep it at a distance. And hence this grand result—that which impresses the principle of volition in the observer (more shortly that which impresses the observer), and thus develops belief in him, is required by him to manifest itself, to declare itself, to show itself distinct from himself, *i. e.*, as an object.

And hence the well-known character of the contents of a perception, viz., the affirmation, 1st, of attribute or phenomenon ; 2d, of substance or cause. The idea of the latter, that which is regarded as substance or as cause (according as the corresponding apparition is fixed and obtains the name of attribute, or changeful and obtains the name of phenomenon), the soul has from herself as her type of Being ; and she affirms it of the object presenting itself, in virtue of the evidence which comes from that object to her, obscurely indeed (for a reason which will presently appear), but with the utmost certainty. The former,

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.

the appearance or phenomenon, be what it may, the Soul has in the same way, but with a great deal more clearness and distinctness, more intellectual repose and satisfaction, because it is given by sense, and therefore by a method which calls into play the activity of the mind both in analysis and synthesis; and this is the condition whereby clearness and distinctness in an object, and intellectual satisfaction in the mind, are attained. Sense, by its nervelets, gives objects and knowledge in the merest minima. An act of synthesis is necessary before they can be seized as objects or unities at all; and provided they be of limited extension in space, there is no end to the play of alternate analysis and synthesis which may be bestowed upon them. Whether these things are intelligible when thus so briefly stated, may be a question, but there is no doubt that in this way the grand fallacy of the popular philosophy, which affirms that we can know nothing but phenomena, and that which denies the doctrine of cause and substance, may be fully exposed.<sup>1</sup>

Here already then, is the principle of volition no longer free, but, by a regard to its own well-being, under the impressiveness of the objects with which it is in relation, kept or keeping itself to a certain state and function; and thus we arrive, without an effort, at the genesis and nature of *attention*.

Nor attention only; but here we have also the nature and genesis of *the idea of direction*, to which almost the entire myo-cerebral system has been made subservient, and which is the grand organon of all distinct perception, the investigation being deeply interesting, but too arduous to be even touched on here. This idea is, so to speak, the believingness of the Soul, drawn out, as it were, into an optic tube by attention, moveable by volition round its inner end, as by a ball and socket in the very eye of the mind—an illustration ridiculous but serviceable.

Nor moveable in this way only. Thought may move along it, as well as move it about. In a word, given objects one after another, they are, in a manner, given in direction also; and the idea of direction can apply itself to them, and give a somewhat distinct perception of them. And thus we obtain *the idea of succession*, which, emptied of all reference to contents, is *the idea of time*. And by the use of this idea, either as that of direction,

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B., on Method.

of succession, or of time, it is that analysis and synthesis, and therefore intellectual deployment upon objects, usually becomes possible. It is by its use, therefore, that clearness and distinctness in objects, and satisfaction in looking at them, can be reached. When, on the other hand, there is no scope for this idea, when the object which awakes belief is such that the principle of volition, the soul, cannot form itself either in direction or time in relation to that object, then the mind's eye cannot distinctly grasp that object, the mind no longer says that it sees or perceives that object, but only that it holds or believes it. The mind is not less certain that the object exists, than when it distinctly perceives it, but it has it, as it were, in the dark, and holds it with less satisfaction.

And hence the distribution of all possible objects of thought into three grand classes, of very different degrees of distinctness in perception. *First*, those which are given in direction, and are the most distinctly perceivable; which includes external objects generally, and the objects of geometrical and physical science, etc. *Secondly*, those which are given in succession, but not in direction, and are much less distinctly perceivable; which includes all transient concepts and phenomena of consciousness, as numbers, events, emotions, etc., and which form the objects of the calculative and the social sciences, etc. And, *thirdly*, those which are given, neither in direction nor in succession, but merely given,—given in the mind itself, and that in virtue of its being what it is in the permanent relations with God and matter in which it exists, and which therefore cannot but always present themselves when anything occurs to suggest them, and cannot but form the laws, or rather the constants of belief, the principles of reason or of common sense, and the regulative principles in every science.

But if such be the genesis of perception (or conception, which, viewed in reference to a present object, may be regarded as the same), if this phenomenon take its rise in the steadying of the eye of the mind in a given direction or order, and the production in or upon the bosom of the soul, of an impress or peculiar state, representative of the object, there is no reason to suppose that in any but cases of extreme impression and absorption with the object, the whole soul considered as a principle of volition, shall be engaged and taken up in perceiving, during the time that it

is so engaged. There is every reason to infer that it will, in all ordinary cases of perception, be still left more or less free to indulge meanwhile in its own congenial modes of self-deployment, and to form itself into new modes of belief. And hence, while the object without, is the primary object to the soul as a percipient, the impress of that object (the state of belief, or the precept or concept) which it produces, may also be an object of belief to the soul, in so far as she is left free by the external object. When an object presents itself, not only may belief strike between the object and the whole soul as subject, but also between the primary state of belief thus induced, and the inner soul as still capable of further belief, and thus a more deeply-seated state of belief may be constituted, which is wholly internal. It must be rather obscure, because, from the laws of perception which have just been laid down, the idea of direction cannot be applied to it so as to render its analysis possible. But though obscure, it must yet be obviously connected with the object presenting itself, or the conception engaging the soul; it must, therefore, be very different from self-consciousness or pure reflectiveness;—it must be that which immediately underlies observation and memory, and looks to them,—what is it then? It is no doubt the highest kind of consciousness which exists in purely psychical natures; and what is it but that state of belief known by the name of feeling, *mere feeling*.

Of these mere feelings or states of outward-bound consciousness, the simplest are those which report the soul's existing state as to free deployment or spontaneous action on the one hand, or as to restraint or arrest on the other, that is, the soul's existing condition as to well-being or ill-being, considered as a Life or living being, a will or principle of volition. And of such states of outward-bound consciousness, of such feelings, what are the vernacular names? To me it seems as if a deeper consciousness itself declared that that which bespeaks the free and spontaneous flow of the soul's life, is certainly *pleasure*, and it may be up to the highest pitch of *joy*; that which bespeaks its arrest, and the suspension of its free play, *uneasiness* more or less, and it may be down to the depth of utmost *distress*. But at all events, such is our theory of the genesis and nature of these elementary conditions of simple internal belief or sensibility. The spontaneous flow of the soul's life is joy; its arrest or suspension is uneasiness or

distress. And hence we are able to understand the pleasure that there is in the act of willing, which is the soul committing itself to its own flow. Hence also why man tends so often and so sadly to cut short inquiry by an act of volition; as also, why a volition at last should be the normal close of a train of thought in the human breast, as it actually is, establishing this great fact for man, that his mission is indeed to think and inquire, not, however, for the sake of thought and inquiry, but for the sake of seeing his way in order to action, in which volition normally consummates itself.

Here also the purely instinctive system in human nature comes in, as has been shortly unfolded in preceding chapters.

But perception, affection, and the pursuit of enjoyment, though all eminently united in the same individual, do no more than constitute a psychical nature generally, such as the lower animals possess in a higher or lower degree, either in consequence of the spiritual nature in the last analysis of the ultimate elements or monads, of which their sensoria are composed, as Leibnitz and the monadologists maintain, or in consequence of the all-pervading power and presence of God, which animates their sensoria with appropriate instincts, as Cudworth and Newton suppose. Perception with emotion and the pursuit of enjoyment, do not constitute human nature. Human nature does not stand in the mere fact or power of feeling in various ways, or of mentally discoursing without conscious end or law, as possibly dogs may do in their dreams, or birds in their songs. It is only when personality or self-consciousness and reason are added to variety of feeling and mental discourse, that human nature is reached: and on these topics let us also touch.

## CHAPTER X.

### OF PERSONALITY AND REASON.

Now let us, though very briefly, proceed towards the consideration of our noblest endowments. And here it at once follows from our views, that we must consider man not as an insulated individual, but in the relations in which he actually exists; for if we have regarded his mere power of believing and his perceptivity, as facts or phenomena of relation, how much more must his reason and his reasoning powers, that is, his systemic modes of believing and of thinking, be facts or phenomena of relation? Moreover, of all the relations in which man stands, it is obvious, that when we are seeking for an explanation of the higher endowments of human nature, we may look with most hope to man's relation to God; for it is to the world (the other grand relation in which he stands) that he owes the lower faculties, which we have considered already—his appetites, etc.

Nor can we doubt, surely, when we consider the omnipotence of God's presence, and the fact that in Him the sensitive soul of man ever lives and moves and has its being—that that infinite Power thus ever presenting itself to a being so quick as the human soul, will produce an effect upon it, will modify it. What, then, are the modifications which we are to expect from this source, the soul being considered as in itself a principle of volition merely? To find this, it is to be considered that, while God is, an omnipotent will, and while His power and presence are therefore calculated to sustain in life the will of man, as the parent sustains the child, it is no less true of God, nor is it a less important fact in the Divine nature, that with Him there is no variableness nor shadow of turning. Along with all that He wills and does, God remains for ever immutable,—for ever identical with himself. Nor is there any attribute of the Being of

beings that is more essential,—more truly co-ordinate with his eternity and self-existence, and more needful to be considered and kept in mind when we are engaged in viewing creation in its relation to the Creator. What effect, then, let us ask, are we to expect upon the human soul from this grand fact, the ever-during immutability, the sustained identity, of the great and glorious Being in whom the soul lives and has her being? In answer to this, may we not say that we are to expect on the soul in the very first instance an impress of immutability also,—the establishment of a sustained identity upon the soul,—in a word, the image of God upon the soul in this respect? Changefulness, or change-producing power, the soul has in her own right already. This is that which forthwith manifested itself in her when existence was awarded to her. But how could the Soul live for ever in the steady light of the countenance of the immutable God, without also receiving or conceiving, or having impressed on her bosom a certain immutability, a sustained identity as well? That such an effect must follow, according to the grand law of Being, might be easily shown; but here, where we are at the fountain-head of law, reason recoils from an inference raised on the order which exists far down the stream; and we would rather leave the matter in the form of a question, and merely say, what are we, from the perfect and sustained immutability and identity of an ever-present and ever-powerful God to expect to come to the soul of man, but a certain constitutional or sustained identity also, embracing as it were the soul's intrinsic ever-changefulness, and bounding it on its celestial aspect, as the body does on its terrene aspect? When, indeed, we consider that the very essence of a mere principle of volition, such as the soul is when in her nakedness, is ever-changefulness, it seems necessary, if she is to come to the possession of identity at all, that she should have it from another source, and not from herself; for though she have in herself unity of substance so long as she exists, it does not appear how that fact could produce any of the phenomena of identity, which so eminently characterise her. Nay, not only does it appear that, in order to possess a sustained and influential identity in the midst of her ever-changefulness, the soul must have it from another; but from such another as is ever-living and ever-powerful. An identity which is to be kept up in a Being in which there ever exists, spontaneously and constitutionally, a

determination towards change, must be something else than an impress once made. It must, in fact, be a power, an identity-restoring, an identity-preserving power. Now, for the establishment of such a power, the presence of God to the soul seems adequate, nay, imminent, unless God forbid it.

That such a power exists, in or on or at all events for the soul, is well known, nay, it forms the very characteristic of consciousness to affirm. The consciousness of identity, in the midst of an ever-recurring disposition to change, is indeed the very essence of that which calls itself "I," "me," "myself." And in the use of these terms there is reference to a fact of a very different order from mere feeling, such as has been noticed and accounted for already, and which a merely psychical nature, is, I think, fully competent to derive from its relation to the world. It is, indeed, generally supposed that the "me" also, the self-consciousness of man, is given simultaneously with the "not me," by the use of the senses merely; the external world around being the "not me," and the "me" being therefore given as a recoil from the external world. But, for my own part, I cannot see how the material world could ever give, as its correlative, an idea so eminently different from all its phenomena and contents, as the idea of the "me," or conscious personality. Such an idea is neither the analogue nor the counterpart of any other which the material world supplies. For my own part, I cannot help believing that I owe my consciousness of myself,—my power of personal reflection,—of resting in myself and of possessing myself, to a simultaneous, deeply impressive, and ever-haunting consciousness of "some one else"—some one else from whom I cannot possibly escape, however well I may succeed in shutting out the world—some one else who besets me behind and before, and lays his hand upon me—some one else who is infinite, and who inhabiteth eternity, and to whom my consciousness points directly as the author and sustainer of my being and my God. In ascribing to this divine source, however, the genesis of that double-deep consciousness which possesses the breast of man, I am very far from denying that the world is adequate to give a certain form of consciousness, such as may be sufficient for purely psychical natures, and constitute enjoyment or uneasiness, according to the conditions of their existence at the time. According to the principles of this work, such consciousness, indeed, could not but



arise in every animated being, whenever it was impressed by any object whatever which affected its well-being, provided only that that impression were not so intense as to absorb its whole psychical nature at the time. But, in such a case, as soon as the world was shut out, and the sensorium had returned to a state of quiescence, such a being would relapse into a state of unconsciousness ; nor could it ever possess a consciousness higher than a perception of something in the outward, accompanied by a state of feeling expressive of the state of the organisation in reference to the object. It never could have an undercurrent of consciousness always awake and on the watch and free within, and competent to lay hold of the feeling which actuates it, or to let it actuate the organisation, or to forbid it as it pleased. All this man possesses, however, and by this endowment of a double-deep consciousness, man is not less distinguished from the lower animals than he is by the gift of reason. Here in fact it is, in this sanctuary of self-consciousness, that the soul can emancipate herself from all her somatic engagements and the trammels of sense. Here it is that she regains her native liberty. Between this retreat and the region where the principle of volition is held in the bonds of sense and more or less under laws imposed from without by material nature, the entire region of reason and reflection lies. And by this intermedium it is that liberty and personal power are secured to man. The voluntary muscles, which, in purely psychical natures, act spontaneously in response to feeling fatally induced by the presence and impress of external objects, are in man placed under the control and act only at the bidding of the principle of volition, thus enjoying at last the possession of its original liberty, and in spite of all somatic relations both external and organic, secured in the stronghold of a deep reflectiveness, with the transparent canopy of reason and the earnest consciousness of responsibility lying between it and the region of impulse and necessity.

But mere self-possession and self-consciousness do not constitute reason, they only supply a field for the possible existence and exercise of reason. This faculty, therefore, still remains for our investigation. I trust, however, it may immediately appear that, in this same fact, man's intimate relationship to his God, by which he is put in the possession of himself, he is also endowed with reason, his noblest attribute.

Since the glorious Being, on the soul's relationship to whom the turning back of every excursive thought and the whole series of truly reflective phenomena are owing, is not merely immutable, but infinite in His every attribute, while, within the precincts of the soul herself, all is finite, are we not to expect that for a being thus placed as the soul is, there shall be, and that among her deepest impressions, the belief or idea, influential but necessarily obscure and undefinable, of the Infinite as well as of the finite? To this inference the grand law of Being directly conducts us. Corresponding to it, at all events, it is certain that there is no principle which enters more largely into the constitution of man than *the idea of the infinite*. The possession of this great idea, through the influence of which, indeed, it mainly is that we struggle to escape from the region of ignorance in which we are born, and aim, as we tend to do, at the embrace even of the universe of truth—the possession of the idea of the infinite has not, indeed, been left to depend altogether on the sublime genesis which has just been assigned to it. This idea is also given in suggestion as the negation or counterpart of the finite. In order that it may take a hold of the whole soul, this lower genesis has been assigned to it as well as the higher. And hence we are able at once to understand the plausibility and to see the insufficiency of sensationalism, in the account which it gives of the idea of the infinite. That account is true, so far as it goes, but it does not go half so far as the truth; and it fails altogether to explain the importance and the value of the idea of the infinite in constituting reason and leading to knowledge.

Many are the forms which the idea of the infinite assumes, and when combined with other ideas of reason, many are the new ideas which it generates. Thus, when associated or synthetized with the idea of succession, it gives the idea of *eternity*. And this, when associated with the idea of direction and synthetized to the utmost, so as to give, as it were, an eternity all round, gives the idea of *immensity*; and of this the materialistic conception is the idea of *space*. And hence we are able to understand the sublimity of these ideas in consciousness, and the recoil which common sense makes from the doctrine which affirms them to be nothing but subjective phenomena, mere fictions of the mind itself, mere phases of feeling. For, according to the view here advanced, the ideas of the infinite, of eternity, and of immensity, are

not creations of the human mind merely, things devoid of any archetype in the outward, they are, on the contrary, truly manifestations to the soul of man of that which is beyond, and which makes the soul to be what she is, and to see what she does. They are not attributes of God as He is in himself, but they are manifestations of His infinity in its relation with the soul of man, as a Being capable of belief up to a certain degree.

To describe in detail the various influences of the idea of the infinite in making the mind of man to be what it is, would require a volume. Here we can only notice some of the chief; and first we may remark that peculiar depth which the idea of the infinite gives to the habit of attention or *application*, whereby it is quickened into the spirit of analysis, breathing the air of the infinite, ever demanding to know more and more, and ever searching deeper and deeper, in the aspiration, glorious though vain, of embracing the whole universe of truth, and of knowing even as we are known.

We may also remark that expansion which the idea of the infinite confers on the conceptive power, whereby it is exalted into imagination, and the soul is enabled to form creations almost rivalling reality in their grandeur. By granting a place to the idea of the infinite, during the free operation of analysis and synthesis executed by the soul on materials of her own choice, there is all that is to be found in the so-called faculty of *imagination*. It is important to remember, however, with regard to analysis, that though it derive its force and its spirit from the relations in which the soul exists, yet it has its life and being from the soul herself. A principle of volition, inasmuch as it is essentially changeful and ever in want of some new object to engage it, is essentially analytic; and this is an important fact; this explains the greatest intellectual fault we have, when viewed in relation with the synthetic habit of the mind, as will presently appear, and ought to put us on our guard against it.<sup>1</sup>

As to the synthetic power, which, along with the analytic, constitutes, in point of fact, all the logical or intellectual power which man possesses,<sup>1</sup> it is to be explained by the fact of the identity-sustaining, the identity-restoring, power of the mind, which has been already laid down and affirmed as the first benefit

<sup>1</sup> Appendix B. on Method.

which the soul derives from its relationship with God. For in virtue of the establishment of this power in and on the soul as a shield against its own ever-changefulness, a new mode of intellectual action must be established in it, and, indeed, be permanently maintained—a mode of action so important as ultimately to give the form to all knowledge. Viewed as a principle of volition merely, with outward objects given for belief and emotion, and nothing more, the soul could only discourse in feeling. It could only range from one object to another, and would have to ramble for ever without any better guide than chance to carry it on, or weariness to bring it to a close. In a word, it could only analyse in a rambling and objectless way. But when an identity-restoring power has been established for the soul, there is not only an apparatus provided for placing all thoughts and things in relation with a common centre, but also, as it were, a mirror in which they may reflect themselves, and thus be viewed in reference to the characteristic of that mirror, which is identity. In a word, from this grand fact in the constitution of the soul, when thus in normal relationship with the Unchangeable One, there results as an abiding habit, a sustained tendency of all thoughts and things to confluence in the mind, and a demand to hold all things together in one view, or in the embrace of one panoramic conception. There results the constitutional and habitual practice of *synthesis*, which is moreover, in the first instance, just as universal and indiscriminate as analysis can be. And thus the relations of analysis and synthesis appears. Analysis is simply a function of the individual soul in its own right as a principle of volition. It is innate and proper to the soul, viewed even as a solitary being in nature. It is an exercise of the soul's own power. Synthesis, on the other hand, is a function of the identity-preserving power of the soul, and, therefore, a relational, a constitutional, or spontaneous mode of action lying beyond the sphere of volition, and which volition could not of itself accomplish.

And hence an important consequence to the operation of these processes respectively. From this view, it follows that they do not stand on the same ground. Analysis is voluntary or intentional, and can be begun and carried on by volition, and usually is so begun and carried on. Synthesis is spontaneous and imminent, and can only be prevented by an effort put forth to suspend it (the judgment) until the truth has been discovered. And

hence plainly there is sure to be a tendency in the human mind to "anticipation" and precipitate judgment; yes, and on a double ground, not only because of a want of watchfulness over the analytic power, but also because analysis, since it is a process carried on by a personal forthputting of the will or of personal power, is necessarily fatiguing more or less; hence plainly an act of synthesis, an inference, a judgment, will often be allowed to steal in and to close an inquiry, not because the fit moment has arrived, not because the truth has been discovered, but because the inquirer has become fatigued in that region of his intellect where inquiry is conducted; while that in which judgment takes place exists in all its freshness, and is even uneasy, perhaps, at having been so long suspended. It is against this peculiarity in the mind that the *Novum Organon* is principally directed. And admirably has the theme been treated by the great English philosopher, whose name the nineteenth century so loudly celebrates—although never more, perhaps, than in our day, did philosophy witness a more ridiculous display of the supremacy of "Anticipations" in every branch of science.<sup>1</sup>

From the relative grounds of analysis and synthesis which have now been laid down, another very interesting observation suggests itself. Synthesis, as here conceived, is plainly not a merely psychical phenomenon; it is a phenomenon of a higher order; it demands for its existence and exercise that the soul as a believer be in relation with God. And therefore, where there is no indication of the existence of the idea of the Infinite in a species, or the possibility of belief in God, it does not appear probable that there would be the power of accomplishing a true synthesis; and, therefore, neither the power of classifying, of generalising, of comparing, or of judging; in a word, of reasoning, using that term in its right sense. Since, then, the lower animals are devoid of all indications of the existence in them of the idea of the infinite, and are wholly incapable of religious feelings, we should infer that they are also devoid both of reason and of the power of reasoning, in the right sense of the term. And I believe it will be found that, though it is no doubt possible, and in us (who go by reason ourselves) very natural, to interpret and explain the actions of the lower animals as functions of

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix C. on Science and Philosophy.

reason and cases of reasoning, yet their actions can all be solved by a reference to mere perception, memory, and special feeling.

But how are we to expect the fact of the soul's identity-sustaining power to manifest itself within the compass of the soul herself? From what has been said of the conditions necessary to distinct perception and conception (*viz.*, that into all such the idea of direction or of time must enter), it follows that the soul's identity and identity-sustaining power cannot be regarded by her as anything out of herself, or distinct from herself, or distinct in itself. It cannot be made to present itself to her as an object. Neither the organon of direction nor that of succession can be brought to bear upon it; for it is on and in the mind itself imminent and always the same. It cannot; therefore, manifest itself as a phenomenon in the mind—for a phenomenon must have a beginning, if not also an end, as well as an occasion or time of occurrence, while the soul's identity is, on the contrary, a sustained unchanging fact or feature in her being. The manifestation, therefore, which we are to expect, will be such as this, *first*, since it is a standing fact in her constitution, it will call upon her as an active Being to affirm her own identity in the midst of all her changefulness; and *secondly*, since it is an identity-sustaining or restoring power, it will also involve her as a thinking Being in a haunting by the idea of identity, and a hunting for identities in all objects presented to her notice. It must form, as it were, a medium through which all things shall be viewed, a mirror in which all things shall reflect themselves. And hence a law both for analysis and synthesis. Analysis must find its well-being, and the soul satisfaction, only when it marches from one identical to another; and synthesis must sieze and hold identicals with a feeling and favour which it does not confer on things which differ.

And hence the development of all those processes (commonly called faculties) which bear upon such objects as present themselves otherwise than in the relation of causes and effects. Hence *comparison*, which is the holding of objects in synthesis under the eye of analysis, the mind withholding belief until their relation as to identity shall have been ascertained.

Hence *generalisation*, which is belief treasuring up in one store all the identities which it perceives in the field of view and neglecting the differences.

Hence *judgment* (using the term not as the logicians and Dr Reid do, but as the name for a mental operation distinct from perception, and as John Locke and common usage sanction),—hence judgment, which is the soul (when the evidence of identity is not sufficient to cause belief to strike under the spontaneity of the mind and according to its own law) invoking the will not merely to give its consent (which it never fails to do in demonstration), but to assist by the use of its own liberty in bringing out and deciding the point, as it were by the erection of a court of equity in the breast in doubtful cases where law does not pronounce.

Hence the demonstrative or *logical power* generally, in which the mind proceeds from one identity of one form to another of another form, till it reaches the result that was at first proposed and aimed at, and having reached it, awards to it the same state or quality of belief which it awarded to the ground or principle it started with, that is, affirms the one of the other. Hence, in fine, the ground of all reasoning which does not build upon the law of causation, and which, when it cannot reach identities or true equivalents, builds upon affinity and *analogy*, as it is so often put to do in this varied world of ours, and our present state of ignorance.

Nor is it merely when a panorama of objects, present themselves, that this determination towards identities in the soul is available for the discovery of the unknown. If it had been so, its use would have been very limited, for it is only to a very small extent that man in his embodied state can entertain a panorama of present objects in his consciousness. So limited, indeed, in this respect, does the mind appear to be, that not more than a system of three conceptions can be held or regarded simultaneously, implying no more than one dip of analysis into the habitually synthetic frame of the intellect. Thus, the only logical formula which can be obtained from the law of identity without other aid, is the *sylogism* in its three parts, and its affirmation, that things which agree with the same thing agree with one another. It is always of importance to remember, however, that besides the dianoetical or merely logical action of the mind, there is also the noetical, that which gives facts and principles, not forms and processes merely.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix C. on Science and Philosophy.

## CHAPTER XI.

### OF MEMORY AND SUGGESTION.

THE habit of ceaseless analysis, which is but the play and expression of the mind's own everchangeableness, as also the filamentary structure of the nervous system, which admits knowledge to the mind only in the veriest minima, conspire together to reduce man to this state, that he usually has, in consciousness, at any one time, only a very small field of view,—one thought, one feeling merely, or scarcely more. But, happily for the interests of knowledge, those which he may have once entertained do not altogether vanish and cease to be, when they are displaced from consciousness by some new comer. The Soul's law and love of identity serves to preserve them. Thus having once existed in a certain state—as, for instance, in perceiving or receiving the impress of a landscape before the eye,—the Soul, in her activity afterwards, when sensation is supplying no new objects, no new identities, proceeds to fulfil the law of her Being by falling into an identity with her former states of being; in other words, when she is not fully engaged in perceiving, she tends to fall into remembering; and thus out of the stores of *memory* she can draw material for future argument and discovery.

And here it were right to discuss the laws of association. They are, however, merely special operations of the law of identity, and not possessed of all the interest which has been supposed to be attached to them. The discussion of them, moreover, in psychological treatises, is usually speculative merely and defective, in consequence of the neglect of a grand law which operates potently, not only in association and suggestion, but in giving the very rhythm and form to all thought; and to this, rather than to



what has been often set forth already, let us in a few words direct our attention.

It is generally supposed that reasoning implies and demands a store of ideas in the mind, previously to the commencement of the process. That reason is synthetic *à priori*, has been elaborately denied; this denial, indeed, forms the very ground of the most remarkable psychology which the genius of man ever produced. And yet it is certain that, however necessary such experience as is usual in the acquisition of ideas and knowledge may be, in order to the mind's being able to construct new knowledge out of its own depths, yet reason can do something without it. The mind is not altogether dependent either on the senses or on the stores of memory for the development of a rational train of thought. Let but one object or idea be given, and let memory be supposed wholly unfurnished as yet, still discovery may proceed, and does proceed, and that spontaneously, nay necessarily. Given any one feeling idea or object to the mind and no more, as material for thought, reason, after casting about under the grand law for identities, for resemblances to the datum, and finding none, —nay, finding nothing with which it may even compare the datum, —recoils, as it were, for a moment, and the next, as if taking a leap in despair, proceeds in appearance to deny the datum. This phenomenon is well known; but here usually it is thought that the matter ends, the Soul having merely fallen to all appearance into bad humour with her position, and indulged in the spirit of negation or contradiction. On looking somewhat more deeply into the phenomenon, however, at least when in its normal development, it soon appears that this seeming denial is very far from being merely an emotive recoil, without any reason or propriety in it. It is, on the contrary, the operation of a law of reason of a very high order, whose genesis and form may be thus conceived:—An object is given. In being given, it is seized by a pulsation of belief, and is held in direct synthesis (between the subject and object). While it is thus held, Reason casts about, by a process of blank analysis, for objects resembling it. But by hypothesis none make their apparition. The mind is, therefore, obliged to confine itself to the datum, and do what it can to gratify its essential activity by discoursing upon it. And in every case it may, of course, bestow at least one act of analysis upon it, and one of synthesis; it may find it identical

with itself, and affirm (though with no small trouble to John Locke) that whatever is, is the thing that it is. But this is small fruit; and the consequence is, that immediately after, while the datum is held in its solitariness, reflected, as it were, in the identity of the mind, and thus engaging its synthetic habit, an excursion of analysis is made naturally the next moment into the infinite, as it always may,—for the soul is intimately in possession of the idea of the infinite,—and then, by the usual rhythm of intellect, a phase of synthesis ensuing upon the back of that excursion of analysis, the datum and the infinite are held for a moment together, and form a kind of couple in the mind. But this condition of existence demands, under the law of identity, that the idea of the infinite, which is in itself, when thus occurring, merely a blank, formless, boundless, and therefore most unsatisfactory conception or rather feeling, shall clothe itself in the same features as those of its associate, shall be expressed in terms which are also expressive of the datum. And what in their simplest form must these terms be? Plainly they can be nothing else but those which are descriptive of the datum itself with the negative sign attached, to note the complete difference, to show that what the mind has found for itself is not the datum, though the datum be the only type in relation to which it can as yet express its discovery. It is not a contradiction of the datum, not a denial of the datum or of its legitimacy, that the soul normally gives from out of her own depths. This is, indeed, a very common condition of the case, and one always to be apprehended when the soul has no tendency to soar into the infinite. But it is a most abusive manifestation of it. The voice of the grand law of suggestion in reference to the datum is indeed “not the datum,” but the import is “more than the datum,” “other than the datum.” It is the utterance of the mind piercing into the infinite, into the universe to which the datum belongs, and aiming at the construction of that universe, in order to find the relations of the datum, though as yet not able to affirm anything of that universe, save that it is not the datum itself. Nor does Reason, in reality, aim at too much when to that universe it prescribes no bounds but the infinite itself; for there is a connexity among all things, and the universe of any one object, the whole sphere of that object, has not been fully known until the whole universe of all actual, nay, of all possible things has been reached, and

all has been referred to one Almighty Will as the Source and Author of all.

In God, and in God alone, can reason find a haven and sabbath for thought; for to everything, the law of causation extends, except to the movements of the principle of volition. And therefore, be the object which engages the thoughts at any moment what it may, if only it be something else than an Absolute Will, reason still calls upon the soul to leave it, and to go beyond it, to seek for its cause in short, or the conditions of its existence, and so on without reprieve. Thus reason keeps the soul still out at sea, still on a pilgrimage, till she has attained to God.

It is impossible to over-estimate the value of the grand law of suggestion in constituting intelligence and in carrying on discovery. But to give an illustration: Say that the datum is the simplest possible—say that it is *unity*, one merely, no more than “one.” Out of this single datum, and without any other intuition whatever, reason has in it, in virtue of this grand law, to construct the whole science of arithmetic; and add only the idea of direction, and it has in it, to construct the whole science of geometry also. Thus given “one,” as soon as this datum has been seized and surveyed (for which a single moment is sufficient, since mere unity gives no different points of view, no field for analysis at all), reason, proceeding according to its normal rhythm, of which the law of apparent negation is the first step, proceeds to say, “not one,”—meaning “else than one,” “more than one,” ultimately an “universe of the kind”—that is, *plurality* to the utmost. And as soon as this conception has been fully developed, this discovery made, synthesis coming to bear upon it, and forthwith superinducing the idea of unity, the primary datum, upon its own discovery of plurality, makes the step of conceiving plurality as unity, that is, develops for itself and for science the idea of a whole or *totality*; and so in other cases.

Great indeed is the value, and manifold are the bearings, of this grand law of suggestion. It is through it alone, indeed, that the mind is enabled to appreciate differences. But for this law it would altogether neglect them. All but identicals and equivalents would be wholly uninteresting, and indeed unintelligible to it. And such (as we should infer from the important part which the idea of the infinite plays in constituting this grand law), appears to be the case with the lower animals. And

hence, what appears to be a great anomaly in them, viz., the existence of instincts which are so admirable as to transcend human reason, and to appear divine, along with an excessive stupidity. A cunning monkey will risk his life to get possession of a ball of worsted, mistaking it for a fruit. A motherly hen will not grudge to sit three weeks on some ill-shaped bits of chalk, mistaking them for eggs. A provident salmon, after a voyage of hundreds of miles perhaps, having for object to find a safe and suitable bed for the breeding of her young, will leap at a steel hook dressed with bird's feathers and tinsel, mistaking it for a fly. Now all such seeming anomalies are explained, if we suppose these creatures competent to perceive, and to be affected by the resemblances of objects, but not competent to mark their differences. If so, they must blunder sadly; and just as in fact they do. And that they are to be expected to be capable of marking agreements only, follows if the views here advanced be sound.

But still more important than all that the grand law of suggestion accomplishes in the purely intellectual sphere, is the part which it plays in reference to action. In reference to action, indeed, may this grand law be said to be principally given. For as often as the soul proposes to herself any action, or is urged to act, this great law exclaims, or rather, indeed, whispers, in the depths of the soul, "not that," "not that." It opens the door for liberty, and invites the soul to look to other, nay, to the universe of all possible actions, relative to the circumstances, and helps her to construct them. And hence, although the brain, or special parts of it, may determine towards certain actions, though there really were an "organ of murder" in the region over the ears, as Dr Gall affirmed that there is, there would still be an organon nearer the heart, which, on the suggestion of murder by Dr Gall's organ, would say, "not murder," "not murder," and that with an energy co-ordinate with the cerebral force generally in the individual, and, therefore, with the organ of murder as to the point of murder, our grand law of suggestion thus keeping the man free, not to murder or to murder, just as he may choose at the time.

## CHAPTER XII.

### OF TASTE AND CONSCIENCE.

BESIDES the two laws which have now been laid down, the law of identity and the grand law of suggestion, there is in reason another of paramount importance, yet so related to the others that the third place only must be assigned to it; for it is rather the product and the resultant of the other two, than a mode of action wholly new, and standing on an independent basis. I allude to the law of the ideal, the power which reason has in the play of its own spontaneity of forming within itself types of those objects or actions, which are given to it by observation or otherwise from without. Its genesis and operation may be thus illustrated; and first in reference to objects possessing form or motion. Say that such an object is given in the outward, or in mental representation, more generally in direction, say (to take a most simple case) a line on a black board stretching between two points, but not quite straight. No sooner do I see this line than (supposing its form to be the only datum), reason in the play of its own spontaneity, and under the grand law of suggestion, proceeds to say, "not this line." A space opens in my mind's eye between the two points, and then, by a movement of spontaneous synthesis, the ideal of a line extending between two points, a line truly straight, is conceived by reason and drawn in the mind's eye. Again, say that an oblique quadrilateral is given, which is not confined by an accompanying definition to any particular unsymmetrical type, the ideal of this order of figures, the most symmetrical of the set, the rhombus or lozenge, mirrors itself in the background of my mind; and similarly in cases more complicated and possessing form in three dimensions. Now, these

representations, the product of reason, are the *ideals* just referred to. And here it is to be remarked of them, that though they are conceived, yet that necessarily with obscurity, because in direction, and therefore in perception, they underly the impressions which are given by sense, and are therefore confounded with them. How, then, will these ideals manifest themselves in consciousness? Plainly not otherwise than by an uneasiness or dissatisfaction accompanying the sight of the form or movement which is given by observation, and which the ideal underlies. Moreover this dissatisfaction will seek to relieve itself by mental experiments to discover what is faulty in that which is given, and to improve it; and the soul will find satisfaction, when it succeeds in reducing the given form or in constructing a new one which coincides with the ideal, or when she meets with one in nature which realises the ideal, or when she can at least tell where the difference and the departure lie. But such a state of things is descriptive of the ordinary and well-known phenomena of taste. And such is, on a general view, the genesis and theory of the emotion of the beautiful. No sooner is any form or movement given in the outward but the spontaneity, the soul deploying itself under law, impressed on the one hand by God, on the other by nature, conceives in her own depths a form or movement of the same order as that which is given, but such an one as is beautiful of its kind. This type, the creation of reason, is, however, overlaid by the real object as given in sense or in memory, and this being more vivid than that of reason, throws the latter into the shade, and so absorbs and confounds itself with it, that the two cannot be separated, till after much practice in this kind of analysis, such as artists alone usually possess. Hence all that is to be noticed in ordinary cases is, as has been stated, an uneasiness or dissatisfaction in the use of the senses when the object presented to sense, and its ideal the creation of reason, disagree; and a flow of the spontaneity of the soul and a sense of well-being and enjoyment in the sense, when the lineaments of both coincide and agree. The field is deeply interesting, but too extensive even to be further touched on here.

Let us rather proceed to remark that it belongs also to reason to suggest and to construct ideals of actions, as well as of mere forms, such actions as are usually proposed, realised, and witnessed in the world. Every action, indeed, has many ideals,

one for each of the points of view in which it may be regarded. Thus, materially considered, every action may be viewed merely as a series of movements, as a mere performance, and in this respect it has its ideal, lying wholly in the province of æsthetics. Or it may be viewed simply as a means to an end, without regard to the moral character of that end, and in this respect also it has its ideal, lying in the sphere of intellect. But in all the complete ideals of actions accomplished by men, the mere performance, and even the act considered as a means to an end, is of little interest compared with that end itself. And in order to explain this, and to be able to make the step from æsthetics to ethics, from the emotion of the beautiful to moral approbation, we must call to mind and fall back upon the primary fact in human nature, viz., that the soul in its essence is a principle of volition, a free power capable of good or evil as it pleases.

Hence another grand fact in reason, not less, nay, more important than the law, either of identity or of suggestion, viz., the law of causation, the consciousness and affirmation of universal causation, and the constant demand for a cause for every phenomenon that has had a commencement. The soul is herself, and feels herself to be emphatically a cause. She also finds herself to be a member in a system of universal causation ; for all things that manifest themselves to her, do so only in virtue of certain powers which actuate them, of which their manifestation is the effect ; in other words, all things manifest themselves only as causes ; and, therefore, the search into causes is one and the same with the search into the order of nature, and is the grand work which reason finds for itself to accomplish. This subject has, however, both as to the genesis of the idea of cause and its place in reason, been so fully elaborated and expressed in all the languages of Europe, that it need not be here dwelt on. We note, here, the doctrine of cause, merely because while it is one of the most influential demands of reason at all times, it is so most especially when the actions of free agents are proposed for consideration. Given a free action, even in form or in conception, reason, knowing that it proceeds from a Principle of Volition, a power capable of producing effects by its actings, tends to pass over all other features in the contemplated action, and at once to ask what is it as a cause ? And this question immediately branches into two, viz.,—*first*, what is it as a cause, considered in itself

and in the sphere in which it is to be accomplished? to which the answer is, *it* is right, or *it* is wrong; and, *secondly*, what is it as a cause in the mind of him who has framed it? to which the answer is, *he* is right, or *he* is wrong; for the actor plainly is entitled to the benefit of his own view of his proposed action considered as a cause, before it has been realised outwardly, in other words, as to the morality of the actor, his intention is everything. While he may be right indeed, his action may be wrong. Considered as a real cause, it may be very different from what he takes it to be. But still the idea of right and wrong is constant in both cases and in all cases, though in one case it may lie in the action only, in another in the intention only. But to facilitate, or rather abbreviate the investigation, let us suppose that the design of the action and the action as accomplished, coincide as causes, in other words, that the action accomplishes what is intended by it; and as the action, taken in the intention, is taken in the most interesting point of view, let us speak in reference to the intention, and consequently in reference to him who has intended it.

Now, confining our regards to one class of actions only, those, namely, which intend happiness or suffering, which are necessarily the most interesting and important of all, and by which alone the sphere of moral action is constituted, the first question is, whether in this sphere, as well as in the sphere of mere forms and movements, there be not ideals also? When an intention, having bearings upon happiness, is formed by any one, or effloresces out of the bosom of an individual will, is anything corresponding to that intention to be expected to be developed in the spontaneity of reason at the same time? Yes; plainly from the structure of our mental frame, it follows that, as soon as any intention is constructed by volition, the work must be also done in the reason. But in the reason it cannot be constructed altogether in the same way as it may have been by the will, unless the will has consulted the reason, and taken it for its guide; for the will is free, and goes by its private likings or aims, while reason does all things under law, and not by personal power or effort, but spontaneously, in virtue of its relation to God on the one hand, and the world on the other. Just as in reference to forms and movements, therefore, so must there in reference to intentions—such of them, at least, as have bearings upon happiness and order—be influential ideals. What these ideals are,



when reduced to their most general terms, is a grand inquiry. Without entering on it here, we may perhaps give some such formula as this for the ideal of the intentions and actions of man, viz., that they are such as, with *veneration for universal order*, aim at the *permanent happiness of all*. Something like this must be the legend on the banner of that true liberty which grows in the Eden of the Soul. But at all events, considering the actual state of the world, and of the heart of man, it is obvious that, whether we look to intentions or to realised actions, we are often to expect a discrepance between these and any such formula, while sometimes, on the other hand, we may expect on the part of others, or we may attempt on our own, an agreement between them. Supposing then such a state of things to exist, let us state the phenomena which are to be expected in the breast?

And, first, when a good action is intended by an exercise of free will, simultaneously, the ideal of the action must form itself spontaneously in the reason, and in this case it must be the echo of the intention in the will. Both, therefore, must be found, or rather they must be felt, to agree; there is nothing to arrest the tide of the soul's flow of life; on the contrary, there is a condition of existence more favourable to it than usual. Hence a more generous flow than usual of the heart's life. Hence a state of delight from a definite cause, with an absence of all accompanying uneasiness; and such is, I think, the character and the characteristic of *moral complacency*. To the actor it is, I think, the purest and the simplest of all known kinds of delight. It seems to me to reject from its bosom all collateral considerations, nay, all considerations whatever, even though they should offer or promise to enhance the enjoyment which it brings.

But not so simple is the emotion in him, who is merely the witness of the good action. In him, indeed, just as in the actor, the ideal of the action forms itself. He feels that the action realised outwardly, is as it ought to be; it is the fulfilment of its ideal. The action is therefore most agreeable to him; and referring it to its author, he feels called upon to regard him as love-worthy. Now to hold him to be love-worthy is to hold him as the object of love, is to love him. But to love him is to hold him as one who is to be made happy; for it is the part and mission of love ever to bestow happiness upon its object, and to insist on its being bestowed in a measure proportional to its own strength on the

one hand, and to the capacity of the loved object for being made happy on the other. Now to be held as one whose it is to be made happy, is one and the same thing as to be held as one whose it is to be rewarded. And thus, in relation with a good intention or good action, while we have in the actor nothing but the simple and delightful emotion of a pure moral complacency, leaving the Soul perfectly free to entertain and cherish the most perfect humility along with it, we have in him who is the witness of it, the more richly constituted, but less peaceful emotion of *moral approbation*. We obtain also here a passing insight into the psychological genesis of the idea of *reward*.

Say, on the other hand, that the given intention has the production of suffering as its object, and aims at nothing but ill-being and disorder, what will be the corresponding state of feeling in this case? To find this, it must be considered that such an action can have no ideal. It is proposed in direct violation of every law of reason. Such an action, therefore, being given, it must prostrate the entire flow of the spontaneity of the soul. There must be intense uneasiness in the contemplation of it. The entire activity must remain in a state of arrest and tension. But this not long; for this is the condition, and here is an occasion for anger of the most intense kind,—anger in this case not merely having its sanction, but its very material or power from the sphere of reason. There will, therefore, be a burst of *indignation* on the evil-doer. The soul will call for vengeance on the destroyer—for destroyer he is in the fullest sense of the term—who is capable of intending suffering for its own sake. And thus there results a state of things for which *moral disapprobation* is a too feeble term. And thus we see, in passing, the genesis, and sanction by reason, of the doctrine of *punishments*.

But the worst has not yet been told. It is a most serious fact in human nature, that this anger, which awakes at wrong, exists in such relationship to the personality, that it tends to be directed against one's self also when he is the guilty one, ever accompanying, with pitiless force, the recollection of the bad action, and deepening the mere uneasiness of simple regret into all the horrors of *remorse*. Nor is this all.

It has been shown that a sense of self cannot be realised in its fulness otherwise than by realising a sense of God also. Hence, to the consciously guilty man, a feeling of responsibility for what

he has done to a higher source than either himself or society. Not anger at self only, therefore, but alarm, is to be looked for among the distressful elements of the feeling which the consciousness of a bad action awakes. Thus remorse leads to *conviction*.

But let us not attempt, in this hurried and yet over-protracted sketch, too much accuracy of detail. In a work in which but a single paragraph is devoted to memory, and a still shorter one to imagination, a complete theory of ethics is not to be looked for. Suffice it to say, that any action having bearings on moral order being given or proposed, man, in virtue of his gift of reason, forthwith spontaneously, in the innermost chamber of his soul, conceives and is put to conceive, what it would be right,—that is, in moral order, or harmonious with the economy—to do; and no sooner does he conceive this, than he feels called upon to realise his conception, by an authority possibly very mysterious to him, but universally forcing the confession of its supremacy; as we may well believe, considering the source to which the ideal or impress of right and wrong is owing. Nothing more probable indeed than that he shall not realise it after all; because man is a fallen creature; and to realise the ideal may be much against the interest of some present emotion or desire; and so he may prefer to go by the psychical indications of his nature; and thus he may compromise his character as a man altogether, and fall away from rectitude and humanity. But still the ideal makes its apparition in him, and the sense of moral obligation haunts him, and his own psychical nature proceeds to reward or punish him, according as he respects these institutions in the nobler sphere of his being, or violates them. If he realise the ideals,—if he take them as the principles and the types of his actions, and carry out his intentions thus moulded according to the moral law, into action, his heart responds in a pleasing swell of ambition and love, flowing into the sanctuary of the soul, where she sits enthroned in her own liberty, regaling self-consciousness with the peaceful feeling of moral complacency. If, on the other hand, he disregards the ideals, and casting them away, takes mere appetite or passion as his guide, and commits his voluntary muscles to be moved by the fatal impulse of mere feeling, and thus directs his actions towards the attainment of some merely personal, or rather somatic good, scarce will the gratification which success has secured be over, before the ideal and the consciousness of

what ought to have been done, re-appearing with the same voice—still and small, yet supremely authoritative—enforcing it, his own psychical nature proceeds to punish him. He is angry at himself for having thrown himself away in the action which he did, and would perhaps fain punish the appetite which seduced him. And while he is thus regretful and angry at himself, the mysteriousness and new severity of the voice within, which, coming down even from God, still calls for obedience when the action is past and obedience is no longer possible, excites his alarm. He is thus plunged in a state of distress, composed of self-anger and alarm. And thus the emotive or psychical nature of man is always in readiness to reward or punish him, when he honours and follows up his reasonable nature or disregards and violates it.<sup>1</sup>

But it would be a very defective view to suppose, that all rewards and punishments are exhausted in these merely temporary pleasures and pains. Man is an immortal being, and his relation to God is indissoluble; and even in his embodied state, the impression of God on his soul, though it gives but an obscure and uncertain intuition of a God, yet gives a most deep, certain, and abiding conviction of responsibility to Him, as also an anticipation of rewards and punishments flowing from this higher relation, more awful and enduring than any of those which arise out of the relation of the emotive to the reasonable part of our nature. But to obtain certain knowledge on this subject, recourse must be had to revelation; for as this subject wholly transcends the sphere of the present order of things, so does the light of nature wholly fail to declare it.

Much, however, remains to be done in the purely philosophical walk also.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Conscience, therefore, is essentially different from taste, even according to the principles of this work, in which "beauty" is regarded as outward and real, and for all intelligent beings the same, and along with "the good" itself but another form of "the holy." *Taste* is merely reason brought into play by sensation, and after judging, awaking only love or its opposite. *Conscience* is reason brought into play by the law of causation, and after judging, evoking the whole of our emotive nature, especially alarm and anger. Conscience is indeed the last word of psychology, as Will is the first.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix D, on the science and the philosophy of common sense.



## APPENDIX.

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### A.

#### *Socrates on Final Causes.*

THIS fact, as well as reasoning of great interest in our day, appears in the following passage of the "Phædo" of Plato, which the reader may well bear with:—

Cebes has proposed some difficulties of a physical nature to Socrates, on which the latter offers, and on Cebes' earnest invitation, proceeds to recount the result of his studies in the history of nature (or as we should say physics). Hear, then, my account, said Socrates; for when I was a young man, I had a wonderful liking for that kind of knowledge which they call physics. It seemed to me most excellent to know the causes of everything—how each is produced—how it is destroyed—how it exists. And much did I puzzle myself, speculating, in the first place, on such questions as these,—Whether, when the hot and the cold have taken on a certain putrefaction, as some say, animals are thus bred; and whether it be the blood whereby we think, or the air or fire; or whether it be none of these things, but the brain that furnishes the perceptions of hearing and seeing and smelling, out of which memory and thought are produced; and whether out of memory and opinions, when they have attained to repose, knowledge may be produced. And from these things, turning to speculate on corruptions, and the phenomena of the heaven and the earth, at last I found myself so unfit that nothing could be worse. I will give you an

instance. To things that I understood well enough formerly as appeared to myself and to others, I became so blind, that I lost the knowledge of things which previously I thought that I knew, and among many others,—how a man grows in size. This I thought at first was obvious to everybody, viz., that it was because he ate and drank, that because out of his victuals fleshy parts were added to his flesh, and bony parts to his bones, and similarly other parts to those that were like them, so that what was at first a small mass afterwards became a large one. Thus I thought. Does it not appear so to you? Yes; to me also, said Cebes. And look you here, also, I thought it was befitting in me to think that one man compared with another might appear taller (as, for instance, by a head), and one horse than another, and also plainer things than these. Ten appeared to me to be more than eight, in consequence of the two besides that are in it; and a yard to be greater than a half-yard, in consequence of the half that remains. And what do you think of these things now? said Cebes. So far is it from me now, by Jove, to think that I know anything about the cause of these things, that I cannot settle it with myself whether, when to one one is added, it is the one to which that one is added that makes two, or whether the added one and the one to which it was added because of the addition make two; for it is a wonder to me, while each of them when by itself was one and not two, and they then came together, that this should be a cause of making them to be two viz., their concourse, their being placed beside each other. Nor, on the other hand, if one be divided, can I be persuaded how this division can be a cause of two; for this is the very opposite of what was the cause of two before. Then it was the bringing together in juxta-position of each to each. Now, it is the parting and dividing of each from each. Moreover, in what way one is produced I cannot persuade myself that I understand, nor anything else; in one word, how it is produced, how destroyed, or how it is, by this sort of method. But a certain other sort I at random mix up with it. This, at all events, I cannot admit. Having, however, on a certain occasion, heard one read from a book, he said, of Anaxagoras, as his opinion, that mind is the disposer and cause of everything; with this cause I was greatly delighted: the position appeared to me to be good, that mind was the cause of everything, and I inferred that if it be so, then

the disposing-mind will order all things, and place each where it is best. If, then, any one desire to find the cause of anything by which it is produced, or is destroyed, or exists, he ought to find concerning it what is best for it, either to be, or to do, or to suffer. And, according to this view, there would be nothing else for man to investigate, whether with respect to himself or other things, but what is most fit and best; for it follows of necessity that when what is good is known, so also what is bad is known; for the one suggests the other. Reflecting upon these things, I thought myself truly happy to have found Anaxagoras, a master who should teach me the causes of things on the principle of a disposing Intelligence, who should explain to me, first of all, whether the earth is flat or spherical, and after he had told me this, should point out the cause of the necessity, telling me what is best, and why it is better than another. And if he should say that it is in the midst of the system, should show me that it is best for it to be in the middle. And if he only told me these things, I was prepared not to ask for any other sort of causes. But I should have asked further respecting the sun, the moon, and the stars, their relative velocities, their revolutions, and their other phenomena, and why it was best for each of them to do and suffer, what it does and suffers. For I did not think, as he had told me that they were disposed by intelligence, that he would assign any other cause for them, but that they were as it was best for them to be; and having assigned the cause of each, and the causes common to all, I expected that he would point out to me wherein consists that which is good for objects in particular and objects in common. Nor did I esteem my hopes of little account. But having got the books with all haste, I read them as fast as I could, that as soon as possible I might know what is good and what is bad.

Borne on by this admirable hope, my friend, reading and proceeding, I see a man making no reference to intelligence, nor assigning any such cause to arrange things, but assigning air, and ether, and water, and many other things and irrelevancies. Which, indeed, to me, appears just as if some one should say that whatever things Socrates does, he does by intelligence, and then having taken in hand to speak of each of the acts which I do, tells me, first of all, that I am lying here, because my body is composed of bones and sinews, that my bones are hard, and are



in separate pieces ; but my muscles, as they are such as can contract and relax, bend the bones with the soft parts and the skin which encloses the whole. Wherefore, the bones being lifted up in their joints, the muscular fibres pulling and relaxing, bring it to pass that I can bend my limbs, and on account of this cause I lie here bent !

And in like manner as to our conversation, he will assign such causes as voices, and air, and hearing, and many others of that sort, neglecting altogether to assign the true cause, viz., that since it appeared best to the Athenians to condemn me to death, it appeared also best to me to sit here, and more just, patiently waiting to undergo the punishment which they have commanded. By the dog ! These sinews and bones of mine would have been long ago in Megara or Bœotia, which were much better for them, if I did not think that it was more just and more honourable, instead of flying and living in exile, to undergo whatever sentence my country might inflict on me.

To call these things causes, is great nonsense. If, indeed, any one should say that unless I had bones and sinews and such other things as I have, I should not be what I am, nor could do what I do, he says what is true. But to say that what I do, I do by these organs and not by my mind, having a regard to what is best, is a great blunder ; for it is to fail to mark the difference between the cause, and the thing without which the cause could not be a cause, which the many appear to me seeking for, as it were, in the dark, and making up to a name which is not its own, dub it a cause. Whence one having surrounded the earth with a vortex, represents it as fixed under the heavens, and then supports it on the air as a foundation, like a flat baking dish. But as to that power which placed it as it now is for the best, they neither inquire after it, nor do they think that it possesses any divine strength. But they think this a more powerful and imperishable Atlas, and better able to sustain all things. What is really good and fit for connecting and sustaining all things they take no account of. Most gladly, then, would I become the disciple of any one who would lead me to this cause, be where it may.

## B.

*Of Method.*

It is universally agreed, that nothing is more important than method. On this subject, therefore, let us bestow a few words ; nor let us shrink from it, though the train of the inquiry should lead us right into the rhythm, and even into the constitution, of intelligence itself. But has not the subject been exhausted ? Is there any occasion for an essay on this subject ? Has not the true method been fully ascertained ? Yes : this, at least, is what everybody says ; and therefore is it not quite safe to have recourse to authority, and to adopt at once, without doubting or gainsaying, and simply as a matter of course, this method, which is in such popular favour in this our day ? Yes, again : at least such a course is usual. And yet to do so, what is it but to do great homage to the repudiated philosophy of Hume ? For what is it but to prove, and that even in the fact which lies at the root of all discovery, that " Custom is the great guide of human life " ? Let us, therefore, in reference to the adoption of a method merely because it is popular, frankly say, No. The popularity at any given moment of a method or doctrine is no adequate evidence of its soundness, or even of its ultimate pre-eminence in history.

But if the mere popularity of any scientific method, in any particular epoch of the history of philosophy,—as, for instance, our own,—be no adequate sanction for its adoption, neither is it any argument for its rejection. On the contrary, the method of the day should, in the first instance, be accepted, though merely as a method which is given, and not to the immediate exclusion of others. If we are to discuss the problem of method in a truly scientific and satisfactory manner, we are called upon, if we accept any one method merely as given, to search for and accept as given all others that actually are given, all others which the history of philosophy records as having been popular in their day. Now, let us only do so, and what is the result ?—We find ourselves in a labyrinth of methods, which is as bad for our actual guidance, if not worse, than no formal method at all !

What, then, is to be done ? Why, it appears that, whether as critics we undertake the co-ordination of them all, with a view to

reject the contradictory and the false, and leave ourselves in possession of the true method only at last, or whether we shake ourselves free from them all, roughly, at once,—whether we act the part of the philosopher or of the cynic, we come at last to one and the same object of pursuit, and that is the method of nature, the method designed for reason, the method which reason realises and acts upon, so far as she realises herself and makes good her own. That such a method there must be, if method be a possible thing at all, is certain ; for no method can be sought out without a previous method of seeking for it. There must, therefore, be method, and among methods there must be one which has preceded all others, which must have been the mother of them all,—a method to whose legitimacy all others must owe whatever legitimacy they possess, and whose power cannot but be greater than that of any other, since it made the discovery of all others, and, until they were unfolded, carried them all in its own bosom. The method of nature, then ; let us seek for the method of nature,—that primitive method which reason has in herself, and which she sanctions by making spontaneous use of it herself.

But how shall we find this method ? That, of course, is the grand inquiry. In answer, it may be said, that perhaps we could not do better than just forget for the time as much as possible all philosophical tradition, all the methods of the schools, and throw ourselves regardlessly upon the mercy of Nature, merely desiring as much as possible, as new-born babes, the sincere milk of her word. Let us try ; and for this purpose let us call to our assistance some one who, while he is in the entire possession of human nature, is not necessarily of a reflective disposition, as every one comes ultimately to be who has practised reflection much, and so fallen into a habit of it. Only let us keep him “*en rapport*” with ourselves, so that we may experiment on him as we please, and observe the mental phenomena which he displays. Or, if this be impossible, let us try to put self under such discipline.

And, to take as simple a case as possible, let us suppose that we make the experiment in the open air, say in a clear night. Well, in such a night I come out into the dark, and, directing my eyes upwards, I say, “A starry night.” I perceive something—that, which I express by saying *a starry night*, of which the import is to me little more than, “not a dark night,” and which therefore indicates the intellect still at zero, or very near it. But,

along with the perception, all vague as it is, I have something more. The simple perception of the canopy causes a pleasing bewilderment of mind, viz., *Wonder*. Wonder, then, is the state of feeling corresponding to the intellect excited, but at zero. A short time of wondering, however, is long enough; I am now, therefore, passing my eye from star to star, yet always so as to hold the old along with the new—the whole with the part; moreover, I find a resting-place as often as I find a group of stars which displays any symmetry, or any resemblance to any concept which I have already in my mind. And thus (to be short) the natural rhythm of my mind leads me successively to say, *first*, “a starry night;” *secondly*, “the constellation of Ursus Major, of Scorpio, of the Southern Cross,” and soon after, “a Centauri,” then the individual stars, “Sirius, Canopus, Antares, Arcturus,” etc.; and *thirdly*, “a starry night” again; but not now, as at first, with mere wonder as the accompanying state of feeling, but wonder lit up with delight and intelligence, and thus transfigured into the sabbatical *emotion of the beautiful*.

Now, in this case, and in every case where Reason is allowed to follow her own natural and normal rhythm, the procedure of the mind from ignorance to knowledge, from wonder to intellectual repose, the method of research and discovery is always the same; and it is this. A thing as an object, and the mind as a percipient or believer, come in the course of nature into relationship with each other; in other words, a thing manifests itself, and simultaneously, the mind seizes that thing as an object. Belief strikes in answer to evidence; and, though this never takes place in the ordinary course of nature without a certain bestowal of *attention* on the object (which, indeed, the striking of belief is directly designed to produce), and therefore never without a certain noticing of the object, as well as seizing of it, yet this intrusion of the Will, implied in the fact of attention, is the overlapping of the second phase of mental action upon the first.

As to the first act, the mind, in answer to the call of evidence which an object sends in, and in its first embrace of an object acts purely as a believing Being, and in no degree as a free or voluntary Being; and hence it realises no more knowledge about the object but the fact of its Being, and experiences the emotion appropriate to the impress of that Being. And if the operation of intellect stopt here, a holding, a *belief* of Being on all hands

from which evidence came, would be the sum total of human knowledge. All the rest of our mental action would be mere feeling. And such appears to be the condition of psychical existence through a considerable portion of the scale of animated nature. Such, in a word, appears to be the character of the truly instinctive state. Objects around impress the percipients as such, yet only as believing Beings. They impress them with a sense of their reality, and that with a degree of intensity which, as the appropriate form of belief, constitutes love, pugnacity, or timidity, as the well-being of the individual creature impressed may stand related to the object impressing. And thus such creatures are at once, without the necessity either of any conceptive, voluntary, or reflective power at all on their part, put in the way of maintaining their well-being, and of enjoying their lives. And thus a class of phenomena, otherwise most perplexing, receives an easy explanation. In this way insects, for instance, whose eyes and analytic powers are obviously quite incompetent to give them distinct concepts of objects, may be easily capable of all the seemingly intellectual wonders which they achieve. By this provision they are also saved the necessity of having wills of their own, which they obviously do not possess, and which they could not possess, without being involved in great risks.

Nor is this phase of mental existence altogether unknown in human history. There is no doubt that the Soul having made this grand movement in response to surrounding Being, the Soul having realised the great fact of Being, tends to rest upon her oars, and to suffer herself to be carried along with the stream of the universe, caring for a time to know nothing more about anything but what is quite obtrusive, and much preferring to pour herself out in sublime and delightful emotion. And for this purpose she clothes in her own attributes all that surrounds her. In this the first stage of her infancy, the Soul, holding all things synthetically as one, tends to anticipate and supplant the forthcoming manifestation of God and of nature by her own word. She tends to claim and hold the whole of what exists in sisterhood with herself, mirroring the universe in her own bosom, and bathing it in her heart. All things seem to her to breathe the very feelings which animate herself. While the first spontaneous pulsation of thought and feeling in human nature gives Being, all Being, Being as everything, to man, that belief, too strong in

its own strength to listen much to nature, and merely rejoicing in the fellowship of other beings, and content merely with their presenting themselves, tends, in spontaneous gratitude, to light up all and every one of them with the attributes of its own humanity. But, this done, there is a close of thought, at least for a time. Emotion becomes possible, and therefore emotion comes on, for emotion is always delightful. And thus man, in this phase of his Being, tends to assume the character of the worshipper or the poet, according as he feels more overawed by the power, or sustained by the sisterhood, of that which is around him; and which to him is as yet both God and nature and almost himself too, enwrapped in one glorious but confused and mysterious apocalypse.

But it usually happens, in the order of nature, that belief, while it strikes at first with all objects indifferently which manifest themselves, strikes with some more ardently than with others; as, for instance, with this one in consequence of its nearness, with that one in consequence of its bearings on organic well-being. To man, therefore, a mental engagement with particular objects becomes immediately possible, and indeed, often in virtue of the relation of the nervous system to the will, unavoidable. Hence, in man, almost too soon, an end to the reign of universal contemplation and poetry. Hence, instead of that outpouring of the feelings, and suffusion of humanity over all things, by which, in the poet's soul, human nature tends to respond to Being, on its first presentation, there is in men in general an arrest of the mental activity in the face of some object specially presenting, there is a suspension, for a moment, of all intellectual discoursing upon it; there is, in a word, an uneasiness about it. But no sooner is this uneasiness felt; no sooner has attention thus amounted to uneasiness, than the Soul presses that object which occasions the uneasiness to unfold itself, that she may have an opportunity of deploying herself upon it, and so of escaping from her uneasiness: for uneasiness is in every case merely the mental suspension or arrest of the soul's activity, which ever tends spontaneously to flow; and it changes into enjoyment as soon as the spontaneous flow is permitted to resume. The Soul being made uneasy by the object, desiderates a better understanding of it—in a word, she is curious about it. And this *curiosity*, did it consist with our present plan, it might be

shown to be a principal design of the institution of sensation to set a-going. Here, however, let us only remark, that every vivid sensation previous to the intellectual play which it involves, being essentially a departure from that state of normal repose of the nervous system, in which conscious well-being, or organic comfort and repose consist, cannot but give, when viewed in its nakedness, an uneasiness in relation with the object which excites it; and this uneasiness will be found to be one with curiosity in its somatic genesis.

There is never uneasiness without at the same time an effort to get out of it; for the personal activity or will ever feels liberty or the absence of constraint to be the first condition of its well-being. And thus, by the development of curiosity, the soul is brought to enter upon the second stage of intellectual life. Inquiry begins. The will invoked by the uneasiness of curiosity, comes to the assistance of belief to open the mind's eye; to direct, fix, sustain, or carry it from point to point of the given object, till that object has been pried into to the utmost, and explored all over. Before, the object was merely laid hold of; now, it is questioned and observed. Nor let it be inferred that this process is necessarily incompetent for the discovery of reality, because the will assists in it. That the will does so is true, no doubt; for without the concurrence of the will, there can be no sustained observation,—no fruitful analysis,—nothing but mere belief, belief which can give no account of itself to itself, and feels like inspiration. But still, in this concurrence of volition in the act of observation, no laws of belief are broken; the will, though it has power over belief thus far,—though it can direct the march of the research which sensibility prompts to, has yet no power to part the intuitive from the logical, the noetical from the dianoetical; so that, let the will direct the eye of the mind as it pleases, still all the while, and however intense attention is in consequence, the intellect flows spontaneously; and hence the preservation of the original power of discovering reality, and truth; hence a perfect harmony and continuity between the first and the second stage of intellectual operation upon an object, in coming to a knowledge of it. The second is merely the soul repeating the first; only not now, as in the first, embracing the whole of the object, but merely a part or particle of it, and having the will to carry about her eye from point to

point, and all over the object; each part or particle, when the attention is fully concentrated upon it, being to her an entire object for the time.

But the will cannot act in this way, or in any way in which it acts truly as a will, without being subject to fatigue. The sustenance of concentrated attention upon an object for an indefinite time is, therefore, impossible, as is also the perpetuation of the act of ranging by volition from point to point. The second phase of intellectual action, therefore, necessarily has a termination; and therefore, beyond it there must be another. There must be a third. But the unassisted power of belief having done its best when by itself in the first, and the activity or principle of volition having done all that it can to assist belief in the second, and there being nothing in the constitution of mind but these two, the relational and the personal, no new third phase of intellectual action is possible. And plainly, a third is not indispensably necessary to carry the mind on; for let but the second through inattention, the fatigue of the will, or the exhaustion of the given object intermit, and then the first must forthwith spontaneously recur and come over the mind, sweeping together according to intellectual law, all the products of the second, and thus giving to the mind the object now, not as at first, a being or thing merely,—food for the soul as a believer only,—but as a clearly and distinctly perceived object, lit up with attribute while still remaining true to substance, displaying phenomena as well as giving the assurance of cause.

And thus we see the grounds on which many are in the habit of saying, that we know nothing but phenomena and attributes, and of denying the same evidence, or even all evidence, to substance and cause. Phenomenon is necessarily a much more impressive or distinct and interesting conception than substance or cause, because it is an expression of the personal activity or will, as well as merely of the power of belief or reason in her original ground. It is the object specially, as it manifests itself to us in particular, specially in its relation to ourselves. It is the object presented to the full tide of the mind. Hence it cannot but be, as has been said, more impressive, distinct, and interesting to us. But it has not more evidence than that of substance or cause; its reality does not stand upon a firmer basis; for it is the relation of an object to the soul as a believer alone, which consti-



tutes its evidence. And with this relation the personal activity, the will, cannot interfere. The affirmation of common sense, therefore, of substance and cause as well as attribute and phenomenon, not the delivery of the sensationalist, is the truth.

Such is the normal or the truly natural operation of intellect upon a given object. And though, for the sake of simplicity, I have supposed this object to be truly an unity in itself of some kind, yet it plainly follows, that however multiple an object may be in itself,—be it the whole canopy of the starry heavens, the entire panorama of the landscape, all that sense or memory presents simultaneously,—still, though in the first place it be seized and held as one object, yet by the process which has been described, a reduction of this and of all such adventitious unities must be made by the mind, until each is parted into the natural coherences or true unities of which it consists; and of these, one, say the most interesting, will come to be known in the terms which have been described. But this done, intellect does not stop here. Guided by deeply interesting laws of procedure, of synthesis or suggestion, one object is no sooner known and discussed, but it suggests another and another. The mind now holds not one object merely, but two or more as one; and in reference to each of them and all of them together, the same process is repeated until possession is taken again of the entire original panorama or sphere of the given object—not now however presenting itself as a confused display of Being, but as a definite, orderly, and well-understood exhibition of attributes and phenomena, with adequate substances and causes underlying, and all in the order of nature.

And now, the mind having become acquainted with the realities around her, is put in a condition for proceeding to those higher inquiries respecting them, which pre-eminently constitute philosophy; as, for instance, Why are these things so? What will become of them? What ought we to do in the circumstances? What are our prospects?

But though it may thus be easy to put a method down on paper, it is obvious that the acquisition of true knowledge, when the given objects and their relations are manifold, cannot be by any means easy. It must call for a long operation of analysis, a long sustenance of the mind in its second phase of intellectual operation, that namely, which has for its end to discover the

many in the one. Now, this part of the process of discovery demands, as has been shown, the sustained concurrence of the will. It cannot, therefore, but be fatiguing. It will, therefore, ever run the risk of being brought prematurely to a close, especially as it is for ever pressed upon by the spontaneity of the mind in its intrinsic demand for believing, of which analysis is in no small measure a suspension. Moreover, devoting itself to some one point of inquiry, the mind never forgets that it has rejected many for the sake of one; and therefore, it is ill at ease till it is allowed to embrace the entire panorama again. And hence, obviously the besetting sin of the intellect must be to foreclose and "anticipate," instead of merely "interpreting" as it ought. And to insist upon this as a fact and illustrate it, and to persuade the student to spare no pains in being on his guard against this tendency to precipitate generalisation; and, first of all, to find what really is, and all that is, in the object before him by observation, experiment, and all sorts of cross-questioning and torture, constitutes the grand labour of Bacon, having chiefly external nature in his eye, and commending it as the most advantageous panorama for research; while, by a happy concurrence in Providence, Descartes, much about the same time, in another language and country, was labouring in the same field, the soul of man being his starting place and elect field for observation and research. So that it fell to Descartes to show the value of consciousness, as it did to Bacon to show the value of the external senses; *i.e.*, it fell to the one to show the value of perceptivity when directed to the outward, to the other to show its value when kept at home—the mental power being the same in both cases, only bestowing itself on different fields of observation. The labours of these two great men are, therefore, the complements of each other. And it is only by paying a due respect to both, that science can escape a relapse into the era which preceded them. Let the method of either be followed exclusively (of which the period elapsed since then has supplied abundant examples), or both together (of which there are also instances), and there results, the state of things so felicitously described by Bacon in these terms: "Those who have treated the sciences were either empirics or doctrinaries. The empirics, after the manner of ants, only make stores and use them; the rationalists, after the manner of spiders, spin webs out of themselves. The

method of the bee is a middle course. She gathers her material from the flowers of the garden and the field, but still she changes and digests it by her own faculties. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy, which is not altogether nor chiefly the product of the powers of the mind, nor merely a laying up in the memory entire of the matter as supplied by natural history and manual experiments, but after being changed and elaborated in the intellect; and therefore, from a more strict and holy alliance of these two faculties (the experimental and the rational), which has not yet been made, much may be hoped for. (Aph. 95, B. 1.)" Let it not be supposed, however, that there is anything new either in the method of Bacon or Descartes. They are both merely the reclamation of the wisdom of genius in favour of the method of nature; the English philosopher postulating its trustworthiness, and commending its application chiefly to external nature, and chiefly with a view to the advancement of the arts of life; the French philosopher refusing to postulate its trustworthiness, and demanding first the application of analysis for the appreciation of the instrument and method by which alone anything can be known.

What this method is has just been shown; and to resume; it may now be said that the method of discovery in the order of nature is this. *When viewed synchronically*, it consists (1) in a sustained state of synthesis direct with the given object, or of simple belief in what manifests itself, giving that object to the mind as Being; (2) with analysis (that is, synthesis or belief confined by an effort of volition to point by point of the given object, and not allowed to embrace the whole), traversing the field of original synthesis, and illuminating every successive point, and ultimately all that is analysed with a double intensity of light; the mind as a true agent as well as merely a Being in relation with other Beings, as a *will* as well as a *believer* bestowing itself upon the given object; and thus earning for it, so far as it is analysed, the award of attribute or phenomenon; while yet the primary synthesis subsisting expresses itself also, though with its original obscurity, and holds the same object as substance and cause; the two taken together constituting "a known thing," which, according as it is viewed chiefly in a synthetical or an analytical, a statical or a dynamical point of view, is named Being or Agent.

When *viewed in its sequences* the method of nature consists, *first*, in a phase of synthesis; *secondly*, in a phase of analysis; and *lastly*, in a resumption of synthesis again, which always closes the process of observing when that process is closed normally and in the order of nature.

And hence the explanation of almost all the great aberrations in philosophy. Analysis has been made the concluding term instead of being indulged only as the middle term. That analysis should ever tend to become intrusive in great thinkers, may be anticipated, because it is that phase of mental action in which most especially thinking consists, and, therefore, by over-practice in thinking, analysis must tend to become too much for synthesis to balance, and in fact become, as usual from practice, a habit of mind. Unhappily also, as has been shown, analysis consists mainly in a suspension of belief. Its over-indulgence, therefore, must tend to weaken the mind's power of believing, and hence a habit of excessive analysis must also tend to induce a habit of scepticism.

It is never to be forgotten, however, that a very different value as to infallible truthfulness attaches to the first and third products of synthesis. So very interesting to the mind is everything, in developing and constructing which the will has had a hand, compared with anything in which it has had no hand, that unhappily in the closing act of synthesis the mind tends to include nothing as phenomenon and attribute, but such points as have been analysed or observed; while, in point of fact, there may be many other points which an adequate knowledge of the object might demand to be recognised. There is, therefore, a notable difference in the relative standing as to truthfulness between the product of the original synthesis and that subsequent to analysis. Not but there are conditions in which both may be equally trustworthy; but it is deserving of remark that the second act of synthesis never can surpass the first in truthfulness. The contrary is, indeed, supposed by those who hold demonstration to be a better organ of truth than intuition; but the secret is, that they hold it to be objectively better, merely because its development gives them more pleasure. In general, however, the ultimate product has none of the certainty which belongs to the first, and thus it is that *perception* degenerates into *judgment*. Nor is such degradation to be wondered at; for there can be no analysis without the

concurrence of the will. And therefore all synthetic holdings or believings subsequently to analysis, that is, all conclusions, are liable to manifest traces of the will. Now the mere will naturally cares nothing for truth, merely as such. To the mere will, interest is everything; and, therefore, the will naturally tends to carry analysis along that train of discovery which is agreeable to feeling, rather than along that which would lead to a faithful and disinterested delineation of the object.

And hence, obviously the grand point in the application of method is the discipline of the will, the confining of it strictly to its duty in all reasonings as the handmaid of reason, the holding up of the torch of intuition to the face of the given object simply as it is given, so that those trains of thought may arise in the mind which the object itself is calculated to suggest, and those trains only, and all subjective, personal, interested views, be kept down, views which, however, never fail to arise if the will allows itself to wander away from the object in hand, among the feelings which the contemplation of the object may tend to awake in the individual. The element, therefore, which is needed for fruitful discovery in philosophy, is an energetic will disciplined so as to sustain itself in the form of simple attention, and of perfect candour and the love of truth.

But this is not enough. Besides such a quality of the will, that which is in the will, that which the will directs and holds up to the object, the eye of the mind, must have discovery in it. It must have the virtue of seeing at once simultaneously and singly, diffusively and deeply; and of seizing and of being seized by the features of the object given, in the order of their eminence; so that if surprised by an act of closing synthesis surreptitiously supervening upon observation or analysis not duly completed (as is but too apt to happen), the Soul is already, in virtue of her first thoughts, in possession of the most important features and bearings of the object. This it is which constitutes sagacity, natural wisdom, the *magia* of the *novum organon*. Nor does the science of method know anything that is better or half so good. It is in fact the method of nature realising itself spontaneously in the man in whom common sense and quickness are duly supported by a piercing eye and a good will. And though these all are eminently the gift of God, yet every man may do much for himself. Self-discipline may not only have perseverance and candour

for its object, but also a higher truth-penetrating power of mind for its result.

Of this discipline there can be no doubt that a principal element is the bestowal of an equal respect, and the giving an equal entertainment to all the principles of common sense, and the making use of each frankly and freely when it presents itself without any partiality or favouritism. But this, unhappily, it is extremely difficult to do, when one's habits of thought have come to be under the influence of the love of system, as is almost always the case with the man of science. In that case, the extreme demand of the mind for some unity as the ground or starting place for everything, is almost sure to prevent the simultaneous operation, or even the spontaneous co-ordination and succession of all the principles of common sense into the field of judgment, and thus to render the condition of the man of science less respectable than that of the man who thinks merely by natural sagacity. Nor, indeed, is it easy to see how a peace between science and philosophy can be established on a basis fully permanent and satisfactory, but in showing that all the principles of common sense are but developments of some one principle. To do this, however, will be to perfect the science of common sense. Meantime, though our breath may fail us when we attempt to reach the bottom by diving, though a very long line be required even to fathom it, yet by simply postulating, or rather setting out with a Divine will, and created wills, as the only original elements, may we not arrive at the principles of common sense and of things as they are? I believe this to be possible. In the preceding pages I have even commenced the attempt. But the reader may not agree; and let us not part upon this; but rather let us unite in being content and thankful, that though nothing of the kind be realised in our day, yet we are always safe, and sure to be in good moorings for truth, as long as we keep as many anchors out, as there are principles of common sense.

## C.

*Of Science and Philosophy, their Relations and Objects.*

Science ! philosophy ! the boast of our times. Yes ; but what are they ? What is science ? What is philosophy ? Are they the same, or are they different ? Have they each a form and substance of its own, or are they in both respects identical ? Or haply, is science the form, and philosophy the substance ? These are deeply interesting questions. But the answer to them does not appear either in the terms themselves, or in their popular use in the present day.

Let us devote an Essay to the illustration of this subject, premising only that the term Science is used by us neither as equivalent to the Latin "Scientia," nor the French "Science," but as it commonly is by writers and speakers in English. And here let us at once endeavour to establish, that as most eminently and most properly used, the term *Science* neither signifies knowledge in general, nor even any particular kind or kinds of knowledge properly so-called, but only a particular form of knowledge, or rather indeed of thought, whether that thought be representative of any outward reality or not ; while the term *Philosophy*, on the other hand, appeals to substance and reality as its ground independently of form. Yes ; what is formally meant by "science" and "scientific" is it anything more than a product of the discursive or dianoetic faculty ? Science, does it not consist in any postulates or data, be what they may, provided they be duly expanded and digested into logical order, according to the laws of mental analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalisation ? Philosophy, on the other hand, at least in its just conception, is it not, the expression of the realities of reason, or the noetic faculty ? Does it not consist eminently in an affirmation and exposition of that which is and that which is not, that which ought and that which ought not, its main grounds being those of consciousness and common sense ? At all events, between these two things there is a very notable difference, and there is need for two such terms as science and philosophy to designate them respectively.

Not that we should expect such a distinction to be accurately observed by the public ; for of the two, philosophy is plainly

nobler, and, therefore, we are only to expect that the term philosophy will be made by ambitious authors to supplant the term science as often as the public will allow ; and, therefore, considering the general carelessness and indulgence of the public, we have nothing better to expect, than that almost everything speculative, however jejune it may be—however wide of true wisdom, shall be called by the name of philosophy. Still, the terms are not so far gone, but the distinction I have made may, I think, be verified. To this, then, let us proceed, in the hope of reclaiming its own place for the respectable name of philosophy.

And, in the first place, in order to be convinced that science is a thing of form only, that a certain amount of thought may become legitimately entitled to the name of a science, independently altogether of the character of its contents, either as to truth or reality, provided only that it possess a certain form, nay, to discover that a certain number of conceptions may be held to form a most beautiful science, and may impart a high delight to him who has mastered it in the face of a multitude of obstacles to beauty in so far as the ground of these conceptions is concerned, one needs only to take a survey of the various branches of popular science in our day, to contemplate the gratification which each student finds in his own pursuit, and the impunity, nay, the approbation with which he is allowed to dignify it with the name of a science, whatever it may be about, provided only that he has treated it in a certain way, and has succeeded in exhibiting it in a certain form. Let but thought advance prosperously, be the subject what it may, if only it have a definite sphere, and let but each new discovery be seen to fall into its own place, as determined for it by the desiderata of intellect, a science will be found to grow, and that delightfully to the student, and approvedly by the public (to whom language belongs), whatever the contents. That which is meant by the term science, is purely the form of the thing. To the method followed, and the form obtained, the beauty attaches; and from the development and the contemplation of the form, the pleasure of the science arises.

All, save only that which is wholly odd, and which insists on standing for ever alone, may become ultimately beautiful in the eye of intelligence. And hence an admirable institution for securing the favourable regard of intelligent beings to every object in creation, for in the whole compass of the creation,



there is nothing that is insulated or odd. Nay, hence an institution, in virtue of which or all seeming deformity, even disgustingness, however much of it there may appear to be in certain objects, when they are looked upon as insulated individuals or beings in relation with the observer only, vanish so soon as these objects are viewed in the places and relations in which nature presents them. Such is the intellectual charm of resemblance, order, and continuity, that though a number of objects, when viewed merely either as individuals or as a heterogeneous multitude, would be hateful all and every one of them, still, let them only, even in ugliness, go "share and share alike,"—let them only be analogous, though it be but in deformity, and let but the eye of intelligence look upon them in their resemblances, and dispose them in scientific order, according to that most pleasing movement of the spontaneity of the intellect, which ever seeks to do so, overlooking all ugliness rather than be prevented,—let them be but contemplated in the light of their analogies and agreements,—and forthwith the ugliness in the individual has vanished, and there is beauty in the whole—a beauty which not only sanctions the existence of each object as it is, and makes the student content with them all, but ultimately brings him to hold with peculiar favour, and to cherish with a peculiar affection, points even of peculiar ugliness, provided only they take their places, and fill them well, in completing the series of forms or functions to which they belong.

Great care, therefore, must be taken in allowing the off-hand decisions of taste to sit in judgment on the pursuits of science. Let not the entomologist, for instance, or the mycologist, be despised. Let it not be said that the students of such subjects can have no higher intellectual attribute than mere curiosity. These sciences serve to show pre-eminently the endless resources for enjoyment and life, at once of the human mind and of creation, when these two are placed in correspondence with each other, as we find them in nature. They serve pre-eminently to show that the human soul can live, and enjoy its life, on any word which has proceeded out of the mouth of God, and which has awarded existence to any kind of being or thing, be what it may. It may be doubted whether Galileo, or Newton, or Herschel, were more scientifically engaged, or enjoyed a greater amount of pleasure, in explaining and expounding to themselves the starry

heavens, than Rudolphi or F. O. Muller, when bestowing themselves on the entozoa. Nay, perhaps an argument, not serious indeed, but still not perhaps unsound, might be got up in favour of the helminthologists. It might perhaps be made out, that their pursuit was of the two the most securely pure of every possible taint of vulgarity; for they could not but know that whatever the amount of their success, it never could bring them aught of popular applause; and, therefore, their souls, when engaged on their elect science, could not be vitiated or vulgarised by the love of fame.

Nor let such branches of knowledge be repudiated, or denied the name of science, on the ground of their uselessness. True; astronomy stands very fair in this respect. To it we owe the improvements of navigation. But is it not better to have health and wealth at home than to have to go to sea for them? At all events, let that man, who will not allow the Ehrenbergs of science to sit with the Herschels, remember that once upon a time he was himself no more than a microscopic cell; and that even to this day his whole bodily framework is composed of these same cells, without whose good behaviour, each in its own place (of which the men of the microscope alone can tell us), all enjoyment, nay, even all thinking, are suspended.

But to return. It is not from outward observation only that we may discover that science is purely a thing of form. Reflection teaches the same truth. By reflection it may be learned that intelligence has, so to speak, a form of her own, with which all conceptions, whether true or false, must be co-ordinated, if only they have once been proposed, else she continues unsatisfied and uneasy about them. And hence, when anything new is laid down for thought, we are always asking questions about it. Now these questions, it will be found, are eventually the same in every case. Nay, they are always asking in the same order too. And so it is that when any mass of information, any amount of thought of any kind, has been digested and disposed, in answers to these questions, and in that order which intelligence thus demands and seeks to secure to herself, then there is a science. It is not indispensable that the thoughts be truly representative of anything that possesses reality or outward existence. Reality and truth are no doubt what the soul is always seeking for, and the hope of finding which alone, keeps her earnest in research. But the

term science is not limited to systems of reality. It is awarded by common consent to schemes of thought, though they cannot be more than provisional representations of reality, wide of the truth at the best. Thus who denies to modern chemistry the name of a science, and yet who can bring himself to believe that nature is built up of some fifty-nine primitive substances, by the agency of imponderable fluids! Doubtless such conceptions will give place in due time to others that are more rational; yet, in the meantime, chemistry is certainly a science, and that of a high order. In like manner the objects of science, instead of being attempts to represent realities, may be wholly pure and hypothetical. Such is indeed the fact with regard to all the most perfect sciences—viz., the mathematical. In reference to them it may indeed be said, that the postulates at least exist in nature; but even this condition is not necessary to the existence of a science. Given hippogryphs and chimeras, hobgoblins or fairies animating a dynamical system extended in space of which the law is the  $n^{\text{th}}$  power of the distance, given anything, in short, that is compatible with intellectual treatment, such a system of data, though existing in conception only, will give as ample a scope for the relative science as if it were real.

This arises from the nature of those questions, or rather indeed that single question, which alone the purely intellectual, the merely discursive, logical, or dianoetical action of the mind has to ask. For as this action consists only in the alternate play of synthesis and analysis, with a power of discrimination and a demand for resemblance accompanying, so it has no more to ask but this,—“How may all that is laid down be so arranged that unity, identity, or resemblance may appear in the multiplicity? or among differences that are obvious, how may we construct the entire object-matter into a harmonious whole, resting upon a basis as simple (that is, as much an unity, an identity) as possible?” Now this question mere intellect may proceed to solve, it may succeed in the solution, may accomplish its function, and so attain to a state of well-being and repose, without making any inquiry whatever into the objective validity or reality of the data. To the discursive action of the mind it belongs merely to accept data. It needs no other feature in them, but that they be concepts or conceivables. Such is the life of the soul, that, given this feature only in that which is given; let but him to whom it is

given be able to say, "I can conceive it," and then, though nothing more be asked or given about it, forthwith the mind can discourse, and that in the most orderly manner, upon it. And, therefore, though there were no reality, no truth at all accessible to man, still provided there were conceptions or even conceivables, there would be a field for science.

Very different it is with reason, or the noetic faculty, and philosophy, which is its theme. This faculty demands, in every case, to have truth and reality for its ground. And what are those questions which it is the part of this faculty, the part of reason, to put? They are more than in the former case; but what their form, and how many they shall be, it can only be a matter of taste to determine; for the same amount of information may obviously be asked in a greater number of questions, or a smaller, while it is vain for man to attempt to reach the ultimate limit of analysis. Aristotle allowed four, and others have insisted on more than twice that number. But may they not also be reduced even to two? For what more about anything can any man reasonably want to know than, *first*, the whole of that thing in the order of nature in which it exists and develops itself; or more shortly, the thing as it has been, is, and is to be, in all its relations? and, *secondly*, a sufficient reason or end for its being, its having been, and its becoming so? These two questions appear to exhaust every possible subject of abstract inquiry. And hence it appears, that truth, or reality, when it assumes a regular or intellectual form of development, presents itself in two grand branches, the first giving an orderly description of objects and phenomena, viewed in reference to a principle of unity or identity,—*i. e.*, the genera which include these objects or phenomena, and the laws which express them: while the second aims at the discovery, why they are as they have been found to be, and what would have resulted if they had been, or had become, different from what they are, or are becoming.

Now in these two inquiries, it is important to remark, that the faculties which are called into exercise in conducting the one, are very different from those which are called into exercise in conducting the other, and the bearings of both upon life are very different. Thus when our study is merely to know objects as they are, and to refer them to the classes they belong to or the laws they are under, and to wend or work our way, until the

whole field of the data presents itself as one orderly panorama, our engagement after all is purely logical, discursive, or dianoetical. Reason brings into play none of her peculiar principles, save only that of identity and difference, and her demand for unity and identity gratified in this case by the connexity of nature. Nature is considered as given; and to acquire a knowledge of things as they manifest themselves to observation, and to arrange them according to their true affinities in being, or rather in action, considering them as simultaneously or successively existing, is all that is aimed at. Our mental employment is, therefore, still purely scientific. Our pursuit differs from science taken in the largest sense, or abstract science, only in this, that the data on which the mind discourses, and which it endeavours to arrange and generalise, are not fictions or merely concepts, but realities or their representations in nature.

When this has been successfully accomplished, however, it is not to be denied, that a great step has been made; and accordingly, a certain amount of intellectual satisfaction and repose is forthwith attainable. A good resting-place, in the ascent from the dark valley of ignorance to the bright and commanding summit of general knowledge, has been reached. But surely it is only a resting-place, nay, not higher up the steep than midway at the most. And the answers possible at this midway station, however satisfactory, so far as they go, are not all—nay, not more than one half, of what the intellect insists upon in reference to every theme of an exalted nature. [In fact, as yet only one of the two questions under which it has been shown, that all these inquiries may be comprised, is answered. We only see, as yet, how things are as they are given, not how they are given, not why they are so. Now these are points which Reason will on no account dispense with.

The soul finds herself to be eminently modifiable, both from without and from within. She also perceives that all beings and things around, are constantly modifying themselves or undergoing modifications from external agencies. And this all-important consideration of ever-changefulness, she will not consent to omit from her inquiries into the nature of things. She cannot refrain from believing, for common sense assures her of it, that there is more about nature than appears to the sight, that beneath mere forms and phenomena, there is that which moulds and modifies

them, and makes them to be what they are ; and from what they are, she cannot refrain from conceiving and believing that they might have been different ; and, therefore, she will not refrain from asking, why they are as we find them to be ? Except, on the condition of this question being satisfactorily answered, complete intellectual satisfaction is not attainable. Not but the soul may be persuaded to go away without an answer, and yet not be permanently uneasy for want of it. Let her be but fully convinced, that through want of intellectual reach on her part, an answer is not possible, and she is satisfied. Waiting for more light, she will at least keep holy the Sabbath rest, which God alone can celebrate (as Jacobi beautifully says). But still she will not fail to maintain to the last, and even in her utmost darkness, that a sufficient reason does certainly exist for everything, though we may not have the means of discovering it in particular cases ; and it is only on this understanding that she will consent to leave off from her pursuit of reasons, and return upon her steps, and content herself with mere facts.

The truth is, that in every process of thought, even the most abstract, the conscious activity as sensibility assists. There is no possibility of thinking without the accompaniment both of a conception and a trace of pleasure or pain, more or less. In every inquiry, the moral nature of man takes an interest, as well as the merely intellectual ; which latter, indeed, is not good for man when alone. And accordingly, mere science, mere knowledge of forms or phenomena in synchronism or in sequence never satisfies an unsophisticated mind. The facts being ascertained, we cannot refrain from looking into their bearings upon the general order and well-being of the system of things into which they are found to enter. The conviction, which belongs to man intimately as a being whose call is to virtue, that wherever anything is done it ought to be rightly done, and that in every phenomenon something is being done, forbids him to rest contented merely in observing phenomena, and in comparing them together, and noting their arguments and differences, and the order of their occurrence. An ingenuous full-minded man will not be satisfied merely with ascertaining the existing forms and order of things, and the laws of their variations. He will ever insist on looking into their substance and working also,—their powers and bearings upon the order and well-being of the system to which they

belong, and upon happiness, if there be sentient beings within the sphere of their influence. Nor this only; he will persevere in asking till he get an answer, how they come to be as they are, and to operate as they do, and for what end they both exist and act. The origin and end of things ever have been, and ever must be, of all inquiries the most deeply interesting to man. In fine, a true unsophisticated man will not be satisfied with mere science; he must have philosophy also. Whatever the dogmas of particular moments in the history of the human mind, and the restrictions upon research which particular methods seek to impose, the generous soul will disregard them all, and let herself out in spite of them; and therefore, not genera and general modes of action (which are but surreptitiously named laws when no lawgiver is allowed), but God, liberty, design, and responsibility, will be for ever the grand objects of philosophy, the last words of all right thinking.

The mind that is in man is essentially teleological. Every stream of thought flows into moral feeling as its centre, and the soul finds in goodness, ultimately in God alone, a haven and sabbath for herself. To banish final causes from philosophy, is in reality to banish philosophy itself from the world. An intellect that is in good health, and vigorous and unsophisticated by the dogmas of particular schools, never finds itself breathing quite freely in reference to any object which engages its contemplations, so long as it merely sees that the thing is, and that it is so. A healthy intellect wants to know also, and for the complete enlargement of reason it needs to know, why the thing is, and why it is so. Till it has seen that the thing is as it ought to be, reason is not at ease. Nor is this demand illogical. Nothing short of this is an adequate expression of the law of universal causation, as that law declares itself in the reason of man. With regard to indifferent objects, indeed, it may be allowed that the demands of this law, and therefore of reason, so far are satisfied, when, by adducing the physical causes which have conspired to produce it, that object or phenomenon has been shown to be such, and so related to others, that it could not have been, or now be, otherwise than it is. But the attempt to extend this doctrine of physical necessity to cover and account for all phenomena whatever, as has been so often done of late, is a wretched scheme,—a mere paralogsism in truth; for while it

professes to be an illustration of causation, it is, in point of fact, an absolute denial of cause altogether. It assigns a physical necessity as the cause of every particular event, be what it may! It admits no idea of cause which is not itself a thing caused by something else external to itself, applied to it at the moment of its action, and making it to be what it is! And what, according to this doctrine, is "cause"? Why, according to this doctrine, "cause" is but effect antecedent, or, at the most, a mere propagation of effects. This doctrine, therefore, destroys the idea of cause altogether; which, however happily for man, reason will never give up.

But the doctrine of physical necessity, even though it did not fail in realising the idea of cause, is also far too limited. It does indeed respect the demands of the law of causation in reference to the moment when the phenomenon appears. It provides adequate conditions for the existence of the phenomenon; but there it stops. And therefore it would be adequate only in reference to the last phenomenon of the last day. Meantime, and until then, the law of causation calls upon us to view every phenomenon, not only in reference to the causes immediately foregoing which have produced it, and so on, till we ascend to a First Cause, it requires us to regard every phenomenon not merely as an effect, but also destined to become itself a cause in its turn. A healthy mind never fails to look at events and phenomena in their effects as well as their causes. The "must be" of a mind that is in right working order does not relate merely to the genesis of the phenomenon which it is at that moment contemplating. Reason is not indifferent as to the manner in which this new event which has just occurred must tell upon the system of things, on the bosom of which it has just manifested itself. Reason will not refrain from looking to the new conditions of existence to which it has given rise; and from observing whether it falls in harmoniously with other objects and phenomena around, and whether it combines with them in maintaining its own and their order and stability, and the stability and order of the system into which they all enter, or whether it causes confusion and destruction. Reason cannot forget that the existing system of things is modifiable. Reason cannot help regarding every phenomenon ethically, so to speak, as well as mechanically. Reason is not satisfied merely with a "must



be," unless that "must be" is perceived also to imply an "ought to be," that is, a "must be" in order to the general well-being.

In every language, we find the term "ought," or some equivalent for it; and in every unsophisticated mind we find a point of curiosity, and a natural demand corresponding. Now, surely such a state of things must be respected, and not merely waived or denounced, as it has become so much the fashion to do of late. Is it said that the tendency of the mind to final causes is merely an idol of its own, merely a bad habit, of which the true philosopher must purge his mind altogether; then why not purge the mind of its tendency to causes generally? Both tendencies or habits, or whatever you please to call them, rest upon the very same basis, and both of them are equally legitimate, if either of them be legitimate. Nay, why should the intellect be indulged in its habit of generalising—its habit of viewing or trying to view as one, things which are obviously many, of comparing and of seeking for agreements among objects which are well known to be different? And yet more, why should abstraction be allowed, that fixing of the thoughts upon some one object, to the evident and even intentional exclusion of others, which are well known to exist along with it in the same sphere, and to be equally legitimate in nature? What is this but a voluntary surrender of truth; nay, a shutting of the eye to truth for the purpose of forming a partial view? In fine, why allow all that incessant marking of the agreements and differences of objects in which the mind constantly indulges? What better can they be but different feelings in our fickle selves, which we fallaciously, under the name of differences, ascribe to external objects, because they happen to be in our eye at the time! And so on. Let us but once begin to cut and carve upon the intellectual constitution which our Maker has given us, let us but begin to question the legitimacy of common sense, and there is no end of the havoc which we make. We open a flood-gate to scepticism, which flows, and that legitimately, to the full extent of the ancient Pyrrhonism, desolating the fair field of knowledge, sweeping away all certainty before it, and instead of God and nature and man to believe in, leaving nothing as a ground of thought but a general glare, something between within and without, between finite and infinite, which will not bear the name even of phenomena.

But universal scepticism cannot possibly be legitimate, because not less than any other system of thought, it is the creation of the very same principles and processes of mind. In questioning and denying their legitimacy, therefore, it also denies its own. It cannot save itself from the general ruin which it proposes to bring on all others. But let us not speak of universal scepticism. The thing is impossible. Let a man doubt or deny everything, he cannot but believe that he doubts or denies; and thus in spite of all his scepticism, behind and beneath it, and as its ground, there is, and there ever must be, dogmatism after all. To escape from belief is utterly impossible for man, and therefore surely it is just as well to consent at once to everything for which there is sufficient evidence. No doubt belief limits liberty, and therefore it is natural to escape from it if we can. But in limiting liberty, belief also assists it so as to render it enjoyable. Best accept it, therefore. But indeed, as has been said, this has not been left to our choice. There is no alternative for man. Either he must accept as trustworthy the intuitions and constants of reason, or else he must abjure all thought which claims to be legitimate, and be for ever silent. But this too is impossible. Man exists under the necessity of thinking and of communicating his thought. And if he is to think at all, then why not think as far as the light of reason will carry him? Why lay down arbitrary limits in one age, which the past does not recognise, and the future is destined to overturn? To say that nature is simply to be accepted as a datum, and that all that is to be aimed at, is the accurate knowledge and description of individual objects as they exist, their classification and the discovery of their genera and general modes of action, and that with the ascertainment of these points inquiry is to cease, is to prescribe limits to discovery which reason does not recognise. To go thus far is indeed a good work, but yet—if reason is to be listened to—it is only a pre-exercitation to a better work, that namely, which looks upon nature not as an absolute datum whose origin and end are not to be inquired into, but as a product contingent and modifiable by an adequate cause; in fine, that which looks not to mechanical force, but to true Power or a Will as the type of causation generally. Let it be admitted that the two fields of research are distinct, that the observation of forms and phenomena, and the discovery of genera and general

modes of action is one thing, and the observation of the bearings of these forms and phenomena upon the happiness of sentient beings, and on the well-being of the system in general, and the inferences to which these observations lead as to the attributes of the First Cause, is another ; still there is no reason in history or in the nature of things why the former should deny the legitimacy of the latter, or usurp its place. On the contrary, while the respectable name of science may be freely awarded to the former, as indeed it usually is, the latter is that which pre-eminently constitutes philosophy. And that such was truly the mind of Bacon, whatever now the method may have come to, which passes under the sanction of his name, an attentive perusal of his own works cannot fail to satisfy every candid mind. While he felt and has dwelt with such success on the necessity of bestowing observation and experiment on external nature, and of following the inductive method far more than had ever been done down to his day, he was intimately aware of the insufficiency of this method for all the higher purposes of true philosophy ; and therefore in the first aphorism of the First Book of the “*Novum Organon*,” he places in the field for observation, the *mens* co-ordinate with the *res* ; and in the second Book, which is wholly devoted to the method of discovering causes and impalpable objects, having shown the inadequacy of mere observation by the senses and the sometimes evil of experiment, he says, “*transeundum plane a Vulcano ad Minervam.*” And how could he possibly give greater emphasis to his conviction, that something far more than merely the classification of objects and the general modes or laws of phenomena was the main object of philosophy, than by devoting the entire Second Book of the “*Novum Organon*” to affirm this, opening it with the following aphorism, which I quote because it not only shows Bacon’s idea of the range of science and philosophy, but lays down a most articulate announcement of the importance of the statical and the dynamical points of view—one which figures so advantageously and to such an extent in the “*Philosophie Positive*” of Comte, and the discovery of which that author is pleased to ascribe to De Blainville, though Bacon devotes a succession of pages and aphorisms to its exposition. (N. Org., B. ii. Aph. 1).

“The office and end of *human power* is to produce or superinduce a new nature or natures upon a given body. But the

office and end of *human knowledge* is to discover the constitutive principles (formam) of a given nature or its essence (differentiam veram), or that nature which makes its nature to be what it is (naturam naturantem), or the fountain from which it flows."

"And to these primary operations two others of secondary and inferior note are subordinated: *to the former*, the change of concrete bodies from one into another, through all possible variety; *to the latter*, the discovery in every case of production and motion of the LATENT PROCESS, continued from the agent and matter under the eye even to the constitutive principles which are built upon; and the discovery, likewise, of the LATENT STRUCTURE AT REST and not in motion."

It may be very true, as John Playfair says, "that Bacon placed the objects of science too high, and too much out of the reach of man, even when his exertions are most skilfully conducted" (Encyc. Dissert. 473); but it is very unfair to quote Bacon as sanctioning the confinement of all our researches to inquiries into the genera and laws of nature. In doing this, both on his own authority and under the cover of Bacon's name, Playfair's distinguished colleague, Dugald Stewart, has gone a great deal too far. It may be very true, that the method for which Bacon is chiefly remarkable, when followed out exclusively, tends to mere generalisation as its limit, as does that of Locke still more decidedly. But, since both these philosophers so carefully avoided the exclusive pursuit of their method, and moderated it by earnest appeals to the claims of the spiritual world, it is scarcely fair to lay to their charge the desolating views of the eighteenth century, and of our day; which, by maintaining that matter alone is demonstrable, admit nothing else to the rank of that which is belief-worthy; and thus spread the mantle of inevitable fate over every man's life, and leave nothing at all for the worst to fear, or the best to hope for, when this life is over.

There can be no legitimate ground for denying to reason the right she claims of engaging deeper in the nature of things than merely the observation of phenomena, and the discovery of their relations, their genera, and general modes of action, unless it be the impossibility of going any deeper with success. This, however, cannot be affirmed on the pure or *à priori* authority of reason herself; because her constancy in seeking deeper is a

teaching on her part of the possibility of success. It can only be affirmed on the strength of experience; and the form of the argument can never be better than this,—“Man cannot reach the constitutive principles (*formas*) and final causes of things, because he has never yet done so.” But to admit such an argument is to fly in the very face of the “*Novum Organon*.” It is to incur the censure even of the opening words of the Preface, the very first sentence of the book. It is to pronounce “*more professorio*” concerning nature, “*tanquam de re explorata*.” It is “to affirm that there is no land, because we as yet see nothing but sea,” which Bacon elsewhere beautifully shows, when treating of the claims of metaphysics, is the part of but ill discoverers.

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D.

*The Philosophy and the Science of Common Sense.*

If the doctrine of the preceding essay be in any degree admitted, it follows that we Scotch do nothing wrong when we speak of the Philosophy of Common Sense. The expression is tautological, no doubt, because there is no other order of thought which is entitled to the name of Philosophy, save that which is in accordance with common sense; but when an error lies at the door, tautology, though doubtless an offence against the theory of language, is often a very pardonable and even a necessary one; and in the present instance, since it is a popular belief that there are as many different Philosophies as there are Sciences, specific appellations must be attached to each. Let the above designation of our Philosophy stand therefore; let us even venerate the name, **THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE.**

Is it anything against this Philosophy that we have it spontaneously, and have not to go a-hunting for it? Of all the doctrines that can be even imagined to be in the possession of men of science, can any better principles of guidance to truth than those of common sense be found or even fancied? Are not all its grounds intrinsically authoritative, sure as sure can be?

Do they not all dwell together in the breast, on the very best understanding with each other? And do they not guide man to his well-being, to the very extent that he knows and respects them, and invokes their aid for the regulation of his conduct? Nay, do they not explain the universe up to the degree that we have the means of observing it?

What, then, is against them? Only this: that they do not explain themselves; that they do not give an account of their own legitimacy and authority. That they do not this, must be admitted. They do not stoop from the proud place of imperative, both in science and in life. Their authority is all the light they shed upon themselves. But what harm in this? In the position in which they hold—so deeply seated in the human breast—how could they give an account of themselves? And, with the constant business they have in hand, why should they? In fact, they could not do so, otherwise than by resigning the Presidency of human nature, and by changing their utterance from that of the throne to that of the confessional. To explain themselves, would be to dismember and break up their government. Let Science do this for them if she can. But, as to Common Sense, as to Reason herself, and the living embers of heaven-born truth which glow for ever in her bosom, and whisper of God, nature, and man, better far that she make no confessions; better far that the torch of truth and the flame of thought be kindled by the spontaneous utterance of the heart. Science is no doubt good; method is both food and raiment to the Soul; but Common Sense is better than both; better than all. It is the very life and body of the Soul; and it is more than mere system, even as the life is more than meat, and the body than raiment. Often, indeed, since the earliest ages of reflection, has common sense been put to the torture by philosophers; and of late years, and in Germany more especially, has it undergone a “*rigoroso esame*” by intensely metaphysical inquisitors; but still “*questo buon vecchio*,” though on his knees, barefoot, and in his shirt, has no sooner heard their sentence against him, than even in the innermost depths of their own breasts he was heard saying, “*eppur si muove*.”

And yet, after all, is it safe to leave common sense thus to stand solely and wholly upon its own authority? May not this be construed as a trespass on that authority? In answer to this,

it may be affirmed, that if common sense herself say that it is safe, and that in terms which admit of no mistake, then, of course, it is safe. If she affirms that her legitimacy and grounds must not be made the subject of inquiry, then, of course, we must abstain. But in vain do we listen to her for any dogmatism to this effect. On the contrary, she even invites Science to fathom her, and unfold all her principles, their order, genesis, and ground of authority, if only it have strength for the undertaking. And indeed it appears, that the time is fully come when such an attempt ought to be made, and that, too, in our country if possible, else we must sit down under very hard words from very great men. Very severe is the Philosopher of Königsberg. An appeal to common sense, says he, in his Preface to the *Prolegomena*, is merely "a convenient means of giving one's self an air of importance, without the least insight,—is nothing but an appeal to the judgment of the multitude, at whose applause the philosopher blushes, but in which the popular witling triumphs and glories; and when resorted to, when insight and science are exhausted, one of the most subtle discoveries, by which the most shallow-pated (meaning Reid, Beattie, Oswald) may enter the lists, and cope with a man of the most profound Reason" (meaning Hume). Another, also a truly great metaphysician, and who may, indeed, be viewed as pre-eminently the Critic of the Critical Philosophy, M. Cousin, though in his review of the Scottish Philosophy, he is eminently friendly and favourable, as we shall soon see, is also sometimes very severe. Thus, when setting forth the terms under which "the ideas of Plato are reproduced in modern Philosophy," and after showing that they are the eternal verities of Leibnitz, he proceeds thus:—"Again they are, in an inferior degree, the laws of the constitution of human nature, the principles of common sense of the Scottish Philosophers. But the Scotch have made use of their laws, and of their principles, without any deep research into their nature,—without determining their origin, without embracing all their import, without enumerating them or classifying them, without tracing the history of their apparition and their development in consciousness, without following them into their consequences, and without referring them to their first and last principle. Kant has gone infinitely farther in the same route." (*Nouv. Fragments*). Now, it must be admitted, that in this criticism, severe though it

be, there is much truth. But it is equally true that it is not just to the Scottish School, considered as reconstructive of Philosophy. It is no disparagement to it in this point of view. Now, this is the point of view in which it ought to be regarded in its rise, and, indeed, almost down to the present day. For, if we except the labours of Sir W. Hamilton, as propounded in his deeply philosophical and historical criticisms, and who has contributed so much to the Scottish Philosophy, not only in that walk, but also in that of original discovery, what contributions have we had which are really of any great value since the days of Dr Reid?

As to Kant's criticism, it is altogether incorrect and undeserved. Thus when the Scottish metaphysicians of the last century began to work in earnest, the pursuit of a certain method, and the working out of a certain hypothesis as to the origin of human knowledge, was bringing into suspicion, nay, into disbelief, all that had been previously held to be most sacred, most animating to duty, and most soul-sustaining under the trials of life. Science and system had brought philosophy to the brink of ruin; when Dr Reid arose. If, then, there be such a thing as truth and natural wisdom for the whole human race, and not for men of science only, if philosophy have a hold and a home in human nature, independently of system and science, the normal movement in such circumstances plainly was, to adopt that method which appeared best for the saving of Philosophy as fast as possible, and the invalidating at once of the hypothesis which was stopping the springs of spontaneous thought and natural feeling in the men of that age, and, in so doing, poisoning faith and Philosophy at its fountain head. Now, this is exactly what Dr Reid proposed to himself, and what he accomplished to an extent so admirable. The only thing which is seriously to be regretted in Dr Reid (and indeed in the Scottish Philosophy generally) is, the neglect with which the religious element in human nature has been treated. Not but Dr Reid was a firm believer, a pious man. This appears everywhere in his works, and I am able to state, that his piety was an element in his personal life also, my father, the late P. Macvicar, D.D., having been much with him during his latest years. Still, however, Dr Reid was a believer on the strength of Revelation chiefly. And neither does his faith derived from this source animate his philosophy, nor does his philosophy go far to strengthen the grounds of his faith. In this respect he still



belongs to the philosophy of Locke, which may indeed, in a religious point of view, be safely held by such great and good men as Locke, Reid, Chalmers, and the like, but cannot be embraced without danger by those who address themselves to it without bringing along with them a well grounded faith in revealed religion.

Reid did not misunderstand Hume, as Kant affirms, though he was, no doubt, too free with his irony in dealing with a man who knew so well what he was about. It formed no part of Dr Reid's plan to meet Hume's argument by pursuing a parallel train of thought. Hume himself characterised Reid's Inquiry, after he was persuaded to read it, as a "piece" that was "deeply philosophical;" and Reid, in the truly handsome answer which he sent to Hume's truly handsome opinion of his great work, writes to Hume "I have learned more from your writings in this kind than from all others put together. Your system appears to me, not only coherent in all its parts, but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received among philosophers; principles which I never thought of calling in question until the conclusions you drew from them in the treatise of Human Nature made me suspect them. If these principles are solid, your system must stand; and whether they are or not can better be judged after you have brought to light the whole system that grows out of them, than when the greater part of it was wrapped up in clouds and darkness. I agree with you, therefore, that if this system shall ever be demolished, you have a just claim to a great share of the praise, both because you have made it a distinct and determinate mark to be aimed at, and have furnished proper artillery for the purpose." Such was the criticism of him whom Hume had in his eye when he made, in anticipation of his work, the following remark—"I wish that the parsons would confine themselves to their old occupation of worrying one another, and leave philosophers to argue with temper, moderation, and good manners."<sup>1</sup> Kant himself could say nothing more truly descriptive of what Hume's system is. Reid had a distinct perception how matters stood; and he saw that his part was to choose a standing place different from that of Hume. Accordingly he appealed to "the constants" which are found in every formula of thought which possesses the character of rationality, he appealed to the laws

<sup>1</sup> Burton's Life of Hume, vol. ii., p. 153, et seq.

of human belief, or as he himself most tersely named them, the Principles of Common Sense. And in establishing the existence of these principles, and the thesis that all results which stand in contradiction of them must be false, *ipso facto*, he established a criterion of truth, an organon of discovery, a method in science of most extensive application and invaluable use, as Kant indeed indignantly confesses that it is. He at the same time superseded the necessity of discussing all particular questions in detail. Reid set matters right at once, so far as he went. And what if this amounted to no more than the bringing of them back to what they were, before they were tampered with by system! Science suffered a little, perhaps, from his rough handling, but Philosophy was saved and set free. And that fact covers over all defects, and makes Dr Reid's a truly glorious work. For Dr Reid to have aimed both at Science and Philosophy at the same moment, would have spoilt all. His great work was, as he has well named his earliest volume, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense." Now, for the carrying out of this work, it was even essential that those Principles which he invoked should be taken simply as they are found in human nature, just as all thinking men might be expected to respond to them, and free from all speculation which could be construed into a sophistication of them. Besides, to ask from one mind or even from one age both an inquiry into the human mind on the Principles of Common Sense and an inquiry into these Principles also, is to ask too much. If Dr Reid committed a fault as to this matter, it did not lie in refraining from a systematic unfolding of the principles of common sense, but in denouncing such an inquiry and proclaiming it to be impossible.

And yet has not the philosopher of Königsberg himself, by the results which he arrived at, gone far to justify all the horror which Dr Reid expresses, when the thought of submitting the principles of common sense to analysis comes into his head? The entire history of philosophy has not half a dozen names to match with that of Immanuel Kant in intellectual power; and yet, when he proceeded to overturn Hume's scepticism systematically, as Dr Reid had already done, not systematically, but by an appeal to common sense, what was the result? A most marvellous work, it must be admitted, of admirable analytical power, and of exquisite coherence as a system, so far as it pre-

tends to be a system. But what is its relation to philosophy, even by its author's own confession? Why, it only begins to be a philosophy when it ceases to be a system; and when, abandoning the method of demonstration on the principle of contradiction as a basis, found to be insufficient to reach the truth, it makes an appeal to common sense after all! for what else but an appeal to common sense are the grounds on which Kant lays down as truths the doctrine of liberty, immortality, morality, God? And what comes of his system, in reference to these grand verities, in the belief of which he plainly is as sound as ever man was, but that, while many other things of minor moment, comparatively speaking indeed of no moment at all, are given as demonstrated truths, those on the earnest belief of which the well-being of humanity turns, are admitted merely as postulates! But the worst of it is, that, according to Kant's system, it is not legitimate even to postulate them; for they are all mere "ideas of reason." With respect to them all, the element of intuition, which is alone admitted by Kant as satisfactory evidence of objective existence, is wholly wanting; and if, except in so far as merely this evidence goes, all our other notions and concepts are purely subjective, how can we ascribe legitimately objective existence or reality to God and the moral system? Is it said they may be known to be such by common sense, or by reasoning on the principles of common sense? That is good and true; and thus alone can they be effectively known. But unfortunately nowhere does common sense feel herself so completely put out as in the speculations of Kant. He does indeed most completely overturn the sceptical views of Hume, as to the grounds of the human understanding. He shows that the understanding is by no means merely a creature of experience, as Hume has it; and thus negatively all is well; but when positively, the German philosopher goes on to show, that instead of being the creature, the human intellect is the creator of experience, by a swing of thought to the other side much too far from Hume, Kant plunges us in a scepticism far worse than that from which his own philosophy is the recoil—worse in the degree that our understanding, considered as our own merely, is less trustworthy than nature. Hume says custom is the great guide of life. As we have seen and thought before, we see and think again; and we have nature and life to thank for being

what we are, and for having what understanding we have. Kant says the understanding is the great guide of life. From first to last it is the make of the mind, and that alone, which determines not only what we shall think, but what we shall see. Nor is it possible in any way to see anything as it really is. Hume says that nature imposes laws upon the human mind. Kant says that the human mind imposes laws upon nature. And certainly, in establishing both systems, however contradictory, it is not possible to conceive more exquisite logical acumen than both authors display. But on the review of such a state of things (which might be extended so as to include many other names scarcely less distinguished), what is the legitimate inference? Plainly it is, that a mere logical process is not an adequate ground on which to rear the temple of philosophy; but that "intuitions," as well as a "rhythm," must be admitted to belong to intelligence; in a word, the principles of common sense as well as a logical process and external perception.

But here let us protest against the identification, by the great Kant, of the term "common sense," as used by Dr Reid and our countrymen generally, with "the judgment of the multitude." The informations of common sense are perceptions or holdings, not judgments or thinkings,—*i.e.*, they are simple strikings of synthesis, strikings of the soul with truth, in which hesitation is impossible, and in which it is by no means necessary, nor even allowable, to call in the aid of the will to assist in making a choice between two things, both presenting some claims to be true, as is the case in an act of judgment, as that term is generally used. Nay, neither the judgment of the multitude nor his own, does a man appeal to, when he appeals to common sense. He appeals, and is known and understood to appeal, to a criterion of truth, which is neither his nor any man's, but which is given in common to all. But hear its explanation by Jouffroy. "The history of philosophy (says he) presents a singular spectacle. A certain number of problems are reproduced at every epoch; each of these problems suggests a certain number of solutions always the same; philosophers are divided; discussion is set on foot. Every opinion is attacked and defended with equal appearance of truth. Humanity listens in silence, adopts the opinion of no one, but preserves its own, which is what is called 'common sense.'" Powerfully again

says this philosopher, "Common sense is nothing but a collection of solutions of those questions which philosophers agitate. It is another philosophy prior to philosophy so-called; since it is found spontaneously at the bottom of every consciousness independently of all scientific research. There are accordingly two votes on the questions which interest humanity, namely, that of the mass and that of the philosophers, the spontaneous vote and the scientific vote, common sense and systems." The philosophy of common sense, then, has a standing place secured for it in the world, even by the constitution of human nature itself.

But all that has been said tends also to show how very desirable it would be, if common sense could only acquire the form of a science, as well as the substance of a philosophy. The love of the human mind for system is always strong, and in the keenest students it is the strongest. The pleasure which systematic views impart is intense; nor is this their only recommendation. The intellect declares, even in its very working, that truth itself is a system; and no sooner is any aggregate of thoughts presented in the form of a system, than it seems already and in virtue merely of its own concinnity to have claims upon our belief, while, with regard to any such aggregate as repudiates every attempt to systematise it, one never can command intellectual satisfaction in holding it, and it must be very clear and intrusive indeed, if it be not neglected or rejected. Plainly, therefore, it is most desirable that the principles of common sense should be disposed of scientifically, that is, enumerated, classified, generalised, and, in a word, accounted for. Now, certainly there is nothing in this desideratum which at first sight declares itself to be impossible. Nay, have we not here the "materiel" for a most complete science? for while on the one hand we have consciousness, the most certain of all kinds of perception, in the very centre of our sphere of operation ready to discover everything, we have also a canon for the construction of the science given, even in the very ground of it; for plainly we have in attempting the science of common sense this rule for its construction, that every successive step must be in keeping with common sense, and every ultimate result and the whole product an expression of it. Nothing, therefore, can be logically more perfect in anticipation than a science of common sense. The only question is as to its practicability.

But is not this question and all questions relating to this sub-

ject solved by the fact that this science has been constructed already? Has not Kant, notwithstanding his aversion to the name, yet in reality given in his analysis of the understanding, etc., the science of common sense? There is no doubt that his research has nothing else for its aim. But that it is in this respect a failure, notwithstanding its admirable logical coherence, is certain; for in all its great steps it contradicts common sense. Thus Kant maintains that space and time are nothing but forms or fictions of the mind, while common sense most positively declares that they are in some respect outward and independent of the mind. Kant maintains that what in science are called laws of nature, are not so in reality, but only the laws of the human mind imposed upon nature, while common sense affirms that whether they be laws of the human mind or not (respecting which she makes no affirmation), they are certainly laws of nature so far as they are true. In a word, Kant's philosophy affirms that we know nothing at all about anything, either as it is in itself or as it may appear to other orders of intelligence, but only out of something given to us as a cause, of which we can say nothing else but that it is not ourselves, we construct for ourselves all the forms and phenomena which we know, while common sense affirms that by taking proper steps we can know things as they are in their relations truly, and that only so far as we thus know them do we know them at all. The system of Kant is, therefore, plainly at fault when considered as the science of common sense, because it so palpably contradicts it.

But from the founder of the German schools may we not turn, with confidence of finding what we are seeking for, to him to whom the Professor of Logic in Edinburgh beautifully dedicates his edition of Reid's works; "not only as a token of his own admiration of the First Philosopher of France, but as a tribute due, appropriately and pre-eminently, to the statesman through whom Scotland has been again united intellectually to her old political ally; and Reid's writings (the best results of Scottish speculation) made the basis of academical instruction in philosophy, throughout the central nation of Europe." May we not turn with confidence to Victor Cousin, assured that we shall find here what we have failed to find in the exquisite analysis of Kant: that is, a scientific account of the principles of common sense, in keeping with common sense itself? And here let it be at once

acknowledged, that we find much that is truly exalted in thought, and that has all the signatures of truth, in the philosophy of Cousin. Nor is there anything in the views of this great founder of the eclectic school of France of which it can be affirmed, as may be done of many of the doctrines of the founder of the German systems, that it stands in direct contradiction to common sense itself. Still, whether it be taken in a dogmatic or in a systematic point of view, I do not think that this philosophy can be regarded as a wholly successful solution of the problem of common sense, or an exposition of the science of common sense. In truth, as in reference to Hume and Kant, we have had extreme views already, so here again we have another in Cousin—not, indeed, in his historical criticisms, which are eminently moderate and benignant, the author beautifully endeavouring to bring out the truth in everybody's favour, and ever breathing the love of humanity, as the first principle of philosophy, but in his dogmatical expositions; which, however, are so few and rapid, compared with what one would wish to have from him—especially when compared with the exquisitely-detailed and logical procedure of Kant—that it is hard to be obliged to find fault with them, as if they were also excessive. And yet, when placed side by side with the deliverances of common sense, they certainly are excessive. They are a recoil from the Kantian doctrine, not to the middle place which common sense occupies, but to the opposite extreme. Thus, Cousin holds that reason, the noetic faculty in man, instead of depending for its views on the make of the mind itself merely, is absolutely the voice of God. Instead of leaving man altogether unable to discover God on scientific grounds either in his being or attributes, as Kant concluded (who was, however, a firm believer on other grounds), Cousin maintains that Reason is the apparition of God in human nature, and, indeed, constitutes a full manifestation of the Godhead to man. Speaking of the nature of the ideas of reason, which he reduces to three, he says, “elles ne sont pas autre chose que la manière d'être de la Reason Eternelle.” And in the next page, having expressed his hope that he will not be accused of Pantheism, “de confondre avec le monde l'éternelle Intelligence qui avant le monde et l'humanité, existe déjà de la triple existence qui est inherente à sa nature,” he refers to another charge “which he accepts,” viz., “celle de vouloir pénétrer dans la profondeur

de l'essence divine, qui, dit on est incompréhensible," and having stated, for the reconciliation of his audience to his consciously bold procedure, that it is principally the measure of the comprehensibility of God that will be the measure of the faith of man (which is, I think, a very grave mistake, since the conceptivity of the human mind, or its power of representing or comprehending, is essentially bounded, while its power of holding reality, of believing, of faith, is indefinite), he adds, "Dieu la substance des idées est essentiellement intelligent et essentiellement intelligible." "Le dogme de la Trinité est la révélation de l'essence divine éclairée dans toute sa profondeur et amenée tout entière sous le regard de la pensée." Now, though there is something very pleasing to the believer in finding a mind so eminently gifted as that of Cousin, arriving after such a course at the central doctrine of Christian Theology, yet it may be easily seen that from the position he has assumed in philosophy, it belongs to him not to rest in that doctrine, but simply to notice it in passing. If Reason be in man what he holds it to be, plainly there is something for man higher than Religion, and its lights, plainly the light of Reason,—Philosophy is higher,—light this, whose mission, according to this view, is not only to sit in judgment on the doctrines of Revelation commonly so-called, but to define the limits of all possible Revelation, and, in a word, to give, the very truth of God ;—yes ; all this from reason in its own right, as an element in the constitution of human nature ! Nor does the author shrink from these consequences. In the opening lecture of his "Cours de Philosophie" (the first lecture of the volume of 1828, the general Introduction to his Lectures on the History of Philosophy), he says, "La Philosophie est donc la lumière de toutes les lumières, l'autorité des autorités." And in the fifth lecture he says, "Le droit comme le devoir de la philosophie est, sous la réserve du plus profond respect pour les formes religieuses de ne rien comprendre de ne rien admettre qu'en tant que vrai en soi et sous la forme de l'idée.

\* \* \* La religion est la philosophie de l'espèce humaine ; un petit nombre d'hommes va plus loin encore." And that to which they go, does it not appear to be (though not without the most sincere veneration for religion in others yet), to replace religion by philosophy in themselves ! But as we are desirous of believing otherwise of the views of this great



man, let us not fail to remark here, that when he speaks of religion he seems to have in his eye only the worship of the Church of Rome, and other symbolic modes of worship. "*La forme symbolique et mystique est inhérente à la religion*" says he. Now, if so, there is no religion in Scotland; yet it is certain that there is more of the worship of God in it, than in any country under heaven. Is the religion of Scotland then, and of purely protestant communities, philosophy engaged in worship? This construction is not unfair. But if so, all is well. The only thought which is horrible, is that philosophy should be such a thing as to absolve the philosopher from the worship of God.

But on what grounds does this great man build these sublime pretensions for philosophy, which, however pleasing to the imagination, do they not hurt the modesty of common sense? On what evidence does he rest them so as to give them the standing-place of science, which he claims for them? This brings us to the characteristic of his system, that point where it strikes off from the philosophy of common sense and begins another school. Cousin maintains that the soul possesses a mode of spontaneous thought into which volition and reflection, and therefore personality, do not enter, and which gives her an intuition of the absolute. For this he has appropriated the name *apperception*, explaining it also as a true inspiration, and holding, therefore, that inspirations come to man not by the special volitions of God, as commonly believed, but fall to reason in its own right, thus constituting a scientific organon of discovery. On this ground it is that he maintains in favour of Reason the high pedigree he assigns to it, and the truth of his philosophy generally. Not that he repudiates the Inductive Method. On the contrary, he is a warm advocate for it, and he appeals most earnestly to observation and history for truth, yet still chiefly as a verification of truths obtained by intuition from this transcendent source, "*La raison éternelle substance et cause des vérités que l'homme apperçoit.*"

Now, what says common sense to this sublime conception? Does she recognise herself in it; or accept it as an account of herself? No. The appeal to common sense is one thing, and the appeal to *apperception* is another, another such that I trust I am not doing an injury to Cousin's own exposition of it, when I say that, according to his own showing, a state of *apperception* can only be reached by keeping common sense under, if not by put-

ting it absolutely away. Still, however, even though it were so, to keep under or put away is not to contradict; and, therefore, it is an open question for common sense to ask whether this apperception do really exist or no;—only if it do exist, common sense must consent to give up to it the domain of the highest philosophy—if it do exist, then there is something better for man than common sense, a sense and a philosophy higher than herself and her own.

The grand question, therefore, is—does apperception, such as Cousin describes it, and such as he conceives it to be, really exist in human nature? Now, to me the answer to this appears to be, that it does exist as he describes it, but not as he conceives it. I cannot help thinking that every person of any enthusiasm or poetry of nature must be conscious of having often experienced in certain most blissful moments of existence, such dreamy visits of thought, such conceptions, or rather aspirations of reality, as our author describes so eloquently. (Lec. vi.) Nor is it less certain that both in consciousness and in memory they make their apparition invested with a certain charm of sacredness and heavenly stillness, as if they were indeed breathings of eternity, vistas into a higher sphere than that of ordinary intuition. This, I think, is truly a psychological phenomenon, a fact truly belonging to the natural history of the human mind. But whether this phenomenon be really what Cousin holds it to be, *i. e.*, a true inspiration, nay, insight within the very sphere of the Godhead, and an organon of infallible discovery, is quite another question. And how is this question to be solved? It can only be, either from the character or the contents, the operation or the products, of the phenomenon. Now, looking to the character of the phenomenon, listening to the way in which the subject of it feels affected, there is the appearance of so much ground for Cousin's view, that it may perhaps be fairly concluded that these singular points in our intellectual life were originally designed to be what Cousin holds that they actually are; and that to humanity when in its typical unfallen or normal state, to the soul when sinless, pure, and unclouded, and walking with God, it belongs constitutionally to drink the water of divine truth while yet welling at the very fountain-head, and so to have access to inspiration in her own right, as God's own child. But as to actual man, the ignorant sinful creature that

he is, and must be admitted by all of us to be, whatever our ethnological views, we are obliged to conclude, by evidence which is far too ample, that no such fact as that of a constitutional inspiration, or inspiration by right of humanity, no such thing as an infallible intuition of Divine things, is possible to the human mind. Not that we would venture to make good this affirmation, by showing the defects of those views which our author rests upon apperception. Victor Cousin is an eminently enlightened man, every way too formidable to be encountered by us; still, let us not scruple to ask, whether it is not rather by way of moral reclamation than by scientific determination, that the personality, the liberty, and the free power of God, as well as His intelligence, appear in our author's writings? But let us not venture on a criticism to which we are not equal. Besides, it is at any rate better to appeal to experience. Now this we can do; for the phenomenon which Cousin builds so much upon, has not been built upon by Schelling, or by Cousin alone, or the ancient or modern philosophers of Europe alone. Apperception is the favourite organon of discovery of the sages of India, time immemorial; and the institutes and the discipline by which this state may be reached, form the principal theme of the sacred books, and the pursuit of the holy men of the East. There is, therefore, an ample field for the application of the inductive logic, and for ascertaining, by the only infallible method of verification, the true character of apperception, or at least of its discoveries. What then is the fact? Why, men of ignorance but of exalted genius have from time to time laid claim to this state, and have uttered their oracles of wisdom from out of it, and the multitude, conscious of a trace of it in themselves, and admiring the discipline of self-denial and meditation (*Thana*), by which they see their sages aiming at its more full development, have freely granted to these sages the inspiration, or rather perspection, which they claimed and no doubt believed themselves to possess. But what, after all, have been the products of this state, in which, to use an illustration of Goutama Budhu—"the holy man chips the shell of ignorance"? Certainly not the same as in the enlightened mind of Cousin; nay, not consistent with each other; nay, always conflicting, and often ridiculous; in a word, no better than food merely for a brood of sects, with truth far in the distance away from them all. To

say the very best of apperception, therefore, which the observation of its products as manifested in the great world will permit, it is but an empty form or shadow, the matter and substance wanting, and which, though breathing the air of a true inspiration, yet deriving its contents from other sources than the pure light of heaven—sources often most obviously terrene. Yet, because of its form, its seemingly sacred self-sanction, when operating on that deep-felt “apprehension,” if not “apperception” of God, which common sense affirms along with Cousin, to be one of the characteristics of humanity, we agree with him in regarding it as the origin of those prophecies, pontificates, and modes of worship, of which the world is full. We also agree with him that the doctrine of apperception here given, explains these prophecies, priesthoods, and worships, and that far better than his view. For, according to his view, they are all venerable, all expressions of the same divine truths, under a variety of symbols, all forms of true religion. According to the view here advanced, they cannot be expected to be better than simulations of divine truth, apt to produce not a legitimate symbolism, but haggard mockeries of true religion, imploring loudly the mercy of God to favour the world with a true revelation, and a worship in spirit and in truth. Now here again another possibility of verification offers itself. An appeal may here again be made to the great world. The question may be asked, Do the religions of the world, as actually professed and practised by the millions of the human family, verify the view of apperception given by Cousin, or that given here? And this question let any one who has come much into contact with heathenism answer. Moreover another mode of verification offers itself, which, though not so direct nor so indisputably legitimate, is not without its value; viz., whether does the view of apperception, as given by Cousin or that here given, accord best with a true philanthropy?—that is, a love to man which is willing to labour for his advancement in well-being, and not merely to find ground of fraternisation in the midst of extreme spiritual differences, (for which mere specific identity ought to be sufficient). According to the view here given, no moral enterprise can be higher than to labour in every way which friendship, based on the ground of a common humanity, will admit, to spread the knowledge of the true revelation. According to the Cousinian view, the true

revelation is universally spread already—a truly serious mistake if it be one at all. But this by the way here.

Our only question here is, whether apperception be an organon of peculiar discovery—or, to put the question more generally, whether there be another organon of discovery distinct from common sense, so as to give rise to another philosophy than that of common sense. Now if what has here been said be found true, there is no such organon. Apperception is, after all, a mental frame only, deceptively intuitive—at least, in so far as it is different from reason or common sense, commonly so called. Would, then, that this great man would only grant that his apperception is after all only a sublimate of common sense, very difficultly and very questionably raised, and in reality merely the same, only amid the intoxicating vapours in the top of the alembic. Cousin would then re-enter the goodly company, “facile princeps,” of the philosophers of common sense.

Meantime let us glorify ourselves with his benignant criticism. “Liberal politics,” says he (*Ecole Ecossaise*, *Introd.*), “the love of virtue, inexorable good sense, the true method of philosophy, such are the general characters of the Scottish School; it is on these titles that I have accepted it, and that I present it with confidence to the youth of my country. \* \* \* Common sense, it is true, is not the limit of science permitted to man, but it is the starting post, and it ought always to remain as the measure of it. It inspires a just distrust of the opinions of individuals, and an enlightened respect for the beliefs of the human race. Now, of all the beliefs of the human race there is not one that is more firmly asserted and more constant than the distinction between liberty and necessity, good and evil, just and unjust, virtue and vice, selfishness and self-sacrifice, merit and demerit; there is no belief more universal than faith in a Divine Providence, which all religions adore and all great philosophies proclaim in concert. Let us put ourselves, then, willingly for sometime to the school of common sense, and let us not be disconcerted at the intercourse which we are going to establish with Scotland, if we bring back from it a taste more enlightened and more sure for reason, for virtue, for liberty, for all that is beautiful and all that is good.”

Now, not under the influence of such generous sentiments, though every Scotchman might well be proud of them, but

simply from the state of the case, it must surely be admitted that this great man is altogether in the right when he maintains that common sense is not the limit of science which man may reach. And truly there is a call to go onwards if it be possible. The original standing-place of the Scottish school was good for the time in which it was taken, but it cannot be good for ever. In fact, it is no longer good. Even though the principles of common sense had no claims to a systematic discussion on their own account, or defied it, yet after the labours of Kant and his more renowned successors, such a discussion has become necessary, were it only to save the reputation of the principles of common sense; for while these principles claim to give universal truths, objective views which, so far as they go, are the same for the same things to all orders of intelligences which look upon these things from the same point of view, the Kantian doctrine maintains that they give views which are not truly objective at all, views which are good in reference to our minds only, which are in fact for us and ours only; and that in reference to the same things as they may appear to other orders of intelligences, or as they may be in themselves, there is nothing for man but the most profound ignorance. Now, such results are no doubt, as has been already said, wholly at variance with common sense, but it will not do for the man of science who comes after Kant, merely to fall back on the authority of common sense, as Reid did in reference to Hume, Berkeley, and his antagonists generally. It is not satisfactory, in a scientific point of view, to repudiate the Kantian doctrine at once, simply because it contradicts our authority. For the popular mind no doubt this happily is, and we hope ever will be, sufficient; but the man of science ought to be able to do something more, if possible. Otherwise, common sense may find herself in a dilemma; for certainly she never can refuse to grant, come thereafter what may, that whatever has been proved is to be believed; and though it be ever true that no demonstration can impart to any conclusion a stronger evidence or a higher degree of belief-worthiness than that which every principle of common sense possesses in its own right, and in virtue of its own self-evidencing power, still such conflict of authorities is always in the highest degree undesirable.

Now it is a very possible thing that science may, upon the whole, give a vote that Kant has proved that our views of

things depend, at all events immediately or in the first instance, on the form or make of our understandings. One who adheres to the philosophy of common sense may come away from the perusal of the works of Kant without ability any more to escape from the conviction that it is even so; while yet common sense moves within him, and insists upon the supremacy there, as indeed it did in the breast of the philosopher of Konigsberg himself, and in Hume himself, not a whit less than in Dr Reid, while he set agoing both Kant and Reid equally to oppose him and each other. What then is to be done? Why, Kant having first entered upon the problem in a manner strictly scientific, to him must be awarded the honour of determining the form of the science when treated historically, even though our object should be to disprove his conclusions; and therefore I think that the problem in the science of common sense which now demands a solution, supposing the subject to be treated critically, is this—postulating that the views of the understanding are in the first instance determined by its own make, (1.) to determine the conditions on which the soul shall give the reality of things as they exist notwithstanding, as common sense affirms that she does, and (2.) to verify the hypothesis thus obtained by an appeal to the whole sphere of reality accessible to us.

That some such hypotheses are possible we have already seen, for the philosophy of Cousin is such an one; and to these many others of less note might be added from among those of Kant's followers who have pursued the train of thought which he adopts in his Practical Reason. Yet still there is not one of them that realises the conception of a science of common sense, or pedestal expressly formed for the philosophy of common sense to stand upon. The science of common sense is still a desideratum. But here let us add that though the historical or critical form, as supposed above, have many advantages, yet it has also many disadvantages, especially where the proposed discussion of a science is designed for popular use; for it supposes the student to be up to the state of the question, and, therefore, to have mastered the views of all eminent authors upon it. There is another mode of treating the subject which is far better, provided only the subject be so well defined and self-contained as to admit of being treated in such a way; and that is to follow the practice of the astronomers who divide the discussion of their science into

two parts, viz., descriptive astronomy and physical or theoretical astronomy : *the former* consisting in a description of all the phenomena, simply as they present themselves in nature to an intelligent observer, free from the slightest trace of a disposition to account for any one of them, or anything that would admit a sophistication of them by hypotheses, which very possibly may be no part of the economy of nature at all ; *the latter* consisting in a presentation, arrangement, and discussion of them in relation to the dynamical principles which account for them, and of which they are illustrations or verifications. Let it not be said that the descriptive part must necessarily be an unscientific production, destitute of all order. On the contrary, if well executed it will give a detail of the phenomena as orderly as the faculties of the human mind, and, moreover, as unchangeable as humanity itself ; so that once well done it is done for ever, and forms a storehouse from which all theorists may draw the facts which they are to explain, wherever their dwelling-place or whatever age they live in. It will in fact be a fair copy of the celestial phenomena in their relations to humanity, or the common sense of mankind. Now, it were well if this practice of the astronomers were universally insisted upon ; but it is on the contrary, in almost all the sciences giving way. In almost all the sciences the very first fact, perhaps, to which the learner is introduced is already sophisticated by hypotheses. This is particularly the case in chemistry. Every experiment now is but a member in a series, all based on some one or other of many hypotheses. It begins also to be the case in anatomy, which is now treated on the strength of certain physiological conceptions, which are far from having been demonstrated to be certainly true. It may be also found to prevail in the lesser sciences ; not without certain admirable reclamations, however, in favour of what have been called natural history methods.

At all events this plan should be insisted upon in the development of the science of common sense. This science ought to consist of two parts, descriptive psychology and theoretical psychology, or psychology proper : *the former* consisting of a concise but elegant description of mental phenomena, simply as they manifest themselves in society, and in the breast of the individual ; and concerning which, therefore, if it were once accurately done, there would be no room for change or



further speculation ; *the latter* giving the principles and laws of which these phenomena are the developments, and thus giving them in the order of their genesis and mutual relations and functions.

Nor has anything been yet done to render the construction of the science, according to this conception of it, impossible. On the contrary, its actual state is very much what one could wish in order to realise such an idea. Dr Reid's labours were all strictly in descriptive psychology, as were also those of Professor Stewart, with some feeble attempts of another kind. The invaluable and profound labours of Sir W. Hamilton have also been to no small extent in illustration. What is wanted, therefore, in order to the completion of this part of the work, is rather an enlightened digest than anything more original. And certainly there are men using the English language who are capable of accomplishing it, at once scientifically and popularly, which last is highly desirable. Something may also be done even by persons less gifted. And something has been attempted in the volume now brought to a close, though not without too much of that defect and confusion of thought which almost invariably overcome the European mind when existing under a vertical sun, which was the author's position when composing it. He trusts for his excuse to his brevity in every case, when it fell to him to say what he knew had been said in English before.

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   move *laughter*, which is an or-  
   ganic emotion designed to destroy  
   the rhythm of attention when  
   an object eminently not belief-  
   worthy is presented for belief ; as,  
   for instance, a word which sug-  
   gests two ideals that are incon-  
   gruous or incompatible with each  
   other (a pun). It is not merely  
   the counterpart of *the emotion of*  
   *the sublime*, as commonly sup-  
   posed, but of *earnestness* or the  
   emotion of the belief-worthy, and  
   is of great intellectual and moral  
   interest and importance. But at  
   the date (1845-49) when this  
   treatise was composed the author  
   did not understand the theory of  
   laughter, and thus omitted it.

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